Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from an encounter between police and several residents, and their guests, in front of a home, which erupted into an altercation and the subsequent arrest of four men on a number of charges. Defendant and his brother (defendants) were convicted of disturbing the peace and defendant was also convicted of two counts of assault and battery on a police officer. At issue was the trial court's erroneous exclusion of certain statements made by the police officers. The court held that the exclusion of the statements did not rise to the level of constitutional error and was properly reviewed under the prejudicial error standard. In the court's review, the error was prejudicial and therefore, the court reversed defendants' convictions.

Defendant was convicted of attempted kidnapping of an eleven-year-old boy when he drove up to the boy, who was walking along the street, and told him to get in his car. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty because there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that his statement to police was improperly admitted in evidence. The court held that there was no evidence that defendant did anything but drive away after the boy refused to get into the vehicle and therefore, the court held that the trial judge erred in denying the motion for a required finding of not guilty. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and set aside the finding.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and carrying a firearm without a license. Defendant appealed from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that, in several respects, he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. Defendant also challenged his firearm conviction under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments and argued that the court should exercise its power under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt. The court held that because defendant had not asserted or made any showing that he applied for a license to carry a firearm, defendant could not challenge this conviction. The court also held that defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel as it related to evidence of defendant's gang affiliation, failure to introduce material exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument, and jury instructions. The court also held that there was no basis of relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of assault and battery of the victim when he punched him at a bowling alley. At issue was whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defense where he instructed the jury solely on whether the force that was used was greater than necessary in all circumstances. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and held that the error in the jury instruction on self-defense did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where defendant was not prejudiced by the incomplete instruction and where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant used unreasonable force in the circumstances.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial in which he sought to vacate guilty pleas he entered in 2005, on the ground that he was deprived of his right of effective assistance of counsel, as that right had recently been explicated in Padilla v. Kentucky. At issue was whether Padilla applied retroactively to defendant's collateral challenge to his convictions and, if so, whether he had demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings. The court held that Padilla did apply retroactively on collateral review of guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. The court also held that defendant had made an insufficient showing that had he been properly informed of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was charged with several offenses based on events that transpired after defendant and a companion pushed their way into an apartment where a dinner party was in progress. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to commit a felony. The court held that there was insufficient evidence where the inference that defendant intended to commit the felony of assault and battery by mean of a dangerous weapon or knew that his companion possessed a knife when they forced their way into the apartment could be plausible but could not bear the weight of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for entry of judgment of conviction on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and for sentencing pursuant to that offense.

Defendant appealed from his conviction of the deliberately premeditated murder of his estranged wife in May 2000. Defendant asserted several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a conversation between the victim and their daughter as an excited utterance that supplied the motive for the murder; in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial because the witness's testimony as to her observation of defendant inside the apartment building on the morning of the murder was admissible and because there was nothing objectionable about the questions soliciting that testimony; in concluding that the prosecutor's closing argument was not improper; and in refusing to give a so-called Commonwealth v. Bowden instruction where the judge's instructions on credibility and reasonable doubt were adequate and they allowed defendant the opportunity to present fully this factual issue to the jury. The court also held that there was no error in a jury instruction that defendant alleged, for the first time on appeal, failed adequately to explain deliberate premeditation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle after his license had been revoked for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At issue was whether the district court erred by admitting into evidence a certificate from the registry of motor vehicles attesting to the fact that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to defendant on a specified date. The court held that the admission of the certificate violated defendant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment where the registry certificate did not constitute a non-testimonial business record. The court also held that such admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the registry certificate was the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish notice. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed convictions related to several drug offenses. At issue was whether his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and statements was improperly denied where the warrantless search of his hotel room was unlawful, which thereby invalidated statements he later made to police as well as subsequent searches made by police pursuant to warrants. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress and held that, because the hotel manager lawfully evicted defendant from his room, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room at the time of the police search and the search therefore was not unlawful.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a new trial where he was convicted of second degree murder for the stabbing of an individual. At issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial because his defense counsel asked the judge not to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on reasonable provocation, even though the evidence permitted such an instruction. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial and held that the defense attorney's strategic decision was not manifestly unreasonable and that there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.