Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of sexual offenses. Before Defendant completed his sentences, the Commonwealth filed a petition to commit him as a sexually dangerous person. A superior court judge granted Defendant's motion to have his counsel be present during interviews conducted by qualified examiners. One of the two examiners refused to conduct the interview with counsel in the room and submitted to the court her report based on her review of Defendant's records. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Commonwealth's petition, claiming that the examiner's report was not based on an "examination" pursuant to Mass. Gen. Law. ch. 123A, 13(a). The superior court granted the motion, concluding that dismissal was required. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, dismissal of the Commonwealth's petition was not warranted where one of the qualified examiners personally interviewed Defendant as part of his examination and filed with the court a report expressing his opinion that Defendant was a sexually dangerous person. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Felt" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned twenty-two indictments against Defendant, including indictments charging murder in the first degree and various counts of masked armed robbery. The charges arose out of a robbery of a department store perpetrated by Domenic Cinelli. The Commonwealth proceeded against Defendant as a joint venturer and coconspirator. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss (1) indictments relating to Cinelli's escape-related offenses as not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the portion of the murder indictment that included any theory of murder other than felony-murder. The motion judge dismissed the challenged indictments and the portion of the murder indictment that included theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the grant of Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments that charged Defendant with the assault and battery and firearm crimes perpetrated by Cinelli during his escape, holding (i) Defendant may be liable for Cinelli's escape-related crimes where the Commonwealth proves that he participated in, and intended, such crimes; and (2) reversed the grant of Defendant's motion to dismiss the prevented the Commonwealth from proceeding at trial on all three theories of murder, holding that sufficient evidence supported the indictment. View "Commonwealth v. Hanright" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was indicted for distributing cocaine and for being a second or subsequent offender in violation of section Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(d). In 2012, before Defendant's trial had commenced, the Legislature enacted the Crime Bill, which amended the enhanced penalty provision of section 32A(d) by reducing the mandatory minimum sentence. Twenty days later, Defendant was found guilty. The judge imposed a mandatory minimum prison sentence as permitted by the Crime Bill. The Commonwealth requested that the judge correct the sentence so as to comply with the sentencing provisions as they existed on the date Defendant committed the offense. The judge denied the request, concluding that the Crime Bill made the sentencing reductions applicable to persons sentenced after the effective date of the new act even if the offense was committed before the effective date of the act. The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth's petition for relief, holding that to interpret the statute amending the mandatory minimum sentence in section 32A(d) not to apply to Defendant would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature. View "Commonwealth v. Galvin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to police, as (i) Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, (ii) Defendant's statements were voluntarily made, and (iii) Defendant was not intentionally deprived of his statutory right to make a telephone call until he was booked; and (2) the judge slightly erred in instructing the jury on murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, but the error did not prejudice Defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four charges of possession of firearms and ammunition. At issue on appeal was which two of four convictions must be vacated because they were duplicative. Defendant argued that the two convictions on lesser included offenses should be vacated even though they carried higher penalties, and the Commonwealth argued that the convictions carrying lesser penalties should be vacated. The Supreme Court (1) vacated two of the convictions and sentences as duplicative and remanded for a judge to decide which conviction in each set of paired convictions should be vacated; and (2) affirmed Defendant's motions to suppress and for a mistrial, holding (i) the vehicle stop during which the firearm was seized was lawful, and (ii) testimony given at trial indicating that the police were conducting narcotics surveillance when an officer observed Defendant with a gun was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Rivas" on Justia Law

Defendants Cory Moody and David Newman were separately indicted for violations of the Controlled Substances Act arising from their alleged involvement in an organized group engaged in drug trafficking. Prior to trial, Defendants filed motions to suppress the fruits of several search warrants issued under the Massachusetts wiretap statute authorizing the interception of calls and text messages sent over their cell phones. Defendants argued that the interceptions were beyond the scope of authority provided under the state wiretap statute and thus were preempted by the federal wiretap statute. The motion judge denied Defendants' motions as to their cell phone calls but granted the motions as to the interception of Defendants' text messages. The judge then reported a question to the appeals court, and the Supreme Court answered by holding that a superior court judge possesses the authority under the Massachusetts wiretap statute to issue warrants permitting the interception of cell phone calls and text messages. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Moody" on Justia Law

Luis Alicea pleaded guilty to a firearm offense and was sentenced to three and one-half years' incarceration. Alicea later filed suit in federal court against his former defense counsel, Lawrence McGuire, alleging that McGuire's conduct resulted in Alicea's serving an illegal sentence. The district court judge granted summary judgment for McGuire. While the federal case was pending, Alicea filed an action in the superior court against the Commonwealth as McGuire's employer, asserting claims of malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Alicea's claims were premised on the allegation that McGuire had caused Alicea to serve an illegal sentence. The superior court granted summary judgment for the Commonwealth, concluding that the judgment entered in the federal action precluded Alicea from litigating the issue of his purported illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the central issue of Alicea's claims in the superior court was decided in the federal action, application of the doctrine of issue preclusion prevented Alicea from relitigating the issue. View "Alicea v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel was not ineffective in preparing and presenting Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police, and any error on the part of the motion judge in denying Defendant's motion was not likely to have affected the jury's conclusion; (2) the trial judge did not violate Defendant's right to a public trial by closing the court room during a witness immunity hearing; (3) the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the Commonwealth's burden of proof; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction on the theory of felony-murder, but the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Defendant killed the victim with deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. View "Commonwealth v. Mercado" on Justia Law

Defendants were indicted on charges of armed robbery and other crimes in conjunction with the robbery of a gasoline station. The Commonwealth sought a buccal swab from each defendant for purposes of DNA testing of a firearm used in the robbery and a necklace allegedly taken from a victim of the robbery. The superior court judge ordered both defendants to provide buccal swabs. A single justice of the Supreme Court treated Defendants' respective appeals as petitions brought under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and denied Defendants' petitions for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a petition under chapter 211, section 3 was the appropriate means by which to seek interlocutory relief from the court orders compelling Defendants to provide a buccal swab; and (2) under the circumstances, the single justice properly denied Defendants' petitions. View "Commonwealth v. Bertini" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a class B controlled substance in connection with the death of Richard Beaulier. During trial, a toxicologist testifying as an expert witness for the Commonwealth testified about the results of laboratory testing and toxicological analysis of Beaulier's blood, which showed the presence of a high level of fentanyl. The toxicologist, however, had not conducted any of the testing. The appeals court affirmed the conviction, holding that the admission of the toxicology results testing conducted by a nontestifying analyst constituted constitutional error, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the improperly admitted evidence would have had little or no effect on the fact finder, and therefore the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Lezynski" on Justia Law