Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of malicious burning of personal property, damage to property for the purpose of intimidation, and a civil rights violation where the convictions stemmed from defendant setting his homosexual neighbor's boat on fire. At issue was whether the statements that defendant made "off the record" during his interview with a state trooper were voluntary. The court held that the fact that the trooper's simple acquiescence to defendant's request that certain of his comments be "off the record" was not so manipulative or coercive that it deprived defendant of his ability to make a free and rational choice about whether to make such comments in the first instance. The court also held that this fact, taken together with all of the other circumstances surrounding the interview, which the court had already determined did not suggest coerciveness, supported the conclusion that defendant's statements were not involuntary. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's motion to suppress these statements were properly denied. View "Commonwealth v. Tremblay" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to a life term in State prison. On appeal, defendant contended that the judge erred by failing effectively to instruct the jury that only an intent to kill can support a conviction of premeditated murder in the first degree; allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony from cooperating witnesses that they were testifying "truthfully" pursuant to their cooperation agreement; allowing a cooperating witness to testify that members of the Latin Kings gang killed cooperating witnesses in prison; and in refusing to discharge a juror who reported being followed by a member of defendant's family. Defendant also raised other issues on appeal. The court concluded that the conviction in the first degree was supported by ample evidence and found no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that he should be granted a new trial because the trial judge erred by asking the members of the jury venire to make "mental note[s]" rather than raise their hands in response to any affirmative answer to the questions asked by the judge during jury selection; by allowing a witness to testify to defendant's silence after she accused him of the killing; by preventing defendant from admitting into evidence that the Commonwealth's key percipient witness had told another witness that he had not seen anything; in instructing the jury regarding transferred intent; and in refusing to ask the jury for clarification of their finding as to murder in the first degree, where they did not separately indicate that they based their verdict on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The court concluded as to each of these grounds that the judge either did not err or that his error did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and also concluded that there was no basis to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce defendant's murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial.

This case was brought pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, section 14, and G.L.c. 231A, where the court was asked to decide whether the the imposition of $275 in filing fees to obtain judicial review of a final decision of a municipal parking clerk regarding a parking citation offended the Massachusetts Constitution. Plaintiffs each appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court that the statutory scheme that imposed such fees for review of a municipal parking clerk's adjudication of the citation, following an in-person administrative hearings, was consonant with the principles of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers. The court held that the statutory scheme did not violate substantive or procedural due process; did not violate the equal protection clause; and afforded the opportunity for judicial review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case stemmed from an encounter between police and several residents, and their guests, in front of a home, which erupted into an altercation and the subsequent arrest of four men on a number of charges. Defendant and his brother (defendants) were convicted of disturbing the peace and defendant was also convicted of two counts of assault and battery on a police officer. At issue was the trial court's erroneous exclusion of certain statements made by the police officers. The court held that the exclusion of the statements did not rise to the level of constitutional error and was properly reviewed under the prejudicial error standard. In the court's review, the error was prejudicial and therefore, the court reversed defendants' convictions.

Defendant was convicted of attempted kidnapping of an eleven-year-old boy when he drove up to the boy, who was walking along the street, and told him to get in his car. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty because there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that his statement to police was improperly admitted in evidence. The court held that there was no evidence that defendant did anything but drive away after the boy refused to get into the vehicle and therefore, the court held that the trial judge erred in denying the motion for a required finding of not guilty. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and set aside the finding.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and carrying a firearm without a license. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that, in several respects, he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Defendant also challenged his firearm conviction under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments and argued that the court should exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for a license to carry a firearm, defendant could not challenge this conviction. The court also held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel as it related to evidence of defendant's gang affiliation, failure to introduce material exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument, and jury instructions. The court also held that there was no basis of relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of the victim when he punched him at a bowling alley. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defense where he instructed the jury solely on whether the force that was used was greater than necessary in all circumstances. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and held that the error in the jury instruction on self-defense did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where defendant was not prejudiced by the incomplete instruction and where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant used unreasonable force in the circumstances.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial in which he sought to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2005, on the ground that he was deprived of his right of effective assistance of counsel, as that right had recently been explicated in Padilla v. Kentucky. At issue was whether Padilla applied retroactively to defendant's collateral challenge to his convictions and, if so, whether he had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. The court held that Padilla did apply retroactively on collateral review of guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The court also held that defendant had made an insufficient showing that had he been properly informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with several offenses based on events that transpired after defendant and a companion pushed their way into an apartment where a dinner party was in progress. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to commit a felony. The court held that there was insufficient evidence where the inference that defendant intended to commit the felony of assault and battery by mean of a dangerous weapon or knew that his companion possessed a knife when they forced their way into the apartment could be plausible but could not bear the weight of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for entry of judgment of conviction on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and for sentencing pursuant to that offense.