Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In January 2018, Shaquille Browder was shot and killed in a parking lot in Boston. Ralph Brown was indicted and convicted of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation. Brown appealed, claiming errors by judges and the prosecutor, and insufficient evidence of his guilt.The Superior Court denied Brown's pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained from search warrants for a vehicle's infotainment system and his cell phone's location data. The court found no material misstatements or intent to deceive in the affidavits supporting the warrants. Brown's motion to dismiss the indictments, alleging grand jury impairment due to improper statements by a detective, was also denied. The court ruled that the statements did not influence the grand jury's decision to indict.The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and upheld Brown's conviction. The court found that the evidence, including surveillance footage, cell phone records, and vehicle rental information, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also addressed Brown's claims of improper jury empanelment and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. It concluded that any errors in voir dire questions about motive did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The court determined that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments were permissible and did not shift the burden of proof or misstate facts.The court affirmed Brown's conviction of first-degree murder but vacated his convictions for carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a loaded firearm, remanding for further proceedings consistent with recent case law. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

In the early morning of August 10, 2014, the defendant entered an apartment in Lowell and fatally shot two occupants. He was convicted of felony-murder, armed home invasion, and possession of a firearm without a license. The defendant appealed, raising several arguments.The Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of felony-murder, armed home invasion, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The defendant argued that the jury should have been instructed that the Commonwealth needed to prove the absence of mitigating circumstances for felony-murder, that the prosecutor improperly appealed to emotion, that the judge prejudged the sentences, and that defense counsel was ineffective for not presenting mitigating information at sentencing. The defendant also contended that his convictions for armed home invasion and firearm possession should be vacated.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court vacated the armed home invasion conviction as duplicative of the felony-murder conviction and vacated the firearm possession conviction due to improper jury instructions regarding the burden of proof for licensure. The court remanded the firearm charge for further proceedings. The court affirmed the felony-murder convictions, finding no error in the jury instructions regarding mitigating circumstances, no improper appeals to emotion by the prosecutor, and no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice due to the judge's sentencing comments or defense counsel's performance. The court also declined to exercise its authority to reduce the verdicts under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Poum" on Justia Law

Three juveniles, Frederick F., Angela A., and Manolo M., were adjudicated delinquent on charges of resisting arrest. The events occurred on October 3, 2019, near Brockton High School, where a large crowd of students had gathered, leading to multiple altercations. Frederick yelled profanities at police officers and refused to leave the area, Angela recorded officers with her cell phone while yelling at them, and Manolo attempted to punch an officer and engaged in a physical struggle.The Juvenile Court denied Frederick's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause and denied all three juveniles' motions for required findings of not delinquent. The Appeals Court affirmed the adjudications for resisting arrest but vacated Manolo's adjudication for assault and battery on a police officer due to an error in jury instructions.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the adjudications for resisting arrest. For Frederick, the court found that the circumstances provided a basis for a good-faith judgment to arrest him for disorderly conduct. For Angela, the court concluded that her conduct of thrusting her cell phone within inches of officers' faces and resisting arrest by pulling away constituted the use of physical force. For Manolo, the court determined that his physical struggle with officers on the ground, following his aggressive actions, provided sufficient evidence of using physical force to resist arrest.The court affirmed the adjudications of delinquency for resisting arrest for all three juveniles and remanded for further proceedings on Manolo's vacated adjudication for assault and battery on a police officer. View "Commonwealth v. Manolo M." on Justia Law

The defendant, Manuel Diaz, was subjected to an unlawful traffic stop by Officer Mark Shlosser of the Wilbraham police department. Upon being stopped, Diaz fled in his car, lost control, and then fled on foot into the woods, where drugs were later found along his path. Diaz was charged with trafficking cocaine, and his motion to suppress the drugs and evidence of identity obtained from his car was denied.In the Superior Court, Diaz's motion to suppress was initially denied despite the judge finding the stop unjustified under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amendment. The judge concluded that Diaz's flight was an independent intervening act, triggering the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. Diaz's motion for reconsideration was also denied after a Long hearing, where the judge reaffirmed that the attenuation exception applied.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the attenuation exception did not apply to either the art. 14 violation or the equal protection violation under arts. 1 and 10. The court found that the temporal proximity between the stop and Diaz's flight, the lack of credible justification for the stop, and the inherently flagrant nature of racially selective traffic enforcement weighed against attenuation. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's denial of Diaz's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the unlawful stop. View "Commonwealth v. Diaz" on Justia Law

A police officer found the defendant behind the wheel of a parked rental van in a municipal lot. The key was in the ignition, the radio was on, and there was a strong odor of alcohol. The defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. The officer observed vodka bottles in the vehicle and asked the defendant to move the van slightly to clear a tree blocking the driver's door. The defendant complied, and upon exiting the vehicle, he struggled with field sobriety tests and was arrested for operating under the influence (OUI).The defendant was tried in the Falmouth Division of the District Court Department and found guilty of OUI, fifth offense. He was also found guilty of OUI with a license suspended for OUI after a bench trial. The defendant was sentenced to three and a half years in a house of correction. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant "operated" the vehicle while under the influence. The court held that the evidence was sufficient, affirming the convictions. The court explained that "operates" under the OUI statute includes any act that sets in motion the vehicle's motive power, such as turning the key in the ignition. The court concluded that the defendant's actions of turning the key and being intoxicated while in the driver's seat met the statutory definition of "operates," even though the vehicle was not moving. View "Commonwealth v. Wurtzberger" on Justia Law

In 2020, a police officer applied for a criminal complaint in the District Court, alleging that the defendant possessed a loaded firearm while intoxicated. A clerk-magistrate denied the application, finding no probable cause that the defendant had a firearm under his control inside a motor vehicle. No review of this decision was sought. Over two years later, the same officer filed a new application for the same offense with the same facts, and a different clerk-magistrate found probable cause and issued the complaint.The defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the issuance of the complaint was barred by collateral estoppel and that the delay violated his due process rights. A single justice of the county court reserved and reported the petition to the full court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the principles of collateral estoppel did not bar the issuance of the complaint because the initial denial was not a final judgment. The court noted that a District Court determination of no probable cause is not conclusive and does not bar a subsequent indictment for the same offense. The court also found no due process violation, as the defendant did not have a constitutionally protected interest in the finality of a show cause determination, and the delay did not cause severe prejudice to the defendant's ability to mount a defense. The court remanded the case to the county court for entry of a judgment denying the defendant's petition for extraordinary relief. View "Cabrera v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The case involves the execution of an anticipatory search warrant that led to the seizure of cocaine and U.S. currency from Victor Manuel Mercedes' apartment. The warrant was contingent on a future triggering event, which did not occur. The issue is whether the police could still search the apartment based on other information in the warrant affidavit that independently established probable cause.In the Superior Court, a grand jury indicted the defendant on drug trafficking charges. A codefendant's motion to suppress evidence from a related search was granted, and the defendant joined this motion. The judge allowed the motion, ruling that the anticipatory warrant was void because the triggering event did not occur. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the search was valid based on probable cause from other information in the affidavit.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, police cannot execute an anticipatory search warrant without the occurrence of the specified triggering event or its equivalent. The court emphasized that the triggering event must be clear and narrowly defined to prevent police from exercising unfettered discretion. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence, ruling that the anticipatory warrant was void without the triggering event, and no valid exception to the warrant requirement was established. The defendant's cross-appeal was dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Mercedes" on Justia Law

In 2023, Boima Collins was convicted by a jury of carrying a firearm without a license and other charges. The Commonwealth introduced evidence of Collins' 1998 felony conviction to prove he did not have a license to carry a firearm, as a prior felony conviction bars one from obtaining such a license. The trial judge admitted the redacted court record over Collins' objection and instructed the jury to consider this evidence only for determining whether Collins had a license.Collins appealed, arguing that the trial judge abused her discretion by admitting the prior conviction evidence, claiming it was more prejudicial than probative and that the Commonwealth had less prejudicial means to prove lack of licensure. He also contended that the jury should have been instructed to consider the prior conviction evidence only if the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person named in the record. Additionally, Collins argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he lacked a license because the Commonwealth did not prove he was the same person named in the record.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and found no prejudicial error in admitting the evidence of Collins' prior conviction. The court held that the trial judge correctly weighed the evidence's probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice, provided robust limiting instructions to the jury, and noted that the prior conviction was for a dissimilar offense, reducing the risk of improper propensity reasoning. The court also concluded that the judge's instructions to the jury were not erroneous and that the evidence was sufficient to prove Collins lacked a firearms license. Consequently, the court affirmed Collins' convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Collins" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon after stabbing his father at a family barbecue. The incident occurred when the victim became upset and yelled at the defendant's wife, leading to a confrontation between the defendant and the victim. The victim pushed the defendant first, and the defendant responded by stabbing the victim in the chest. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense and sought to introduce evidence of the victim's subsequent violent act to support his claim.The case was initially tried in the Superior Court, where the defendant was convicted. The judge denied the defendant's motion to introduce evidence of the victim's subsequent violent act, concluding that such evidence was not admissible under Commonwealth v. Adjutant. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the judge erred in believing that Adjutant evidence is not applicable to subsequent acts of violence. However, the court affirmed the conviction, stating that the evidence was correctly excluded because the identity of the first aggressor was not in dispute, and the defendant was the first to use deadly force. The court also held that the judge did not err in failing to instruct the jury on defense of another, as the defendant did not rely on this theory at trial, and no evidence suggested that the defendant reasonably believed he had to use deadly force to protect his wife. The judgment was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Andrade" on Justia Law