Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when he was stopped for speeding and then arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a license in violation of G.L. c. 90, 10. During the subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle, police recovered drugs, cash, and other items. At issue was whether the search was unlawful because defendant did not need a Massachusetts driver's license and possessed a valid Canadian driver's license at the time of the stop and therefore, the evidence recovered from the inventory search was fruits of an illegal search. The court affirmed the order allowing defendant's motion to suppress the evidence at issue where the arresting officer did not, in connection with defendant's arrest, take into account the statutory factors enumerated in G.L. c. 90, 3 1/2, for determining Massachusetts residency and therefore, lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for operating without a Massachusetts driver's license.

Defendant, charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and doing so in a school zone, moved successfully to suppress drugs that were seized from his person. At issue was whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and search his boot where they found 28 packaged bags of "crack" cocaine. The court held that the series of events seen by the experienced surveillance officer were more than sufficient for reasonable suspicion. However, the quantum of facts known to the police justified a stop of defendant for questioning but without more, those facts did not justify the search of defendant's boot, which required probable cause.

A juvenile was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on the grounds of a school in violation of G.L. c. 269, 10(j) when a knife, a recent birthday gift from his father, dropped out of his pocket during shop class and had been seen by the instructor who reported the juvenile to the dean. At issue was whether a knife that was not a per se dangerous weapon enumerated in G.L. c. 269, 10(b), could constitute a "dangerous weapon" as that term was used in section 10(j), when that knife was not being used in a dangerous manner. The court held that the phrase "dangerous weapon," as used in section 10(j), must be interpreted as incorporating the common law definition of that phrase. The definition included knives that were "designed and constructed to produce death, or great bodily harm" but that were not necessarily stilletos, daggers, dirk knives, or the other objects listed in section 10(j). Such knives were dangerous per se under the common law and thus prohibited from schools under section 10(j). The court also held that, although it appeared unlikely that the two-inch folding knife carried by the juvenile constituted a dangerous weapon within the common law definition, the court remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings to determine the design, purpose, and construction of the knife.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty when she ran over her husband several times and was convicted of an assault and battery on him by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant raised issues on appeal related to evidence of her mental impairment, the ineffective assistance of counsel, error in the judge's limiting instruction, and the reduction of her sentence. The court held that the jury was not properly instructed that they could consider evidence of mental impairment on the question of extreme atrocity or cruelty, but that the conviction of murder in the second degree could stand unless the Commonwealth elected to move for a new trial. Therefore, the court declined to decide the remaining issues and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater and sentenced to a one-year term of probation and ninety-day loss of license. The principal issue in this case was whether an annual certification, and accompanying diagnostic records, attesting to the proper functioning of the breathalyzer machine used to test defendant's blood alcohol content were admissible in a criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The court held that the certification and supporting records were created as part of a regulatory program providing standardized mechanisms for the routine maintenance of all breathalyzer machines throughout the Commonwealth and therefore, they were admissible evidence as business records pursuant to G.L.c. 233, 78, and were not testimonial statements within the scope of protection afforded by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, their admission in this case was not error and the conviction affirmed.

Defendant appealed a conviction of murder in the first degree where the predicate felony for felony-murder was an armed home invasion. Defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court reversed the conviction on the indictment charging armed home invasion where the indictment failed to specify the offense for which the defense was charged but affirmed defendant's conviction of felony-murder and illegal possession of a firearm. The court also held that, in light of the circumstances, the admission of the threat at issue did not unfairly prejudice the defendant and there was no error in admitting it. The court further held that self-defense was inapplicable to a charge of felony-murder so any error in the self-defense and excessive force instructions would have had no impact on felony-murder deliberations; that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; and that the judge did not err in deciding his motion for a new trial without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant appealed his conviction of possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and resisting arrest. At issue was whether the court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress and properly convicted him. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion and held that there was no error in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence where the firearm was recovered as a result of a lawful seizure of his person; there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of resisting arrest to and unlawful possession of a firearm where he charged at officers and used physical force against one officer; and there was no merit to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to suppress his statement in response to an officer where there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have could have inferred that he knew that the two men following him were police officers and that the police wished to stop him. The court also held that defendant's right to bear arms and to self-defense under the Second Amendment and his equal protection guarantees under Federal and State Constitutions were not violated.