Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Commonwealth alleged that, at age 16-17, the defendant committed several crimes including acts of child rape. The defendant was not apprehended until he was 26 years old. The defendant moved to dismiss the youthful offender indictments because he had not been afforded a transfer hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 119, 72A, which states that prior to indictment, the judge must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offenses charged and, if so, either order the defendant discharged, if consistent with the protection of the public, or dismiss the case, if the public interest requires that the defendant be tried. The judge allowed the defendant's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Section 72A, states that, "[i]f a person commits an offense or violation prior to his seventeenth birthday, and is not apprehended until after his eighteenth birthday, the court, after a hearing, shall determine whether there is probable cause ...." The language, "after a hearing shall," is clear and unambiguous. Section 54, which states, "[t]he court shall proceed on the complaint or the indictment ... in accordance with [sections 55-72], inclusive," does not exempt the Commonwealth from complying with the requirements of section 72A. View "Commonwealth v. Nanny" on Justia Law

More than a year after his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, defendant, moved for postverdict inquiry of the jurors. The trial judge had recused himself and a different judge granted the motion. After holding evidentiary hearings, the judge allowed the motion for a new trial on the basis that the jury had been exposed to an extraneous influence during deliberations and the Commonwealth had failed to prove that the incident did not prejudice the defendant. The Appeals Court vacated the order for a new trial and remanded the case for further inquiry into the bases for the request for a postverdict inquiry of the jurors and, in particular, the role of defendant and his friend in contacting a juror. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed that remand for further inquiry is appropriate and clarified the procedure for conducting postverdict hearings where, although a defendant claims that the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, there is also evidence that the defendant or someone acting on the defendant's behalf may have been involved. View "Commonwealth v. Bresnahan" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine, G.L. c. 94C, 32E (b ) (1), and conspiracy to violate the drug laws, G.L. c. 94C, 40. He filed an affidavit of indigency, G.L. c. 261, 27B, was appointed counsel, and tendered pleas of not guilty. During proceedings on a motion to suppress, the judge questioned the defendant's indigency status, took evidence, and entered an order concluding that the defendant was not indigent because he was not in custody and had "available funds," under S.J.C. Rule 3:10, 1(b), from his girlfriend and his mother. The judge struck the appearance of counsel in the case before her and in the probation revocation proceeding. The Massachusetts Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, rejecting an argument that consideration of the available funds of his girlfriend and his mother infringed on his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. View "Commonwealth v. Fico" on Justia Law

The trial judge found that defendant was indigent but able to contribute $40,000 to his defense against indictments charging him with the murders of his wife, mother-in-law, and children (S.J.C. Rule 3:10, (1)(g)). In setting the amount of the required contribution, the judge considered assets that defendant had reported to the probation department, including bank accounts, a college fund, and an individual retirement account. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Some of the assets are currently unavailable to defendant under the "slayer statute," G.L. c. 265, 46 because those assets were held jointly with his deceased wife or in trust for the deceased children. An IRA is ordinarily to be considered a liquid asset available to a defendant and may properly be included in the assessment of his ability to pay for his representation, at least up to the net amount available to him after accounting for any early withdrawal penalties and taxes. View "Commonwealth v. Mortimer" on Justia Law

Following indictment on 93 counts of failure to pay wages timely, (G.L. c. 149, 148), defendant filed an affidavit of indigency and sought appointment of counsel at public expense (G.L. c. 211D, 2 1/2 (a )). After reviewing financial information, which showed that defendant and her husband together had an annual income of approximately $60,000 and owned three properties, the probation department recommended the defendant be found not indigent. The trial judge held three hearings at which defendant appeared without counsel and argued that she had little to no discretionary income and that two of the properties were subject to mortgages and tax liens, hindering their liquidity. She did not present evidence, but relied on oral statements and records discovered by the probation department. Reasoning that the defendant has the burden of proof of her indigency, the judge found the defendant not indigent. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. A criminal defendant who seeks to have counsel appointed at public expense bears the burden of proving indigency by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Porter." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, first offense, G.L. c. 6, 178H (a ) (3). In open court, the defendant was sentenced to incarceration for one year in a house of correction. Thereafter, a sentence to community parole supervision (CPSL) for life also entered on the docket. The defendant subsequently filed an "emergency motion to correct the sentence," arguing that the CPSL portion of the sentence should be vacated. The motion was denied. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Imposition of CPSL is discretionary, not mandatory, under the terms of G.L. c. 6, 178H (a ) (3). The sentencing judge mistakenly believed that imposition of CPSL was mandatory. View "Commonwealth v. Williamson" on Justia Law

Defendant, a high school student, was charged with breaking and entering the home of a friend (seeking his girlfiend) with intent to commit a misdemeanor, G.L. c. 266, 16A, and assault, G.L. c. 265, 13A. A jury trial began in 2005. During a sidebar, after the Commonwealth's final witness had testified, the judge warned defense counsel that he had not "heard anything why I wouldn't, based on these circumstances ... put [the defendant] in jail." The judge added, "[T]he facts are kind of egregious and, I don't know why he wasn't charged with house invasion." Almost immediately, defendant entered a plea of guilty to both charges. The defendant unsuccessfully moved, before the same judge, to vacate his pleas and obtain a new trial. A different judge reversed. The defendant then sought dismissal on double jeopardy grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that retrial is appropriate. The record does not support the inference that the judge acted to prejudice the defendant or out of concern that the defendant would be acquitted. Even though the girlfriend refused to testify, there is no doubt that the defendant properly could have been convicted of assault and on the breaking and entering charge. View "Parreira v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioner's son was charged with assault and battery on a person over 60 years of age and with resisting arrest. The petitioner is the alleged victim. The son unsuccessfully moved to suppress a recording made by a third party, allegedly in violation of the wiretapping statute, G.L. c. 272, 99. The recording includes statements made by the defendant and the petitioner. The motion was denied. Petitioner sought relief under G.L. c. 211, 3, on the ground that the introduction of the recording into evidence in the defendant's trial would violate her privacy rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Nothing in G.L. c. 211, 3, or rule 2:21 grants a nonparty to a criminal case standing to obtain review of an interlocutory order. The Legislature has expressly provided a civil remedy, including compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees, for any aggrieved person whose oral or wire communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used, or whose privacy is violated by means of an unauthorized interception. G.L. c. 272, 99 Q. The petitioner does not address this remedy or explain why it would not be adequate to vindicate her privacy interests. View "In re Wadja" on Justia Law

Based on a tip, surveillance, and controlled drug purchases, Brockton police obtained a warrant to search defendant's apartment. Officers found cocaine, cash, and a digital scale in the apartment. In the locked basement of the building, they found heroin, handguns, and ammunition. Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin, G.L. c. 94C, 32E (c); possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, G.L. c. 94C, 32A (c ); school zone violations, G.L. c. 94C, 32J; unlawful possession of a firearm, G.L. c. 269, 10 (h ); and unlawful possession of ammunition without an FID card, G.L. c. 269, 10 (h ). The Appeals Court found sufficient nexus between the suspected drug dealing and the defendant's apartment and that defendant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement. The court nonetheless reversed all except the ammunition conviction. Admission of certificates of drug and ballistics analysis without testimony of analysts who had performed the tests violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the confrontation clause issue. The search warrant application established probable cause to believe that evidence of defendant's drug dealing would be found in his apartment, and the basement was within the curtilage of the defendant's apartment. View "Commonwealth v. Escalera" on Justia Law

A fist fight broke out at a cookout. Shots hit a bystander, who later died. None of the fight participants had displayed a firearm. The only firearm that was seen was carried by defendant, described as a stocky African-American man wearing a white T-shirt and a baseball cap who ran up Arbutus Street. Numerous witnesses saw him; one had photographed him and another had been in jail with him in 1997. Defendant told a friend that he shot the victim in self-defense. The highest court affirmed conviction for murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, G.L. c. 265, 1. The court rejected claims of error in denial of a motion to suppress statements he made to the police, which he claimed were involuntary, and of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to admission of evidence that the defendant was in the house of correction with an eyewitness. The court also rejected a claim based on counsel’s failure to request jury instructions on voluntary or involuntary manslaughter and that the judge created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by making "gratuitous interjections" to defendant's opening statement, examination of witnesses, and closing argument.View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law