Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree under theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant moved to suppress the eyewitness identifications of him as the shooter and the identifications of his jacket, which had been found in the path of flight and identified by two witnesses as the one worn by the shooter. The motions were denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the admission of the jacket identifications did not violate due process or Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 where the Commonwealth did not arrange a “jacket lineup”; (2) no reversible error arose from Defendant’s other claims; and (3) although evidence of questionable conduct by some of the investigating police officers was brought out during the course of the proceedings, there was an insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Bresilla" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth moved for judicial approval of a grand jury subpoena compelling a law firm representing John Doe, who was the target of a grand jury investigation, to produce a telephone Doe transferred to the law firm in connection with its provision of legal services to him. The Commonwealth asserted that the telephone was transferred from Doe to the law firm to obtain legal advice and that it contained evidence, particularly in its record of text messages, of the crime under investigation by the grand jury. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court approved the issuance of the subpoena on the basis that the Commonwealth had, through an ex parte proceeding, established probable cause sufficient to justify a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the attorney-client privilege protected Doe against compelled production of the telephone by the law firm and that the privilege may not be set aside based on a showing of probable cause. View "In re a Grand Jury Investigation" on Justia Law

After a retrial before a jury, Defendant was convicted of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and other offenses. Before trial, two eyewitnesses described Defendant’s gender and race and the color of his clothing. However, neither eyewitness identified Defendant at the live lineup. The trial judge refused to give a modified identification instruction providing that the jury may consider that the eyewitnesses had the opportunity to view Defendant but did not identify him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion by declining to give an identification instruction where there was no positive eyewitness identification and no other eyewitness testimony that significantly incriminated Defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of mayhem and breaking and entering. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress certain pretrial identifications. The trial judge denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that the judge erred by refusing to give Defendant’s proffered instruction regarding eyewitness identification that would have instructed the jury on various scientific principles regarding eyewitness identification and human memory. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions but included in this opinion a provisional jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification evidence to be used before a model instruction would be set forth, holding (1) the judge did not abuse his discretion by declining to instruct the jury about the scientific principles where Defendant offered no expert testimony, scholarly articles, or treatises that established that the principles were so generally accepted that a jury instruction stating those principles would be appropriate; but (2) there are principles regarding eyewitness identification that are so generally accepted that juries in the future should be instructed regarding these principles. View "Commonwealth v. Gomes" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found guilty of larceny from a person sixty years of age or older. The victim in this case was an eighty-six-year-old nursing home resident who sold her property to Defendant. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the “specific intent to steal” element of the crime of larceny by theft requires proof that the defendant knew that the victim lacked capacity to give such consent; and (2) because the judge in this case may have applied an erroneous legal standard for proof of the specific intent to steal, the case must be remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. St. Hilaire" on Justia Law

Twenty-three years after a young woman was found dead in a vacant lot, DNA was extracted from samples taken from the victim’s body and clothing. A match was found with Defendant’s DNA. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) the trial judge’s exclusion of evidence proffered by Defendant as third-party culprit evidence and Bowden evidence was not in error; (3) comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument were misguided, but there was no substantial likelihood that a miscarriage of justice occurred; and (4) the trial judge did not err in his instructions to the reconstituted jury after an original deliberating juror had been discharged. View "Commonwealth v. Scott" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case were both convicted of criminal harassment for posting information about the victims online along with false statements about items that the victims allegedly had for sale or were giving away solely for the purpose of encouraging unwitting third parties to repeatedly contact and harass the victims, and for sending hostile communications to the victims. On appeal, Defendants challenged the constitutionality of the criminal harassment statute, both facial and as applied to them. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the criminal harassment statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor vague; (2) Defendants’ as-applied constitutional challenge failed because the conduct in question was not protected speech but, rather, a hybrid of conduct and speech integral to the commission of a crime; and (3) Defendants’ remaining claims similarly failed. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Haywood Bledsoe, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, commenced an action against the Commissioner of Correction and other officials. A judge granted summary judgment as to some of the counts in Bledsoe’s complaint, and after a hearing in which Bledsoe participated by video conference, another judge granted summary judgment on the remaining counts. While Bledsoe’s appeal was pending, he requested, without success, a transcript of the summary judgment hearing. Bledsoe then moved for a DVD record of the hearing at his own expense. The motion was denied on the ground that it was not necessary for the appeal. Bledsoe filed a petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 from the denial of that motion. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Bledsoe was not entitled to extraordinary relief under the Court’s general superintendence power. View "Bledsoe v. Comm’r of Corr." on Justia Law

Following a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended for operating while under the influence of alcohol. The Appeals Court affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant received notice of the suspension of his license. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment, holding that the record contained no evidence demonstrating that Defendant was notified of the license suspension - and actually contained some evidence suggesting the contrary - and therefore, the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense. View "Commonwealth v. Oyewole" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on seventeen indictments, including three counts of aggravated burglary. Two of those counts arose from the burglary of a dwelling in Agawam involving two assaults therein, and the third count arose from a break into a home in Springfield and an assault on one of its residents. Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking to correct illegal sentences, arguing (1) the two Agawan indictments were duplicative, and (2) an amendment to the Springfield indictment as to the person assaulted rendered that conviction unconstitutional. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 14 permits only one burglary conviction per dwelling, and therefore, Defendant’s conviction on the duplicative indictment must be vacated; and (2) the name of the person assaulted was not an essential element to the crime charged in this case, and therefore, the conviction on the amended Springfield indictment was constitutional. View "Commonwealth v. Bolden" on Justia Law