Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a hearing, a judge of the district court issued a harassment prevention order, under G.L.c. 258E, that directed Robert O'Brien not to, inter alia, abuse or harass Alan Borowski. O'Brien filed a petition to vacate and dismiss the order under G.L.c. 211, section 3, before a single justice of the court, who reserved and reported the case for decision by the full court. O'Brien argued that c. 258E was unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to him because the conduct complained of was protected speech. The court concluded that c. 258E was not unconstitutionally overbroad under the court's interpretation of the statue because it limited the scope of prohibited speech to constitutionally unprotected "true threats" and "fighting words." Because the court vacated the now-expired harassment prevention order on other grounds, the court did not reach the question whether the application of the statute was unconstitutional. View "O'Brien v. Borowski" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder based on a predicate felony of aggravated rape, as well as aggravated rape. The court held that the judge did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the aggravated assault indictment, as there was sufficient evidence from which the grand jury could have inferred the victim did not consent to intercourse with defendant; the evidence of lack of consent, though circumstantial, was very powerful, and supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with defendant; certain evidence of prior bad acts was admissible; and the prosecutor's statements did not make a difference in the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Cheremond" on Justia Law

This case concerned the way by which the costs of financing the school district were apportioned among the city of New Bedford, the town of Dartmouth, and the town of Fairhaven, which were municipalities comprising the school district. Dartmouth commenced an action in the superior court against defendants challenging the funding obligations imposed on the member municipalities by the Education Reform Act of 1993, G.L.c. 70, section 6. Fairhaven filed a cross claim asserting that the funding obligations imposed by the Act were a disproportionate tax on property and income in violation of the state constitution. The court held that the complaint filed by Dartmouth and cross claim filed by Fairhaven were properly dismissed because Dartmouth and Fairhaven failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. View "Town of Dartmouth v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Tech. High Sch. Dist. & others" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murdering his wife and two daughters on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal, defendant argued that the judge erred in allowed the Commonwealth to present evidence of defendant's demeanor, in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty, and in denying his motion for a mistrial because an unsigned note he had handwritten in Spanish was erroneously sent to the jury room. Defendant also asked that the court exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section E, to reduce the verdicts to murder in the second degree. The court held that, because there was no merit to defendant's claims of error and the court discerned no reason to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, the convictions were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Mejia" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine and of a drug offense in a school zone. The Appeals Court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. King, affirmed defendant's convictions, holding that a field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of the certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. King, a case that raised the same issue and involved the same prosecutor and the same detective as were involved in this case. Because the court concluded, as it did in King, that in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed. View "Commonwealth v. Billings" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful distribution of cocaine. The Appeals court affirmed his conviction, holding that the field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of a certificate of drug analysis harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court granted defendant's application for further appellate review and paired this case for argument with Commonwealth v. Billings. Because the court concluded that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was not so overwhelming as to nullify the effect of the erroneously admitted certificate, the judgment was reversed. View "Commonwealth v. King" on Justia Law

While being held for custodial interrogation, and without having first waived the Miranda rights of which he had been advised, defendant shook his head from side to side in response to the question, "So you don't want to speak?" At issue was whether defendant, by his conduct, had invoked the right to remain silent guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of rights and, if so, whether the police sufficiently honored that right. The court concluded that, under both the Fifth Amendment and art. 12, the right to remain silent was invoked but was not "scrupulously honored" and that suppression of the subsequent incriminating statements was accordingly warranted. In so concluding, the court held that, in the prewaiver context, art. 12 did not require a suspect to invoke his right to remain silent with the utmost clarity, as required under Federal law. View "Commonwealth v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a Class B substance with intent to distribute and possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute and eventually entered into a plea agreement. At issue was whether a judge had the authority under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29(a), to reduce a sentence after defendant and the Commonwealth had entered into a plea in which the Commonwealth agreed not to seek indictments against defendant on the pending charges, defendant had agreed to plead guilty to the charges and join the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation, and the judge had imposed the recommended sentence. The court concluded that where, as here, a judge acted on his own timely motion to revise or revoke a sentence, the judge had the authority to reduce a sentence where it appeared that justice may not have been done regardless whether a plea agreement included an agreed sentence recommendation. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a criminal complaint with a single count of armed robbery and eventually plead guilty in the District Court to a reduced charge. At issue was whether the Commonwealth had the authority to require a judge to vacate a defendant's guilty plea where the Commonwealth made a charge concession as part of the plea agreement and the judge imposed a sentence less severe than the agreed sentence recommendation. The court concluded that the Commonwealth did not have this authority under Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511, or G.L.c. 278, section 18. The court further concluded that if the guilty plea were to be vacated at the prosecution's request and over the objection of the defense, double jeopardy would bar further prosecution on that charge. View "Commonwealth v. Dean-Ganek" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an appeal from a decision of the board approving a minor modification to the site assignment for an existing landfill and related processing facility pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, section 14. At issue was plaintiff's standing to seek judicial review in the Superior Court of the board's decision. The court concluded that on the record before it, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision in the Superior Court as persons "aggrieved" and, nevertheless, plaintiffs' substantive challenges to the decision lacked merit. View "Board of Health of Sturbridge & others v. Board of Health of Southbridge & another. " on Justia Law