Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder and declined to exercise its power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the conviction to murder in the second degree, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below.After he was convicted Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance particularly in regards to DNA evidence presented by the Commonwealth. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Defendant appealed, raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, for the first time, a challenge that certain evidence should have been excluded as hearsay. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the challenged testimony was properly admitted against Defendant as a statement by a party opponent; and (2) none of Defendant's claims of error regarding defense counsel's treatment of the DNA evidence required a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Barnett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of simple assault and threatening to commit a crime, holding that the criminal docket of one of Defendant's friends was improperly admitted as evidence against Defendant and that the jury was permitted to return a guilty verdict without reaching a unanimous consensus as to which facts supported that charge.Defendant's convictions stemmed from a violent encounter among four men. During trial, the judge allowed into evidence a copy of the certified criminal docket in Defendant's friend's Charles's case, which reflected that Charles had pleaded guilty to assault by means of a dangerous weapon for an incident charged on the same day as the incident in which Defendant was charged. On appeal, Defendant argued that the certified docket sheet from Charles's case should not have been admitted and that the jury should have been given a specific unanimity instruction with respect to the offense of threatening to commit a crime. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that both claims constituted reversible error. The Court vacated the convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Palermo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the jury's verdict in favor of Defendant in this medical malpractice action for injuries arising after surgery, holding that while the trial judge did not err under current law of evidence in excluding certain out-of-court statements, under new grounds for finding unavailability adopted in this opinion, the testimony's absence was grounds for a new trial.The out-of-court statements at issue in this case were made by a medical student who participated in the surgery. The trial judge determined that the statements could not be entered in evidence as statements of a party opponent made by an agent nor as statements against interest by an unavailable declarant. The Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial after taking the opportunity to adopt as a matter of common law proposed Mass. R. Evid. 804(a)(3), which would allow a declarant in a civil case to be deemed unavailable if he or she testifies to a lack of memory about the subject matter in question. The Court held that if the trial judge had had the benefit of the grounds for finding unavailability adopted today, it would have been an abuse of discretion not to have admitted the statements as statements against interest by an unavailable witness. View "Hedberg v. Wakamatsu" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E but reversed the order denying Defendant's motion for third-party discovery and vacated the orders denying Defendant's motions for a new trial, holding that Defendant's motion for third-party discovery should have been allowed and that denying Defendant's motions for a new trial without first conducting an evidentiary hearing was error.The Supreme Court remanded this case to the superior court to allow Defendant to conduct the requested third-party discovery of e-mail service providers to determine whether additional e-mail messages between the victim and a third-party culprit existed. The Court noted that Defendant may amend his second motion for a new trial to include any information obtained as a result of the discovery requests. View "Commonwealth v. Holbrook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated three of the indictments in this case for a new trial, holding that the trial judge improperly failed to include certain language from paragraph three of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 105(b), in the instruction to the jury on the charges of secretly videotaping children but that paragraph three is not unconstitutionally vague.Defendant was convicted on ten indictments charging him with secreting videotaping unsuspecting individual adults who were nude or partially nude, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 105(b), paragraph one. Defendant was also convicted on five indictments charging violation of paragraph three of the statute for secretly videotaping children during the same incident. In a posttrial decision, the trial judge declared that paragraph three of the statute was unconstitutionally vague and vacated Defendant's convictions of videotaping the children. The Supreme Court remanded for a new trial three of the five convictions for videotaping the children, holding (1) the proper unit of prosecution under section 105(b), first paragraph, is based on the individual victims; and (2) section 105(b), third paragraph, is not unconstitutionally vague, but the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on these charges. View "Commonwealth v. Wassilie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below and that there was no reason for this Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 237, 33E to grant a new trial or to either reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the cell site location information used by the Commonwealth in this case; (2) no other reversible error occurred in this case; and (3) reversal was not warranted due to cumulative error. View "Commonwealth v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that interference with the lawful duties of a police officer is a common-law crime in Massachusetts but that the evidence was not sufficient in this case to establish that Defendant committed the crime of interference with a police officer.A jury convicted Defendant of interference with a police officer. At issue on appeal was whether the crime of which Defendant was convicted is recognized under Massachusetts common law. After examining Nineteenth Century jurisprudence, as well as other authoritative sources, the Supreme Judicial Court held that interference with the lawful duties of a police officer was, and continues to be, a common-law crime subject to carefully constructed limitations to avoid criminalizing constitutionally protected activities. The Court, however, vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of interference with a police officer. View "Commonwealth v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgments entered against Defendant and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the dismissal of a juror was prejudicial error and that there was sufficient evidence to survive Defendant's motion for required findings of not guilty.A jury found Defendant guilty of multiple charges relating to the illegal possession and improper storage of firearms and ammunition. During deliberations, a juror informed a court officer that she could not continue to deliberate. After a colloquy with the juror, the judge discharged the deliberating juror and replaced her with an alternate juror. Ninety minutes later, the jury found Defendant guilty. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the juror was discharged for reasons that were not purely personal to the juror, and her dismissal was prejudicial error; and (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for required findings of not guilty. View "Commonwealth v. Tiscione" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and firearm offenses, holding that four trial errors required that the verdicts be vacated and set aside and this matter remanded to the superior court for a new trial.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court erred in admitting a coventurer's statements against Defendant under the joint venture exemption to the hearsay rule, and admission of the statements was barred by the Sixth Amendment; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the opinion of the Commonwealth's gang expert, and the error was prejudicial; (3) the trial court erred in allowing police witnesses to give their opinions as to the identity of individuals depicted in surveillance footage; and (4) the prosecutor engaged in impermissible argument during closing, and a new trial was required. View "Commonwealth v. Wardsworth" on Justia Law

In this case involving Defendant's failure to properly install child safety seats in her vehicle, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment as to Dylan Riel but affirmed Defendant's two convictions of negligent homicide, holding that there was insufficient evidence to show that Defendant's conduct was wanton or reckless.Defendant was involved in a multi-vehicle accident in which her two nephews - four-year-old Dylan Riel and and sixteen-month-old Jayce Garcia - were fatally injured. At the time of the accident Dylan was seated in the backseat of Defendant's sedan with a seat belt fastened but without an age and size appropriate child safety booster seat. Jayce was in a front-facing safety seat with the straps set too high rather than an age and size appropriate rear-facing safety seat. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter of Dylan, reckless endangerment of Dylan, and negligent motor vehicle homicide of Dylan and Jayce. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction of manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child and otherwise affirmed, holding that there was not legally sufficient evidence to show Defendant's conduct was wanton or reckless. View "Commonwealth v. Hardy" on Justia Law