Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony-murder in the first degree based on the predicate felony of attempted armed robbery, and related crimes. At issue was whether the jury should have been instructed that an alternative underlying felony for the felony-murder charge was armed home invasion committed with a firearm, a crime that at the relevant time did not carry a life sentence and therefore could have served as a predicate felony-murder in the second degree. The court held that, where the felony later advanced by defendant as the predicate for an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree was not itself the subject of a separate indictment, no error occurred if the trial judge did not charge the jury on it even though there could be sufficient evidence supporting such a charge, at least where, as here, no party requested such an instruction or even brought the issue to the judge's attention at trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. The court also held that defendant's argument that his separate conviction of armed home invasion merged with his felony-murder conviction must be vacated because it was not properly before the court. View "Commonwealth v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, armed home invasion, arson, and two charges of violation of an abuse prevention order. Defendant appealed both from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the absence of an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree with arson as the predicate felony required a reversal of defendant's conviction of felony-murder in the first degree. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's conviction of that crime, set aside the verdict, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, at the Commonwealth's option, a verdict of guilty of felony-murder in the second degree may be entered in lieu of a new trial on the murder indictment. The court affirmed defendant's other convictions. View "Commonwealth v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of his girlfriend (victim). On appeal, defendant contended that the admission into evidence of a tape of the 911 telephone call the victim made violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that the victim's 911 call was an excited utterance and was not testimonial because the court could infer from the victim's statements during the call that the victim had just been assaulted, that the victim was still in the same apartment building as the assailant, and that the victim was in danger until the police came or defendant fled. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Commonwealth v. Beatrice" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder with armed assault with the intent to rob as the predicate felony. Defendant was also convicted of armed assault in a dwelling, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. Defendant claimed error regarding the denial of his motion to suppress; claimed that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts and in limiting defendant's use of third-party culprit evidence; claimed that trial counsel should have requested a jury instruction concerning the effects of marijuana intoxication on defendant's ability to form the specific intent for murder with deliberate premeditation and the underlying felony for felony-murder; and requested that, pursuant to G.L.c. 278, section 33E, the court reduce the verdict on the murder charge or order a new trial. The court found no reversible error and therefore, affirmed the judgments of conviction and discerned to basis to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine, second offense, in violation of G.L.c. 94C, section 32A(d), and sentenced to a five-year mandatory term of imprisonment. At issue was whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the admissibility of the drug certificate in her direct appeal and for further failing to seek a stay of the appeal while Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz was pending in the Supreme Court. The court held that the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz was a new rule not applicable to convictions, such as defendant's, that had become final prior to its issuance. Consequently, there was no error in the admission of the drug certificate at defendant's trial based on the law in effect at the time. Because the court also held that defendant's attempt to obtain relief under the rubric of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed, the court affirmed the denial of her motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Boria" on Justia Law

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court concluded that a certificate of chemical analysis, sworn to by a state laboratory analyst and reporting the weight and chemical makeup of a seized substance, came within the class of testimonial statements subject to the protections of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. Consequently, the certificate was inadmissible as evidence in a criminal trial in the absence of testimony from the analyst who performed the underlying forensic analysis. At issue was whether the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court held that the rule announced in Melendez-Diaz, as it related to the applicability of the confrontation clause to certificates of chemical analysis (drug certificates), was a "new" rule within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, and as such, was not available to defendant in this appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of malicious burning of personal property, damage to property for the purpose of intimidation, and a civil rights violation where the convictions stemmed from defendant setting his homosexual neighbor's boat on fire. At issue was whether the statements that defendant made "off the record" during his interview with a state trooper were voluntary. The court held that the fact that the trooper's simple acquiescence to defendant's request that certain of his comments be "off the record" was not so manipulative or coercive that it deprived defendant of his ability to make a free and rational choice about whether to make such comments in the first instance. The court also held that this fact, taken together with all of the other circumstances surrounding the interview, which the court had already determined did not suggest coerciveness, supported the conclusion that defendant's statements were not involuntary. Accordingly, the court held that defendant's motion to suppress these statements were properly denied. View "Commonwealth v. Tremblay" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to a life term in State prison. On appeal, defendant contended that the judge erred by failing effectively to instruct the jury that only an intent to kill can support a conviction of premeditated murder in the first degree; allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony from cooperating witnesses that they were testifying "truthfully" pursuant to their cooperation agreement; allowing a cooperating witness to testify that members of the Latin Kings gang killed cooperating witnesses in prison; and in refusing to discharge a juror who reported being followed by a member of defendant's family. Defendant also raised other issues on appeal. The court concluded that the conviction in the first degree was supported by ample evidence and found no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that he should be granted a new trial because the trial judge erred by asking the members of the jury venire to make "mental note[s]" rather than raise their hands in response to any affirmative answer to the questions asked by the judge during jury selection; by allowing a witness to testify to defendant's silence after she accused him of the killing; by preventing defendant from admitting into evidence that the Commonwealth's key percipient witness had told another witness that he had not seen anything; in instructing the jury regarding transferred intent; and in refusing to ask the jury for clarification of their finding as to murder in the first degree, where they did not separately indicate that they based their verdict on a theory of deliberate premeditation. The court concluded as to each of these grounds that the judge either did not err or that his error did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and also concluded that there was no basis to exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce defendant's murder conviction to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a new trial.

Plaintiff, a workers' compensation claimant, brought suit against defendant regarding the company's conduct in referring his claim to the insurance fraud bureau (IFB), communicating with fraud investigators and prosecutors regarding his activity and claim, and using criminal processes to gain leverage in dealings with him. At issue was whether summary judgment in favor of defendant was properly denied. The court held that defendant enjoyed qualified immunity regarding its reporting of potentially fraudulent activity but that summary judgment was inappropriate because all of plaintiff's claims rely, at least in part, on conduct falling outside the scope of the immunity. The court also held that portions of plaintiff's claims could be barred by workers' compensation exclusivity under G.L.c. 152, but that not one of plaintiff's counts was barred entirely such that the Superior Court would be without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the Superior Court denying summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.