Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possessing or concealing stolen paintings. The victim of the theft (Plaintiff) filed a civil suit against Defendant for, among other claims, violations of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) due to Defendant’s transfers of assets to his family members following the discovery of his identity as the holder of the stolen paintings. Plaintiff also brought claims for relief under the UFTA against Defendant’s family members alleged to have received the fraudulent transfers. A jury found Defendant had made seven fraudulent transfers within the meaning of the UFTA, entering judgment against Defendant for more than $4.3 million. Additionally, the judge ordered equitable remedies against the relief defendants for the purposes of identifying specific assets that had been fraudulently conveyed and could be subject to reconveyance in satisfaction of the judgment against Defendant. Lastly, the judge dismissed the claim against one of the relief defendants concerning assets in a shared trust because the funds in the trust had been dissipated. Defendant appealed, arguing that money judgments should have been ordered against the relief defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment except in respect to a savings account and the shared trust. Remanded.View "Bakwin v. Mardirosian" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. Defendant’s appeal centered on his argument that the victim, an undocumented immigrant, characterized her consensual sex with Defendant as rape in her report to police to obtain immigration benefits. Specifically, Defendant claimed (1) he was denied the right to impeach the victim with evidence of a prior incident of sexual assault, after which she received a temporary work authorization; and (2) he should have been allowed to access Boston Area Rape Crisis Center (BARCC) records concerning the victim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge properly determined that the probative value of any testimony concerning the prior incident of sexual assault would be outweighed by its prejudicial impact; and (2) Defendant did not make the necessary threshold showing that he was entitled to production of BARCC records.View "Commonwealth v. Sealy" on Justia Law

In 1997, Defendant pleaded guilty to a drug-related offense. Defendant was released in 1999 after completing his sentence on that conviction. In 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty to firearm-related offenses. In 2005, while he was incarcerated for his 2003 convictions, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea for the 1997 offense. The motion was allowed, and the 1997 offense was eventually vacated. In 2011, while still incarcerated. Defendant filed a motion seeking credit for the time he had served on the vacated 1997 conviction against the sentences that he was serving on the 2003 convictions. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, but the Appeals Court granted reversed and granted relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s order denying Defendant’s motion for credit, holding (1) credit for time served on a vacated conviction cannot be applied against time to be served on new and unrelated sentences; and (2) moreover, allowing credit in this fashion implicates the prohibition against banking time. View "Commonwealth v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant’s defense was that a third party killed the victim while Defendant was unconscious due to severe intoxication. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) any prejudice in the admission into evidence of recorded telephone calls made on the day of the murder between Defendant and his girlfriend was cured by the judge; (2) the admission of a medical record showing that Defendant tested negative for any drugs was error, but Defendant suffered no risk of a miscarriage of justice; (3) counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; (4) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that there is no “legal limit” of intoxication for any purposes other than determining whether one is guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; and (5) Defendant’s claim that his right to a public trial during jury empaneled was violated was waived. View "Commonwealth v. Wall" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on one indictment alleging forcible rape of a child under sixteen years of age and two indictments alleging indecent assault and battery of a child under fourteen years of age. The appeals court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the judge erred in allowing the prosecutor on cross-examination to elicit expert testimony that both explicitly and implicitly vouched for the credibility of the victim witness regarding her allegations of sexual abuse. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly admitted testimony during cross-examination of the victim’s therapist that implicitly vouched for the credibility of the victim, and the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Quinn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted kidnapping and of accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex. The Appeals Court reversed the judgment on the indictment charging accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex, concluding that because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s conduct involved “sexually explicit language or acts,” the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proving that Defendant’s conduct was “offensive.” The Supreme Judicial affirmed the judgment of conviction on the indictment charging accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex, holding (1) the jury properly could have found the elements of accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Defendant’s counsel provided effective assistance pertaining to his conviction of accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex. View "Commonwealth v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, and related offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor’s several references to his initial invocation of his right to remain silent violated his constitutional due process rights. The Appeals Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s references to Defendant’s invocation of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona at trial constituted error; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, the improper references did not raise a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Letkowski" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation, arson of a dwelling house, and attempted murder of thirteen persons arising from Defendant’s act of setting fire to a curtain in the first-floor apartment of a three-story house. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding that the trial judge erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements she made to police during two interviews, and the error was not harmless with respect to the convictions of murder in the first degree and attempted murder but was harmless with respect to the conviction of arson of a dwelling house. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree. A panels of the Appeals Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 because Defendant acquiesced in certain delays, failed to object to every continuance sought by the Commonwealth, did not press a motion to compel the production of mandatory discovery, and otherwise engaged in ordinary motion practice; and (2) the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument, but the remarks did not constitute reversible error. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to eleven counts of possessing child pornography, one of the sex offenses enumerated in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47 that requires a defendant convicted of such an offense to be subject to global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of any term of probation. Such monitoring was not imposed as part of Defendant’s sentence. Almost one year after Defendant was sentenced, the Commonwealth sought correction of Defendant’s sentence by the addition of GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to vacate the modified sentence, arguing, among other things, that the delayed imposition of GPS monitoring violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. Defendant’s motion was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order imposing GPS monitoring on Defendant, holding (1) Defendant’s initial sentence was illegal insofar as it did not include GPS monitoring as a condition of Defendant’s probation; but (2) under the circumstances of this case, the belated correction of Defendant’s sentence contravened Defendant’s legitimate expectation of finality in the terms of his initial sentence in violation of principles of double jeopardy. View "Commonwealth v. Selavka" on Justia Law