Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A taxicab driver was robbed at knifepoint by a passenger wearing a hat that covered most of his face; the driver fired his pistol at the fleeing robber, wounding him in the back. Police located defendant near the scene of the robbery suffering from an apparent gunshot wound to his back, but no witness was able to identify him as the robber. Defendant claimed to have been shot in an unrelated incident by unknown assailants. Convicted of armed robbery, G.L. c. 265, 17, defendant appealed, arguing that certain statements allegedly made by the fleeing robber were hearsay and should not have been admitted; that a statement attributed to defendant contained in his medical records ("he was in a taxicab when he got shot") was inadmissible as hearsay; and that, even if not hearsay, the admission of the medical records violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The supreme court affirmed, finding error but no prejudice. The trial judge erred in admitting defendant's medical records under the statutory exception for business records, G.L. c. 233, 78, and the disputed portion of the records was not shown to be admissible under the hospital records statute, G.L. c. 233, 79. View "Commonwealth v. Irene" on Justia Law

After being convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition arising out of a shooting, defendant moved for a new trial, claiming ineffective representation by counsel. The judge granted the motion, noting that identity was the central issue and defense counsel had essentially promised in his opening statement that the jury would hear from a witness, Levesque, who had provided a description of the shooter markedly different from that of defendant. Defense counsel cited credibility concerns, stating, "I don't want to call Levesque because I don't have the burden of proof in this case,... This is about the police and what they did, and what they didn't do." Defense counsel was permitted to hypothesize about Levesque's absence in his closing argument. The Appeals Court reversed. The supreme court upheld the trial court decision. Having presided over the trial and a full hearing on the motion for a new trial, the judge was exceptionally well poised to assess the potential impact of Levesque's testimony on the case, to understand counsel's reasons for not calling Levesque, and to scrutinize whether that decision was manifestly unreasonable when made. View "Commonwealth v. Lane" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of manslaughter for "inflicting fatal injuries on a viable and near full term fetus during the birthing process" in violation of her "legal duty...to refrain from wanton or reckless acts committed against her own viable fetus." At issue was whether a woman in the midst of an unassisted childbirth could be held criminally responsible for the unintentional death of her viable fetus. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant on the theory that she was wanton or reckless in her acts of commission because the Commonwealth failed to prove that, once she decided to give birth unassisted, defendant had any alternative safe course of action. Additionally, the court concluded that, in light of the judge's findings that the Commonwealth had not proved that the baby was born alive, or that summoning medical assistance would have saved the baby's life, there was insufficient evidence that defendant's act of omission was the legal or proximate cause of the baby's death. The court also declined to recognize a duty of a woman, in these circumstances, to summon medical assistance, breach of which could give rise to criminal liability or involuntary manslaughter. View "Commonwealth v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, inter alia, that the city council's vote to remove Charles Turner, an elected Boston city councillor convicted of attempted extortion and other Federal crimes, was void, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. At issue were two certified questions: (1) Did the Charter of the City of Boston, or any other provision of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, authorize the Boston City Council to promulgate Rule 40A of the Rules of the Boston City Council and employ it to remove an incumbent Councillor from office before he was sentenced and removed automatically by operation of M.G.L.c. 279, section 30? and (2) If so, is Rule 40A a civil or a criminal provision of law? The court answered that the city council was authorized to promulgate Rule 40A but did not have the authority to employ the rule to remove Turner from office. In light of this answer, the court need not provide an answer to the second question. View "Turner & others v. City of Boston & others" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his convictions of murder in the second degree and related firearms charges. Defendant was convicted on retrial; the jury at his trial was unable to agree on a unanimous verdict. On appeal, defendant contended, among other things, that State and Federal double jeopardy protections precluded the judge at the second trial from instructing the jury on accessory liability where no such instruction was provided to the first jury. The court concluded that the instruction given at the second trial was appropriate, because it would have been supported by the evidence introduced at the first trial, and, in the circumstances of this case, did not invite the jury to convict on a theory of the crime abandoned or foreclosed by the Commonwealth at the first trial. The court discerned no other error that would warrant relief and affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Phim" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted pursuant to the parental kidnapping statute, G.L.c. 265, section 26A, after his five-year-old nonmarital son, G.G., disappeared while in defendant's care. Relying on Commonwealth v. McCarthy, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment (McCarthy motion) where defendant argued that the Commonwealth could not prove, as it must under the parental kidnapping statute, that he acted "without lawful authority" in allegedly taking G.G. To the extent the Commonwealth relied on G.L.c. 209C, section 10(b), to satisfy this element of the crime, defendant argued that the operation of that statute in these circumstances gave rise to an unconstitutional violation of his right to equal protection because it discriminated against him on the basis of gender. Because the indictment could properly rest on the application of another, gender-neutral statute, G.L.c. 209C, section 10(c), and because, in these circumstances, defendant could not raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to G.L.c. 209C, section 10(b), in a McCarthy motion, the court reversed the order allowing the motion to dismiss the indictment. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, murder in the second degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of deliberately premeditated murder and of armed assault with intent to murder. Defendant also challenged two jury instructions and claimed improper direct examination and closing argument by the trial prosecutor. The court affirmed defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and declined to exercise its power to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. The court affirmed the conviction of murder in the second degree. Because the court concluded that the omission of a jury instruction regarding defendant's knowledge that a codefendant was armed created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, the court reversed defendant's conviction of armed assault with intent to murder. Finally, the court affirmed defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm. View "Commonwealth v. Bolling" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned six indictments charging defendant with rape of a child under the age of sixteen by force. At defendant's first trial, the trial judge entered a required finding of not guilty on one of the indictments. The jury returned guilty verdicts on the remaining indictments. However, almost a year later, the judge allowed defendant's motion for a new trial. The case proceeded to a new trial on the remaining five indictments and defendant was subsequently convicted of all charges. On appeal, defendant argued that he was convicted of crimes for which he was not indicted; error in the admission of first complaint testimony; error by the judge's restriction of cross-examination of one of the victims and refusal to grant a mistrial; and error in the admission of bad act evidence. The court transferred the case on its own motion and subsequently affirmed the convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Roby" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with committing an assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age causing substantial bodily injury and wantonly and recklessly permitting an assault and battery on a child that caused substantial bodily injury. At defense counsel's request and with the Commonwealth's agreement, the judge instructed the jury that they could consider whether defendant recklessly endangered her child. The jury acquitted defendant of the offenses charged in the indictments but found her guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless endangerment. Defendant filed a motion to vacate the conviction, claiming that the crime of reckless endangerment of a child was not a lesser included offense and the jury instruction to the contrary that her counsel had requested should not have been given. The court concluded that, although erroneously charged, the lesser included offense instruction created no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court also held that the judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing admission of the expert testimony at issue. View "Commonwealth v. Roderiques" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of 23 out of 32 charges stemming from his participation in a string of robberies. On appeal, defendant argued that he was unduly prejudiced by the joinder of the charged offenses in a single trial, and that inculpatory evidence that was discovered in a search of his bags violated his rights under the U.S. Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and therefore should not have been admitted. The court concluded that the charges were joined properly for a single trial, but that the challenged evidence should have been suppressed. Accordingly, the convictions that relied on that evidence must be reversed. View "Commonwealth v. Magri" on Justia Law