Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant committed a breach of a settlement agreement with the town by failing to remove mulch from property owned by Plaintiff. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, contending that the civil claim was intended to retaliate, deter, and punish Defendant solely for engaging in the constitutionally protected activity of petitioning the town. The motion was denied. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that Defendant failed to meet its required threshold showing that Plaintiff's claim of breach of the settlement agreement was based on Defendant's exercise of its right to petition. View "Marabello v. Boston Bank Corp." on Justia Law

An electrician was killed by electrocution while attempting to repair an electrical transformer at the Logan Airport Hilton Hotel (Hilton). Plaintiff, as administratrix of the electrician's estate, filed suit against, inter alia, Hilton, the architect who designed the hotel (Cambridge Seven), the consultant Cambridge Seven retained to provide electrical engineering services (Costentini), and the construction subcontractor for electrical services (Broadway), alleging negligence, gross negligence, and breach of warranty. Hilton and Broadway filed cross claims against Cambridge Seven and Cosentini for indemnification and contribution. The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment brought by Cambridge Seven and Cosentini as to the complaint and cross claims and ordered final judgment. Hilton and Broadway appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on behalf of Cambridge Seven and Cosentini as to the cross claims brought by Hilton and Broadway for indemnification; but (2) reversed as to the cross claims for contribution. Remanded. View "LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Joint Venture" on Justia Law

In 2004-2005, Costa & Son Construction performed site work for the general contractor (Braitt) on such a project in Bridgewater. After Braitt terminated the relationship Costa sued, alleging breach of contract and violations of G.L. c. 93A. Costa sought to recover damages under a payment bond obtained by Brait from Arch Insurance, G.L. c. 149, 29. Brait asserted similar counterclaims against Costa. Arch argued that Costa had relinquished any right to claim against the bond pursuant to a provision of his subcontract with Brait. The trial court granted Brait and Arch directed verdict with respect to claims under the bond. A jury returned a verdict for Costa, against Brait. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated the directed verdict. A subcontractor on a public construction project for which a payment bond has been obtained by the general contractor pursuant to G.L. c. 149, 29, may not by private agreement forgo its right to pursue payment under the bond. The court also vacated the portion of the amended judgment granting consequential damages to Costa; consequential damages were precluded by the contract. View "Costa v. Brait Builders Corp." on Justia Law

In 2000 Go-Best wired $5 million to an account entitled "Morris M. Goldings client account" at Citizens Bank, based on representations made by Morris M. Goldings, who was then a Massachusetts attorney. Goldings later admitted that the representations were false and that he had used the money to pay other debts. Go-Best filed suit against Citizens Bank, bringing claims of misrepresentation, conversion, aiding and abetting a fraud, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting a conversion, and negligence. Citizens Bank had no knowledge of Goldings's scheme to defraud Go-Best but failed to notify the Board of Bar Overseers of dishonored checks issued on the client account more than six months before Go-Best wired funds into that account. The trial court dismissed, but a divided Appeals Court reversed in part, vacating dismissal of claims of negligence and of aiding and abetting. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reinstated dismissal. Without actual knowledge, the bank's duty to notify the board of dishonored checks from trust accounts arose only from its contractual duty, not from any duty in tort, so the bank could not be liable to Go-Best for any negligence in fulfilling that duty. View "Go-Best Assets Ltd. v. Citizens Bank of MA" on Justia Law

The Regional School District (Mahar), entered into a price watch agreement with Northeast Energy Partners, a licensed broker of energy services based in Connecticut, pursuant to which Northeast would negotiate and secure contracts for the provision of Mahar's electricity from energy suppliers. Mahar did not enter into the agreement to obtain Northeast's services pursuant to the competitive bidding procedures contained in G.L. c. 30B. When Mahar questioned the validity of the agreement, Northeast sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement is valid and enforceable because, under G.L. c. 30B, 1 (b ) (33), the agreement is exempt from the competitive solicitation and bidding procedures set forth in G.L. c. 30B. The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in favor of Northeast, holding that a contract between a school district and an energy broker for procurement of contracts for electricity is exempt from the requirements of G.L. [c.] 30B as a contract for 'energy or energy related services' pursuant to G.L. c. 30B, 1 (b ) (33). View "NE Energy Partners, LLC v. Mahar Reg'l Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint against Safety, which alleged that Safety improperly denied coverage under her homeowner's insurance policy for damage to her house. The court concluded that plaintiff satisfied her initial burden of proving that her claimed loss fell within the coverage of her homeowner's insurance policy. Safety then satisfied its burden of showing that the exclusion for damage caused directly or indirectly by surface water was applicable to plaintiff's claim. In light of the anticoncurrent cause provision in the exclusions section of plaintiff's policy, where the excluded peril was a direct or indirect cause of the damage to plaintiff's home, Safety was not obligated to provide insurance coverage "regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss." Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of Safety's motion for summary judgment. View "Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident, entered into an executive employment contract with defendant. A forum selection clause dictated that all disputes arising out of the contract or the employment relationship were to be resolved in courts situated in Erie County, New York, defendant's principal place of business. The court concluded that a forum selection clause operated as a special contract only when three conditions were met: the employer's claim was covered by the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, sections 148, 150; the court of the forum state, applying its choice-of-law principles, would choose a law other than that of Massachusetts to govern the dispute; and application of the foreign law would deprive the employee of a substantive right guaranteed by the Wage Act. Under modern choice-of-law doctrines, these conditions rarely coincided. On the facts alleged in the case, a New York court, applying New York's choice-of-law doctrine, would certainly apply the Wage Act to this dispute. Therefore, the court held that because enforcement of the forum selection clause would not deprive plaintiff of the protections of the Wage Act, dismissal of the action was affirmed. View "Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., & another." on Justia Law

This case concerned a family dispute over ownership of what had been the family home in Woburn. At issue was whether a party could establish that she lacked the capacity to contract, thus making the contract voidable by her, in the absence of evidence that she suffered from a medically diagnosed, long-standing mental illness or defect. The court concluded that its evolving standard of contractual incapacity did not in all cases require proof that a party's claimed mental illness or defect was of some significant duration or that it was permanent, progressive, or degenerative; but, without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence would not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to support a determination of incapacity where Susan, among other things, understood at the time that she was participating in a mediation to discuss settlement of the lawsuit, was aware that the subject of the mediation was to resolve the dispute regarding the family home, participated in the mediation, and listened to the arguments of counsel. Therefore, the court vacated the motion judge's order and remanded for entry of an order enforcing the settlement agreement. View "Sparrow v. Demonico & another" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought an action against defendant, seeking a refund of two cruise tickets they purchased and cancelled, and damages under G.L.c. 93A for unfair and deceptive trade practices. The court concluded that the evidence at trial plainly established that defendant violated the Attorney General's travel service regulations in two respects: fist, it failed to disclose the refund policy; and second, having violated the disclosure statement, it failed to refund the payments made by a cancelling customer within thirty days. These violations qualified as unfair or deceptive acts, and they caused plaintiffs a loss: the lack of a prompt refund of the ticket price. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' demand letter satisfied the requirements of G.L.c. 93A, section 9(3). The purposes of the demand letter were sufficiently fulfilled where it constituted fair notice of the claim and enabled defendant to make a reasonable tender of settlement. Accordingly, the judgment for defendant on plaintiffs' claims was reversed and the case remanded for the entry of judgment for plaintiffs and for determination of their damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs. View "Casavant & another v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer, claiming that his failure to pay her a referral fee was a breach of contract and violated the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, sections 148, 150. At issue was whether a 2008 amendment to the enforcement section of the Wage Act, providing for a mandatory award of treble damages to a prevailing employee, should be applied in an action brought by an employee against her employer for violation of the Wage Act before the amendment's effective date. The court held that the amendment should be read to apply only prospectively, to claims arising on or after the amendment's effective date of July 12, 2008. Therefore, because the Superior Court judge applied the amendment retrospectively, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rosnov v. Molloy" on Justia Law