Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The court granted the probationer's application for direct appellate review to consider whether his pending appeal from the revocation of his probation was rendered moot when he subsequently pleaded guilty to the crime on which that revocation was based. Because the court concluded that the probationer's claim of error, the reliability of the hearsay evidence used against him, pertained to the judge's factual finding that he violated his probation, the appeal was moot. View "Commonwealth v. Milot" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a petition in the Superior Court for the temporary commitment of David Gangi as a sexually dangerous person. At issue were the consequences of the Commonwealth's failure to meet procedural deadlines in sexually dangerous person proceedings initiated pursuant to G.L.c. 123A, 12(b). Because, in the present action, Gangi was confined for sixteen days more than the statutory minimum, and because this delay was not justified by any extraordinary circumstances, the court concluded that the Commonwealth's petition for civil commitment must be dismissed. View "Gangi v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree, as well as related crimes. On appeal, Defendant Facey contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction as a joint venturer; both defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed on defense of another; and Defendant Norris claimed he was entitled to a jury instruction that one of the elements of possession of a firearm was the lack of a license. The court rejected defendants' arguments, affirmed defendants' convictions, and declined to exercise its power to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Norris" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, aggravated burglary, and armed assault in a dwelling. Defendant subsequently sought to vacate the conviction of armed assault in a dwelling on the ground that it was duplicative of the conviction of aggravated burglary. The court concluded that defendant was entitled to challenge whether two of the convictions arising from his guilty plea were barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy, but that his challenge failed because the convictions of armed assault in a dwelling and aggravated burglary were not duplicative. Accordingly, the denial of defendant's motion to vacate his conviction was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Negron" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct and acquitted of assault as a result of a verbal altercation with her boyfriend. Defendant received two years of straight probation, with conditions, and subsequently appealed from her conviction. At issue was whether the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, which became effective after defendant had engaged in disorderly conduct but before the time of her trial, and which changed the punishment for a first offense, constituted a repeal of the prior version of that statute but, pursuant to G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, did not affect the punishment incurred before the repeal took affect. Rejecting defendant's arguments, the court held that it saw no clearly expressed intention by the Legislature to have the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, apply retroactively. The fact that a defendant who committed the offense of disorderly conduct before July 1, 2009, was not entitled to the benefit of the 2009 amendment may be, in defendant's view, an unfair consequence of G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, but it did not rise to the level of repugnancy. View "Commonwealth v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of being an accessory before the fact to the murder in the first degree of the victim. Defendant appealed from his conviction and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that there was no error relating to the testimony of two key prosecution witnesses and therefore trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the testimony. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court also declined to exercise its power pursuant to G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to order a new trial or enter a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt. View "Commonwealth v. Burgos" on Justia Law

Defendant and two others were indicted for the crime of aggravated rape, with joint enterprise as the sole aggravating factor. After defendant was convicted, defendant argued that, apart from the court's authority in capital cases under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, an appellate court was without authority to order entry of conviction of a lesser included offense. Defendant further argued that, where the Commonwealth did not request an instruction on the lesser included offense and the conviction on the greater offense was a nullity, the Commonwealth was not entitled to entry of a conviction on the lesser included offense. The court agreed with the Appeals Court and vacated so much of the conviction as alleged aggravated rape, let stand his conviction as to the lesser included offense of rape, and remanded the case to the Superior Court for resentencing as to the crime of rape. View "Commonwealth v. French" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on two indictments charging statutory rape. The alleged victim was his then fifteen year old niece. Defendants subsequently appealed from his convictions. The court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because the judge erred in excluding testimony of an expert and the evidence of childhood sexual abuse necessary to apply the expert opinion to the facts of this case, and because the error was prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Polk" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of carrying a firearm without a license; possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card; and possession of a loaded firearm. Defendants appealed, challenging, among other issues, the sufficiency of the evidence that they possessed the firearm. The court concluded that the evidence that defendants jointly and knowingly possessed the loaded firearm was sufficient as a matter of law. The court concluded, however, that the judge erred in denying defendants the opportunity to offer the affirmative defense that the firearm was manufactured before 1900 and therefore could be lawfully possessed without a license to carry and that this error could have materially influenced the firearm and ammunition convictions. Therefore, the court reversed the judgments of convictions for those charges and remanded for a new trial on those charges. View "Commonwealth v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm; unlawful possession of a loaded firearm; and unlawful possession of ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions of possession of a firearm and possession of a loaded firearm. The court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed his firearm convictions. Defendant also appealed from his conviction under the sentencing enhancement provision of G.L.c. 269, 10G(c), on the ground that the evidence presented in support of one of his three prior convictions, assault and battery, failed to establish that he committed a "violent crime" within the meaning of G.L.c. 140, section 121. The court agreed with defendant and vacated the judgment for conviction under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), as an armed career criminal based on three predicate offense convictions, and remanded the case for the entry of judgment and resentencing under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c), based on two predicate offense convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Eberhart" on Justia Law