Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Healey, convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving children, completed his prison sentences, but remains committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person. He was initially committed in 1966, under the law then in effect, and was recommitted after he reoffended sexually while on a gradual release program. He unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge under G.L. c. 123A, 9, several times. In 2005, a jury determined that he remained sexually dangerous. Healy filed a petition in the county court, G.L. c. 211, 3, alleging that his conditions of confinement are governed by the 1958 version of the sexually dangerous person law; that he is entitled to be evaluated by psychiatrists rather than psychologists; that he is entitled to hearings before the parole board; that his right to a speedy trial has been abridged; and that he is entitled to proceed jury-waived. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed denial of the petition. Healy was required to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of remedies alternative to G.L. c. 211, 3, and failed to do so. He could have appealed from dismissal of his habeas corpus petition or filed a civil action against the Commissioner of Correction to challenge the terms of his commitment. View "Healey v. Comm'r of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant, charged with deriving support from prostitution, was tried before a jury that indicated that they were unable to reach a verdict. The judge declared a mistrial. Prior to retrial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments against him on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge (the same judge as at his first trial) denied that motion, finding that the prior declaration of mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that defendant may be retried. View "Ray v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Following internal upheaval in a gang, five members and a nonmember associate executed a sixth member. Two other members testified under cooperation agreements. Davenport, the nonmember who killed the victim, testified that he acted under duress. Following joint trial of four defendants, the jury found all guilty of first degree murder and of other crimes. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting Davenport’s claim that he was entitled to an instruction on duress as a defense to murder. The court also rejected arguments by other defendants that their defenses were mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable with Davenport's duress defense, so that their trials should have been severed, and that the Commonwealth was improperly allowed to challenge a juror who failed to make complete disclosure of his criminal record (the prosecutor discovered the omission after declaring his satisfaction with the juror but before the jury were sworn). The judge properly denied a motion for recusal that was based on statements made during a plea colloquy; properly admitted a statement of another defendant; properly denied a hearing to challenge reliability and admissibility of expert opinion testimony on bloodstain pattern analysis; and properly denied a required finding of not guilty on a charge of aggravated rape. View "Commonwealth v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child and an unrelated unarmed burglary, and was sentenced to eight to 15 years. He had been the live-in boyfriend of the victim's mother for many years. When the victim was approximately seven years old, he began fondling her chest, and when she was about 10 years old he raped her once or twice each week. The charged rapes occurred when the victim was age 12 to 14. A jury found defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, G.L. c. 123A, 1, and he was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for an indeterminate period of from one day to life. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed for a new trial, based on the court: allowing evidence of defendant’s refusal to participate in sex offender treatment programs; admitting evidence of rumors that he had sexually assaulted another inmate; and instructing the jury regarding mental abnormality and the likelihood of engaging in sexual offenses. The prosecutor's closing argument, regarding defendant's sexual frustration from time in prison, was improper. The court properly excused a prospective juror for cause who expressed his belief that no medical expert could conclusively demonstrate whether defendant is going to commit another sexual offense. View "Commonwealth v. Hunt" on Justia Law

More than a year after his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, defendant, moved for postverdict inquiry of the jurors. The trial judge had recused himself and a different judge granted the motion. After holding evidentiary hearings, the judge allowed the motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury had been exposed to an extraneous influence during deliberations and the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the incident did not prejudice the defendant. The Appeals Court vacated the order for a new trial and remanded the case for further inquiry into the bases for the request for a postverdict inquiry of the jurors and, in particular, the role of defendant and his friend in contacting a juror. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed that remand for further inquiry is appropriate and clarified the procedure for conducting postverdict hearings where, although a defendant claims that the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, there is also evidence that the defendant or someone acting on the defendant's behalf may have been involved. View "Commonwealth v. Bresnahan" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine, G.L. c. 94C, 32E (b ) (1), and conspiracy to violate the drug laws, G.L. c. 94C, 40. He filed an affidavit of indigency, G.L. c. 261, 27B, was appointed counsel, and tendered pleas of not guilty. During proceedings on a motion to suppress, the judge questioned the defendant's indigency status, took evidence, and entered an order concluding that the defendant was not indigent because he was not in custody and had "available funds," under S.J.C. Rule 3:10, 1(b), from his girlfriend and his mother. The judge struck the appearance of counsel in the case before her and in the probation revocation proceeding. The Massachusetts Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, rejecting an argument that consideration of the available funds of his girlfriend and his mother infringed on his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. View "Commonwealth v. Fico" on Justia Law

The trial judge found that defendant was indigent but able to contribute $40,000 to his defense against indictments charging him with the murders of his wife, mother-in-law, and children (S.J.C. Rule 3:10, (1)(g)). In setting the amount of the required contribution, the judge considered assets that defendant had reported to the probation department, including bank accounts, a college fund, and an individual retirement account. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Some of the assets are currently unavailable to defendant under the "slayer statute," G.L. c. 265, 46 because those assets were held jointly with his deceased wife or in trust for the deceased children. An IRA is ordinarily to be considered a liquid asset available to a defendant and may properly be included in the assessment of his ability to pay for his representation, at least up to the net amount available to him after accounting for any early withdrawal penalties and taxes. View "Commonwealth v. Mortimer" on Justia Law

Following indictment on 93 counts of failure to pay wages timely, (G.L. c. 149, 148), defendant filed an affidavit of indigency and sought appointment of counsel at public expense (G.L. c. 211D, 2 1/2 (a )). After reviewing financial information, which showed that defendant and her husband together had an annual income of approximately $60,000 and owned three properties, the probation department recommended the defendant be found not indigent. The trial judge held three hearings at which defendant appeared without counsel and argued that she had little to no discretionary income and that two of the properties were subject to mortgages and tax liens, hindering their liquidity. She did not present evidence, but relied on oral statements and records discovered by the probation department. Reasoning that the defendant has the burden of proof of her indigency, the judge found the defendant not indigent. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. A criminal defendant who seeks to have counsel appointed at public expense bears the burden of proving indigency by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Porter." on Justia Law

Before 1997, the authority operated the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Boston extension of the turnpike, and the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels, crossing under Boston Harbor to connect downtown o the East Boston section. In 1997, while the massive "Big Dig" project was underway, the Legislature placed within authority stewardship the integrated system of roadways, bridges, tunnels, and other facilities known as the MHS, which included the Boston extension and the tunnels it had operated before, as well as the central artery, the central artery north area, and the Ted Williams Tunnel. G.L. c. 81A, 3. The authority was authorized to charge tolls "for transit over or through the [MHS] or any part thereof," and to adjust tolls so that, when supplemented by other revenues, they pay all the expenses of the MHS. The authority required drivers traveling through the Sumner and Williams Tunnels, and the Weston and Allston-Brighton interchanges of the Boston extension, to pay a toll, but did not charge a toll to drivers traveling through the Callahan Tunnel, the central artery, or the CANA. Plaintiffs claimed that tolls were unconstitutional to the extent they were spent on the nontolled portions of the MHS. The trial court dismissed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. MA Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

Defendant, a high school student, was charged with breaking and entering the home of a friend (seeking his girlfiend) with intent to commit a misdemeanor, G.L. c. 266, 16A, and assault, G.L. c. 265, 13A. A jury trial began in 2005. During a sidebar, after the Commonwealth's final witness had testified, the judge warned defense counsel that he had not "heard anything why I wouldn't, based on these circumstances ... put [the defendant] in jail." The judge added, "[T]he facts are kind of egregious and, I don't know why he wasn't charged with house invasion." Almost immediately, defendant entered a plea of guilty to both charges. The defendant unsuccessfully moved, before the same judge, to vacate his pleas and obtain a new trial. A different judge reversed. The defendant then sought dismissal on double jeopardy grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that retrial is appropriate. The record does not support the inference that the judge acted to prejudice the defendant or out of concern that the defendant would be acquitted. Even though the girlfriend refused to testify, there is no doubt that the defendant properly could have been convicted of assault and on the breaking and entering charge. View "Parreira v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law