Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After his conviction in 2005 of murder in the first degree and carrying a firearm without a license, and while his appeal to the court was pending, defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for postconviction discovery relating to evidence not disclosed by the Commonwealth. The court remanded the motions to the Superior Court. After separate hearings on the motions, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a new trial. The commonwealth appealed. The court affirmed the trial judge's order granting defendant a new trial and concluded that the judge did not abuse her discretion or commit any other error of law in granting defendant's motion. View "Commonwealth v. Murray" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an application in the county court under G.L.c. 278, section 33E for leave to appeal from the denial of his second motion for a new trial. A single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court on the question of whether a so-called Acevedo error in the jury instructions on the burden of proof on provocation presented a "new and substantial" question under the statute, and if it did, whether the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that defendant's claims were not new and substantial within the meaning of G.L.c. 278, section 33E. The court continued to adhere to the principle that single justices, whose decisions under section 33E were final and unreviewable, faced with gatekeeper applications under section 33E, would allow cases to proceed to the full court in all meaningful matters. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where an order shall be entered denying defendant's application for leave of appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for operating while under the influence of intoxication liquor (OUI), operating with a license suspended for a prior OUI, and operating with a revoked license, following an encounter with an off-duty Summerville police officer in the city of Woburn. At issue was the suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the Woburn encounter, on the ground that the off-duty officer performed an illegal extraterritorial arrest. Because the court concluded that the Summerville officer did not "arrest" defendant for the purposes of triggering the common-law rule against performing a citizen's arrest for a misdemeanor, and that his actions were reasonable preventive measures to ensure public safety, the court agreed with the motion judge that there was no need to exclude the evidence. The court also held that its conclusion was buttressed by the lack of any official misconduct on these facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order denying defendant's motion to suppress and affirmed the convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Limone" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying his petition pursuant to G.L.c. 211, section 3. Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictments against him in the Superior Court, arguing that they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The case was now before the court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21. The rule required petitioner to demonstrate "why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." Petitioner has failed to do so where a statute of limitations defense could adequately be addressed in the ordinary course of pretrial motions, trial, and appeal. Although petitioner claimed that he had a right not to be tried on the indictment because of the passage of time, a statute of limitations defense protected only the right to have charges brought in a timely fashion. Petitioner's remaining claims similarly could be raised and decided during the ordinary course of trial and appeal. View "Garden v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of a single justice of the court denying, without hearing, his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. The case before the court on defendant's memorandum pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, which required him to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or other available means." In his memorandum, which primarily focused on the merits of the judge's decision to revoke his sentence, defendant briefly asserted that he had no remedy in the ordinary appellate process. The court disagreed, if defendant was resentenced to a longer term, he could raise the revocation issue on appeal from that decision. View "Sarantakis v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of felony-murder, deliberate premeditation, and extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant was also convicted of armed robbery as the predicate felony and three charges of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of armed robbery to support his conviction of felony-murder, that there were numerous errors in the judge's instruction to the jury, and that his attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. The court held that because it concluded that no claim of error created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, and discerned no reason to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, defendant's convictions were affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of unarmed robbery of a person sixty years of age or older and was sentenced to life in prison after the trial judge found him guilty of being a habitual offender. At issue was whether the prosecutor's mathematical analysis in his closing argument of the probability that the lone eyewitness's identification of defendant was accurate created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where the analysis was not a reasonable doubt with a statistical probability. The court held that where, as here, the prosecution's case rested solely on an uncertain eyewitness identification and defendant's association with an admitted perpetrator of the crime, it did. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Ferreira" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, and also of armed assault with intent to kill. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Defendant argued that he was entitled to reversal of the convictions and a new trial because the courtroom was improperly closed during individual voir dire of prospective jurors; the judge, outside the presence of defendant, improperly questioned jurors and discussed questions from the jury; defendant was improperly denied a post trial evidentiary hearing on the possible bias of two deliberating jurors; the trial judge committed evidentiary errors; the judge's instructions on malice, voluntary manslaughter, and self-defense were in error; and his trial counsel was ineffective in many respects. The court thoroughly examined the record and affirmed defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, declining to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33 E. View "Commonwealth v. Dyer" on Justia Law

Petitioners (the witnesses) appealed from the denial by a single justice of their petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3. In their petition, the witnesses sought relief from a Superior Court order granting them immunity pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20C-20E, and ordering them to testify in the criminal trial of David Forlizzi and Fred Battista. The court held that the witnesses have not shown that they could not obtain adequate relief from the challenged orders in the normal process of appellate review. Therefore, the denial of their petition was proper. Insofar as the single justice considered the merits of the witnesses' claims, the court also concluded that he correctly determined that the scope of immunity provided to the witnesses pursuant to G.L.c. 233, section 20G, adequately protected their constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the single justice. View "Vaccari & another, petitioners" on Justia Law

This case was before the court pursuant to an order entered by the United States Supreme Court granting defendant's petition for certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding the case to the court for further consideration in light of McDonald v. Chicago. At issue was whether McDonald required the court to dismiss the three indictments charging defendant under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), with possession of a firearm and ammunition without a firearm identification (FID) card. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for (and was denied) a FID card to possess a firearm and ammunition, defendant could not challenge his convictions under G.L.c. 269, 10(h)(1), as unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Accordingly, there was no reason to alter the court's judgment. View "Commonwealth v. Loadholt" on Justia Law