Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a person over the age of fourteen and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, probation, and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his CPSL sentence was unconstitutional. Pursuant to the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding today in Commonwealth v. Cole, which held that CPSL violates separation of powers principles by delegating to the parole board, an agency of the executive branch, the distinctly judicial power to impose sentences, the Court vacated Defendant’s CPSL sentence and remanded for resentencing.View "Commonwealth v. Parrillo " on Justia Law

Defendant was classified as a level two sex offender and was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant later pleaded guilty to failing to provide notice of a change of address. The district court sentenced him to six months of supervised probation and community parole supervision for life (CPSL). Defendant subsequently filed a motion to correct his sentence, claiming that the sentence was unconstitutional. Specifically, Defendant argued that CPSL violated the separation of powers doctrine by improperly delegating to the parole board the exercise of the judicial power to impose sentences. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Defendant and vacated his sentence, holding that CPSL violates article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by granting to the parole board, an entity of the executive branch, a quintessential judicial power, the power to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to additional terms of imprisonment.View "Commonwealth v. Cole" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of committing assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse and prevention order and of violating an abuse preventing order. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant filed an application for further appellate review, contending that the two offenses for which he was convicted were duplicative, and therefore, his convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) violation of an abuse prevention order is not a lesser included offense of assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse preventing order, and therefore, conviction of both offenses does not violate double jeopardy principles; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction of assault and battery on a person protected by an abuse prevention order.View "Commonwealth v. Torres" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested in connection with the shooting death of Jonathan Nieves. While awaiting his initial appearance in the district court and after being held for approximately nine hours in the police station, Defendant was interrogated by police. Defendant moved to suppress the inculpatory statements he made during the interrogation, arguing that the statements were inadmissible under Commonwealth v. Rosario because they were made more than six hours after arrest and before being brought to court for arraignment. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining the Commonwealth’s request to revisit the Roasrio rule, as the rule “continues to serve as an important and practical protection of the constitutional and common-law rights of persons arrested for violations of the criminal laws.”View "Commonwealth v. Powell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and burglary arising out of events that occurred in 1990. Defendant filed two motions for a new trial, which were denied. Defendant subsequently obtained evidence suggesting that the Commonwealth promised its key witness something in exchange for his testimony. In 2009, Defendant filed a third motion for a new trial, arguing that the evidence constituted newly discovered evidence that warranted a new trial. The superior court judge denied Defendant’s third motion for a new trial without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the “newly discovered” evidence was cumulative of other evidence Defendant used to impeach the witness at trial and that, after decades of investigation and discovery, there was no evidence of any agreement between the Commonwealth and the witness.View "Commonwealth v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of possession of a firearm without a license. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of bullet shell casings and live ammunition found hours after the shooting; (2) the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting admitting a recording of a jailhouse telephone call made by Defendant in which he used street jargon and offensive language; (3) jail officials did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by monitoring and recording Defendant's telephone calls from jail and by sending law enforcement information derived from the calls; (4) there was sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of murder under a joint venture theory; and (5) trial judge properly did not give the jury a special verdict slip and special jury instruction requiring the jury to determine separate whether Defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree as a principal or as an accomplice. View "Commonwealth v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Defendant, a noncitizen of the United States, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and received a sentence of probation. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving without a license and taken into custody by immigration authorities. Contending that his defense counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. A superior court allowed the motion, concluding that Defendant’s counsel gave Defendant constitutionally deficient advice when he told Defendant he would be “eligible for deportation” if he pleaded guilty to the drug possession charges. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the conviction of a noncitizen with intent to distribute cocaine makes deportation or removal from the United States presumptively mandatory, counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient in that it did not convey what is clearly stated in federal law.View "Commonwealth v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to strike a portion of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) because counsel did not move to strike the expert witness’s nonresponsive answer, the Commonwealth was provided with the proof it needed to survive a motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the element of intent to distribute; and (2) a new trial was required for the Commonwealth to present the testimony of a witness whose statements were allegedly relied upon by the Commonwealth’s expert. View "Commonwealth v. Sepheus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant appealed, raising five claims of error. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the trial judge erred in furnishing the jury with an instruction in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriquez and Commonwealth v. Tuey, as a reasonable jury listening to this instruction would have understood that, if they were unable to reach a verdict with respect to murder in the first degree, a mistrial would be declared, and the case would need to be retried; and (2) the error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice with respect to the jury’s decision to convict Defendant of murder in the first degree rather than murder in the second degree. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of enticement of a child and four counts of attempting to commit certain offenses, including rape of a child, indecent assault and battery on a child, and disseminating matter harmful to a minor. The appeals court affirmed the convictions of enticement of a child, attempted rape, and attempted indecent assault and battery and vacated the convictions of disseminating matter harmful to a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of enticement of a child and reversed the convictions of attempt, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions of attempted rape, attempted indecent assault and battery, and dissemination of matter harmful to a minor; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of enticement of a child, the judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the introduction of certain photographs notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s prior stipulation not to introduce the photographs, and the police did not violate Defendant’s constitutional rights by searching his computer for evidence.View "Commonwealth v. Buswell" on Justia Law