Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter but affirmed Defendant's conviction of distribution of heroin, holding that the Commonwealth did not introduce evidence showing that Defendant knew or should have known that his conduct created a high degree of likelihood of substantial harm.Defendant had provided a college student with the heroin that caused the student's death. Defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and distribution of heroin. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the judge erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of possession of heroin for personal use because the student asked Defendant to purchase heroin for him and Defendant did not profit from the sale. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the judge did not err in denying Defendant's request for a lesser included jury instruction on simple possession; but (2) there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant's conduct created a high degree of likelihood that the student would suffer substantial harm for his use of the heroin. View "Commonwealth v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the motion judge denying Defendant's motion for access to evidence and scientific and forensic testing pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A, holding that, given the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Following the enactment of chapter 278A, Defendant sought DNA testing of nine items of evidence seeking permission to test the evidence using newer and more discriminating test kits that had not existed at the time of his conviction. The trial judge denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion based on the evidence that was presented at the motion hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Linton" on Justia Law

In this case involving the pretrial diversion of Defendant, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the language of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276A, 3 requires arraignment, at the Commonwealth's request, before a defendant can participate in a pretrial diversion program.Defendant was charged with assault and battery. After Defendant's initial appearance before a judge she moved to continue her arraignment sot hat she could be assessed for eligibility for pretrial diversion. The judge continued the arraignment over the Commonwealth's objection and also ordered, as a condition of release, that Defendant stay away from the alleged victim. Thereafter, the judge determined that Defendant was eligible for pretrial diversion and imposed conditions of release. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter for further proceedings, holding (1) under the pretrial diversion statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276A, 3, a judge may not decline to arraign an adult defendant, over the Commonwealth's objection, and instead direct the defendant to a pretrial diversion program; and (2) whether during the screening period prior to arraignment or thereafter if the Commonwealth does not seek arraignment, a judge may order conditions of release, including GPS monitoring by the probation service. View "Commonwealth v. Newberry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the superior court affirming the Sex Offender Registry Board's (SORB) classification of John Doe No. 23656 as a level two sex offender, holding that Doe's claims on appeal were unavailing.Specifically, the Court held (1) contrary to Doe's argument on appeal, the hearing examiner did not disregard the testimony of Doe's expert witness in evaluating the evidence, but rather, declined to "wholly adopt" the expert's conclusions; (2) there was sufficient evidence to classify Doe as a level two sex offender; and (3) Doe failed to demonstrate that his registration information should not be made available on the Internet. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, holding that because there was no evidence that Defendant was acting in his professional capacity when he committed the offense, the judge erred in denying Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.During the time of his offense, Defendant was a police officer in a K-9 unit and was trained as a mandated reporter but was in plain clothes when he assaulted the victim. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a required finding of not guilty. After he was convicted, Defendant appealed, arguing that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to establish each element of the offense charged. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the Commonwealth presented no evidence to suggest that Defendant was acting in his capacity as a police officer at the time of the crime, the judge should have allowed Defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty. The Court then remanded the matter for entry of a judgment of guilty of the lesser included offense of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. View "Commonwealth v. Gomes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the judge made no prejudicial error in his evidentiary rulings; (2) nothing in the prosecutor's closing argument created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty; (4) the jury's verdict was consonant with justice; and (5) this Court declines to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Reyes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict, holding that none of Defendant's allegations of error warranted reversal.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury and in admitting conversations recorded while Defendant was in pretrial detention. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instructions did not prejudice Defendant; and (2) there was no violation of Defendant's constitutional rights in the admission of the recorded conversations. View "Commonwealth v. Odgren" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held in this plurality opinion that it is generally advisable for prosecutors to instruct grand juries on the elements of lesser offenses and defenses when such instructions would help the grand jury to understand the legal significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses but that the indictment in this case should not have been dismissed.Specifically at issue was whether the Commonwealth's failure to provide instructions to the grand jury regarding the significance of the mitigating evidence it presented required dismissal of an indictment against an adult for murder in the first degree. The justices who subscribed to this plurality opinion held that the dismissal of an indictment due to the lack of instructions is appropriate when the instructions likely would have given effect to a complete defense. Two other justices would hold that the integrity of a grand jury is impaired by a prosecutor's failure to give instructions only in cases where there has been affirmative prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Judicial Court held that because this case failed to satisfy the standards for dismissal set forth in the plurality opinion and the concurring opinion, the indictment should not have been dismissed. View "Commonwealth v. Fernandes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part the superior court's order denying in part and affirming in part Defendant's motions to suppress, holding that the superior court erred in denying Defendant's motions to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his cellular telephone and the cell site location information (CSLI).Police officers asked a Spanish-speaking officer untrained in interpretation to translate Miranda warnings and an interrogation into Spanish. Defendant subsequently waived his rights and spoke with police. Defendant also gave the officers permission to search his telephone. Officers used that information to obtain a warrant for the CSLI on Defendant's phone. Defendant filed several motions to suppress. The superior court allowed the motions with respect to the custodial statements but denied them in all other respects. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the identifications did not require suppression; (2) the translation of the Miranda warnings into Spanish was inadequate to apprise Defendant of his rights; (3) because the search of Defendant's cellular telephone arose from the statements he made following the incomplete Miranda warnings, the evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed; and (4) the affidavit in support of the search warrant for the CSLI did not establish probable cause to access the CLSI for Defendant's device. View "Commonwealth v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the motion judge denying Defendant's second motion for a new trial, holding that there was no clear error or abuse of discretion and that there was no reason for this Court to exercise its power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or to grant a new trial.Defendant was convicted of murder. In his second motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that new evidence cast real doubt on the justice of his conviction. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge found that Defendant had not met his burden of showing that the new evidence was material and credible or that it cast real doubt on the justice of his conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the motion judge's conclusion that new witnesses who offered testimony implicating someone else were neither credible nor material and did not cast real doubt on the justice of Defendant's conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Bonnett" on Justia Law