Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Contracts
McInnes v. LPL Fin., LLC
Karl McGhee, a financial advisor at LPL Financial, acted as financial planner for Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint against McGhee and LPL, asserting claims for, inter alia, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Defendants moved for an order compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration due to an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that none of Plaintiff's claims could be compelled to arbitration because claimants under chapter 93A, section 9 are not required to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) claims alleging an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of chapter 93A, section 9 must be referred to arbitration where the contract involves interstate commerce and the agreement is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); and (2) because Plaintiff and Defendants in this case entered into a valid contract whereby they agreed to settle all controversies related to Plaintiff's financial account by arbitration, and because the arbitration agreement was governed by the FAA, Defendants as a matter of law were entitled under the FAA to a stay of judicial proceedings and an order compelling arbitration. Remanded. View "McInnes v. LPL Fin., LLC" on Justia Law
Lipsitt v. Plaud
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants for failing to pay compensation he alleged was owed to him under an employment contract. The complaint asserted claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Wage Act. The superior court dismissed all but Plaintiff's claim under the Wage Act, concluding that the Wage Act was the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid claims, thereby preempting Plaintiff's common-law claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend the Wage Act to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages, and therefore, Plaintiff's common-law claims should not have been dismissed. Remanded. View "Lipsitt v. Plaud" on Justia Law
City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed’n
The City of Boston transferred a Boston police sergeant who served as a union representative due to what the City said were ongoing concerns about the officer's supervisory authority. The Boston Police Superior Officers Federation (union) sought to enforce a provision of its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City, which prohibited the involuntary transfer of certain union representatives between stations or assignments. A grievance arbitrator concluded that the City had violated the CBA and awarded the officer damages and reinstatement to his original position. The superior court confirmed the award. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for judgment vacating the award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in invalidating the officer's transfer, where assignment and transfer of officers within the Boston police department are nondelegable statutory powers of the Boston police commissioner. View "City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n" on Justia Law
Caron v. Horace Mann Ins. Co.
Insureds purchased a homeowner's insurance policy from Insurer with a personal liability limit of $500,000. The policy contained an animal liability endorsement (endorsement) which limited coverage to $25,000 for claims arising from animal bites. Both Insurer's agent and Insureds mistakenly believed the policy did not contain the limitation of liability but neither conveyed their mistaken belief to the other. After Plaintiff was bitten by Insured's dog, he and his wife successfully brought an action against Insureds. Insurer paid only $25,000 of this judgment. Plaintiffs and Insureds reached a settlement regarding the balance of the judgment and Plaintiffs became assignees of Insureds' claims against Insurer. Plaintiffs sued Insurer, alleging that Insureds and Insurer were mutually mistaken as to the application of the endorsement, and therefore, the policy should be reformed by striking the endorsement. The superior court concluded Plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the reformation claim. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that, absent full, clear, and decisive proof of some prior agreement between the parties as to coverage for animal bites different than that contained in the policy, there was no mutual mistake warranting reformation of the policy. View "Caron v. Horace Mann Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
Claimant sustained injuries in a car accident. The car was insured under a standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy (auto policy) issued by Liberty Mutual that included optional "medical payments" coverage (MedPay). Claimant was also insured under a separate policy of health insurance issued by Blue Cross Blue Shield (Blue Cross). Liberty Mutual paid personal injury protection benefits to Claimant and Claimant's additional medical expenses. After Liberty Mutual declined to pay Claimant any MedPay benefits because Blue Cross had already submitted the expenses, Claimant commenced this action against Liberty Mutual on behalf of herself and a putative class of similarly situated individuals. On remand, the superior court granted Liberty Mutual's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Claimant was entitled to the MedPay benefits provided by her auto insurance policy, notwithstanding that her medical expenses were covered by and paid under a separate policy of health insurance. Remanded. View "Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Feeney v. Dell Inc.
In Feeney II, the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the superior court invalidating a class action waiver in the parties' arbitration agreement, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not foreclose a court from invalidating an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver if it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently issued an opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (Amex) holding that a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement is enforceable under the FAA even if a plaintiff proves that the class waiver effectively precludes the plaintiff from vindicating his federal statutory rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court subsequently concluded that following Amex, the Court's analysis in Feeney II no longer comported with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA, holding instead that a class waiver may not be invalidated on the grounds that it effectively denies the plaintiffs a remedy. Remanded. View "Feeney v. Dell Inc. " on Justia Law
Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ.
A union and college were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a provision that the "granting or failure to grant tenure shall be arbitrable but any award is not binding." A professor at the college, who was a member of the union, was denied tenure and submitted a grievance to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the college violated the terms of the CBA and ordered that the professor be reinstated to his position. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitrator's award. The appeals court reversed, holding that the arbitrator's award was not binding on the college pursuant to the CBA, and therefore, the judge erred in confirming that arbitrator's award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the terms of the CBA, the college and the union did not agree to binding arbitration of a tenure denial determination and therefore did not agree to binding arbitration of the grievance in this case; and (2) because the arbitrator's award was nonbinding, the union was not entitled to have the award judicially confirmed and enforced. View "Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ." on Justia Law
Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n
Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded. View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.
Karla Brown brought a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank and others seeking rescission of a note and first mortgage securing that note, alleging that she was the victim of a predatory lending scheme. The mortgage was originated by Deutsche Bank's predecessor in interest in connection with the purchase of Brown's home. Deutsche Bank requested that First American Title Insurance Company defend Deutsche Bank's mortgage interest pursuant to the terms of its title insurance policy. First American refused coverage, claiming the lawsuit did not trigger its duty to defend because Brown was claiming she was misinformed as to the terms of the note rather than challenging that she granted the mortgage. Deutsche Bank subsequently brought this action seeking a judgment declaring First American had a duty to defend it in Brown's lawsuit. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of First American. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Brown's complaint did not trigger First American's duty to defend because the complaint's claims were not specifically envisioned by the terms of the title insurance policy. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc.
Plaintiff, a janitorial cleaning services franchisee, along with franchisees from other states, filed a putative class action in the U.S. district court against Defendant, the Massachusetts corporation that franchised Plaintiff's business, alleging that Defendant misclassified him as an independent contractor and committed various wage law violations. The district court certified several questions of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150 by filing a complaint with the attorney general does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148, 148B, 150, and 151(1) and (1a); (2) a franchisor is vicariously liable for the conduct of its franchisee only where the franchisor controls or has a right to control the specific policy or practice resulting in harm to the franchisee; and (3) a defendant may be liable for employee misclassification where there was no contract for service between the plaintiff and the defendant. View "Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law