Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was a participant in a drive-by shooting against a group of young men that killed one member of the group and wounded two others. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined Defendant’s request that it grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting the grand jury of a Commonwealth witness; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting prior bad act evidence; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant’s refusal to have his custodial interrogation recorded; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of 911 calls received by a police dispatcher; (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the course of the investigation and the role of the grand jury, but the error did not prejudice Defendant; (6) the prosecutor’s impeachment of a defense witness with her failure to report exculpatory evidence to police was not in error; (7) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing argument; and (8) the trial judge did not err in declining to give a Bowden instruction. View "Commonwealth v. DaSilva" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of possession of heroin and possession of firearms and ammunition. Defendants appealed, arguing, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support Defendants’ convictions of possession of heroin; but (2) the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants constructively possessed the firearms and ammunition found in the apartment in which they were staying. View "Commonwealth v. Dagraca-Teixeira" on Justia Law

Steven Fitzgerald pleaded guilty to certain criminal offenses. Fitzgerald subsequently filed a petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking to vacate his pleas, arguing that he was forcibly medicated when he tendered his pleas and that he has not been able to obtain a copy of a court file of an earlier proceeding which resulted in an order that he be involuntarily committed and treated with antipsychotic medications before he pleaded guilty. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied extraordinary relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Fitzgerald was not entitled to extraordinary relief under the circumstances of this case. View "Fitzgerald v. Dist. Court Dep’t of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was indicted on a charge of violating Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32E(b)(2) for trafficking in cocaine with a total weight of 28.14 grams. In 2012, St. 2012, ch. 192 (Crime Bill) was enacted, which amended section 32E(b)(2), along with section 32E(b)(1), to redefine the minimum and maximum trafficking weights. The Crime Bill also reduced the mandatory minimum sentence required for a violation of both section 32(e)(b)(1) and (2). Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to apply all the Crime Bill’s amendments to section 32E(b)(1) and (2) to his case. The judge allowed Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Galvin, (1) the Crime Bill’s reduction of the mandatory minimum sentence required for a violation of section 32(b)(2) applies retroactively to Defendant; but (2) the reconfigured drug trafficking weights provided in sections 32E(b)(1) and (2), as amended by the the Crime Bill, do not apply retroactively to Defendant. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Didas" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for murder. Defendant moved to suppress certain evidence that the Commonwealth had obtained without a warrant. The superior court allowed Defendant’s motion. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence and remanded to give the Commonwealth an opportunity to demonstrate probable cause for a warrant. Defendant subsequently filed a Mass. R. Crim. P. 15(d) motion seeking attorney’s fees for counsel he engaged to replace his court-appointed counsel for the defense of the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees, holding that Defendant was not entitled to the payment of fees where he was indigent and his new counsel agreed not to charge him any fees for their services. View "Commonwealth v. Augustine" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and assault and battery. Defendant appealed, arguing that the motion judge erred in denying a motion to suppress the victim’s out-of-court eyewitness identification, and (2) DNA evidence identifying the victim as the source of blood found on Defendant’s shirt should have been suppressed because the DNA analysis constituted a search that required a warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the victim had told the police that the assailant wore a gray shirt and Defendant was the only person shown wearing a gray shirt in the photographic array, the victim did not select the photograph on that basis, and therefore, the judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) where, as in this case, DNA analysis is limited to the creation of a DNA profile from lawfully seized evidence of a crime and the profile is used only to identify its unknown source, the DNA analysis is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, no search warrant was required to conduct the DNA analysis of the bloodstain from Defendant’s clothing in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Arzola" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant pleaded guilty to certain offenses in the superior court in Norfolk County. In 2008, Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of unarmed robbery in the superior court in Plymouth County. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, concurrent with the sentence in the Norfolk County case, which he was then serving. In 2013, Defendant moved to correct the mittimus as to the Plymouth County case, requesting credit for the time he was detained while awaiting trial. The superior court denied the motion on the ground that the time at issue had already been credited against Defendant’s sentence in the Norfolk County case and that Defendant had benefited from the concurrent sentences. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the motion judge was not obligated to grant Defendant’s request. View "Commonwealth v. Ridge" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a stun gun in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 131J, which bans the possession of an electrical weapon with some exceptions. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that a stun gun is an “arm” for purposes of the Second Amendment, and therefore, her possession of the stun gun was constitutionally protected. The motion was denied, and the trial judge found Defendant guilty of possession of the stun gun. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that chapter 140 section 131J does not violate the Second Amendment right to bear arms, as a stun gun is not the type of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment protection. View "Commonwealth v. Caetano" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and of possession of a firearm without a license. Defendant appealed, arguing that his attorney’s concession in opening statement and closing argument that Defendant committed the killing was tantamount to a guilty plea and that because a colloquy did not take place between the judge and Defendant as to whether Defendant made the concession knowingly and voluntarily, he was entitled to a new trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) no colloquy was required regarding defense counsel’s concession of guilt to the lesser included offense of manslaughter; and (2) because Defendant did not claim on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, there was no basis on which to vacate Defendant’s convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Evelyn" on Justia Law

Police officers stopped Defendant for driving with an unilluminated headlight. During the stop, the officers saw in the vehicle a one-ounce bag of marijuana. The officers ordered Defendant out of the vehicle and conducted a search of the vehicle in which they discovered two other bags of marijuana. Defendant was booked on charges of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The officers seized and searched Defendant’s cellular telephone, finding text messages they identified as being consistent with sales of marijuana. Defendant moved to suppress the marijuana found in his vehicle and the text messages discovered on his phone on the grounds that “police observation of one ounce or less of marijuana is insufficient, by itself, to give rise to the probable cause necessary to conduct a search.” The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the officers were permitted to enter the vehicle to effect the forfeiture of the marijuana they saw. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officers’ entry into the vehicle was impermissible because they lacked probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime, and therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of the searches of Defendant’s vehicle and of his cellular telephone must be suppressed. View "Commonwealth v. Sheridan" on Justia Law