Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Although Petitioner asked the court to exercise its general superintendence power pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, he did not identify the specific relief he was seeking. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, to the extent Petitioner sought relief from perceived injustices done or imposed on him in the trial court, his claims did not warrant extraordinary superintendence relief directly from the Supreme Judicial Court. View "Ardaneh v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition for relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner's first trial ended in a mistrial. After Petitioner successfully moved to suppress a preindictment buccal swab obtained by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth successfully moved to obtain a postindictment buccal swab from Petitioner. The superior court allowed the motion. Petitioner sought relief, and a single justice of the court denied relief, concluding that Petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief. View "Pinney v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder in the first degree but remanded for resentencing in accordance with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 466 Mass. 655 (2013), holding that because Defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense, resentencing was required.Defendant was sixteen years old when he shot and killed a fourteen year old boy. Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. In accordance with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 2, as the statute stood at the time of trial, Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that he was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error; and (2) pursuant to Diatchenko, held that Defendant should be resentenced so that he will be eligible for parole on his life sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Fernandes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted armed robbery, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress Defendant's text messages was not ineffective assistance of counsel because probable cause was established; (2) counsel was not ineffective for failing to exclude cell site location information; (3) Defendant was not was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to object to in-court and out-of-court identifications made by an eyewitness; and (4) there was no other basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Louis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of felony murder but vacated Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and remanded the matter for entry of a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, holding that the conviction of murder in the first degree was invalid.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of joint venture felony-murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony. On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that the first-degree murder conviction was invalid because, at the time of the offense, the felony of aggravated kidnapping did not exist, and therefore, Defendant could be convicted only of felony-murder in the second degree. Defendant also raised several allegations of error on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the interests of justice were best served by reducing the degree of guilt to murder in the second degree; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Commonwealth v. Trotto" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, on a theory of felony order, with aggravated rape as the predicate felony, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was sufficient evidence to prove that the homicide and the aggravated rape were parts of one continuous event; (2) if there was any error in the prosecutor's closing argument, Defendant was not prejudiced by it; (3) there was no error in the judge's Tuey-Rodriguez charge to the jury; (4) the judge's response to a jury question about the permissibility of inferences from a lack of evidence did not violate Defendant's right to due process; and (5) there was no reason to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Witkowski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court allowing Defendant's motion to suppress all of the statements he made after having invoked his right to counsel, holding that the trial judge did not err in granting the motion to suppress.Defendant was arrested on charges of murder in the first degree and possession of a firearm without a license. Although Defendant first agreed to waive his Miranda rights and speak with police in an interrogation room, twenty minutes after the interview began Defendant requested to speak with an attorney. Forty-five minutes later, Defendant again waived his Miranda rights and agreed with speak with the police. Defendant was subsequently interviewed for about one hour. Thereafter, Defendant moved to suppress all of the statements he made after having invoked his right to counsel. The superior court judge allowed the motion to suppress, concluding that it had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant reinitiated the interview and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err. View "Commonwealth v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful distribution of heroin as a subsequent offender and unlawful possession of heroin with intent to distribute as a subsequent offender, holding that the superior court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress and that there was no other error.In his suppression motion, Defendant sought to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of a motor vehicle. The superior court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion and Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the police had probable cause to search the vehicle, and there was no error in the denial of the motion to suppress; (2) the trial judge erred in allowing the admission of an in-court identification made by a police officer, but the error did not prejudice Defendant; and (3) there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice as to the jury instructions on possession and distribution of narcotics. View "Commonwealth v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

In this appeal from various orders regarding Defendant's pretrial detention status the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the single justice concluding that no due process violation occurred regarding one case and ruled that the other case was moot, holding that remand was required for a determination as to whether Defendant's continued pretrial confinement violates due process.Defendant had been held in pretrial detention for more than eighteen months on charges arising out of the Chelsea Division and the Lynn Division of the District Court Department. At the time of this opinion, Defendant had been held for over a year beyond his initial trial dates. Defendant was eventually acquitted of the charges in the Chelsea case. In the Lynn case, Defendant's trial was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At issue was whether the prolonged detention violated Defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) in analyzing whether a defendant's pretrial detention violates due process this opinion contains a procedural framework; (2) because Defendant was acquitted in the Chelsea case, that case was moot; and (3) as to the Lynn case, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Mushwaalakbar v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the sentencing judge denying Defendant's motion to dismiss revocation proceedings and the finding that Defendant violated conditions of his probation, holding that there was no error.Defendant was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a child and sentenced to two separate periods of incarceration, the latter of which was to be suspended in favor of probation. Upon release from his confinement, Defendant began serving the probation phase of his sentence. One year later, Defendant was found to have violated the conditions of his probation, and his probation was revoked. On appeal, Defendant argued that his probationary term should have terminated prior to the occurrence of the violations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that it was not fundamentally unfair to delay the commencement of Defendant's probationary term until he was released from the treatment center into the community. View "Commonwealth v. Medina" on Justia Law