Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal centering around the scope of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing the Supreme Judicial Court held that, on the facts of this case, the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving any of the three elements articulated in Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 540 (2005).Defendant was indicted for one count of intimidation of a witness. In lieu of the witness’s testimony at Defendant’s trial, the Commonwealth moved in limine to admit in evidence the witness’s out-of-court statements under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The motion judge denied the motion, citing Edwards. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the motion judge did not err in ruling that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing did not apply in this case because the Commonwealth failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the three elements required under Edwards. View "Commonwealth v. Rosado" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the trial judge’s grant of the motions to dismiss filed by the two defendants in these companion cases and remanded the cases for trial, holding that Defendants were not entitled to dismissals because Defendants’ right to a speedy trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 had not been violated and because the judge abused his discretion in dismissing the indictments for failure to prosecute.Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that one year had elapsed since their arraignments. The trial judge allowed the motions to dismiss with prejudice. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissals, holding (1) because an essential witness resisted appearing at trial, the period that the trial was continued for this reason should be excluded under Rule 36(b)(2)(B) or (F), placing the Commonwealth within the time limits of the rule; and (2) the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence in producing the witness did not rise to the level that would warrant dismissal. The Court further held that time can be excluded under Rule 36 based on a defendant’s acquiescence only where the defendant has agreed to or failed to object to a continuance or other delay, and the scheduling of an event alone does not constitute delay. Where the defendant has acquiesced, a delay can be excluded under Rule 36 even where it does not affect the presumptive trial date. View "Commonwealth v. Graham" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the denial of a motion for reconsideration of the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated.The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the discovery that Defendant characterized as “mandatory” and argued was untimely provided to him was not mandatory discovery; (2) even if it did constitute mandatory discovery, a defendant who does not want the speedy trial clock to be tolled where a scheduled event is continued because of the Commonwealth’s delay in providing mandatory discovery must, under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(1)(C), move to compel the production of that discovery or move for sanctions, which Defendant failed to do; (3) a criminal defendant who moves to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on the basis that his right to a speedy trial under Rule 36 and the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions was violated, is entitled to review of such constitutional claims even where his Rule 36 claim is denied. View "Commonwealth v. Dirico" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for restoration of his license, holding that the plain language of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 24(1)(f)(1) and the legislative history precluded the relief sought by Defendant.Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended in 2010 because he refused to consent to a breathalyzer after his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI). Defendant’s license was subject to a lifetime suspension because he had three prior convictions of OUI when he refused the breathalyzer. When Defendant was found not guilty of the 2010 OUI charge, he filed several motions to have his license restored. The district court granted Defendant’s 2017 motion for restoration of his license. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the 2017 motion was not authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 24 because it did not satisfy the “immediacy” requirement of the statute. View "Commonwealth v. Richards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and carrying a firearm without a license, holding that Defendant’s right to a fair trial as provided by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and Commonwealth v. Soares, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), was violated during the trial proceedings.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the Commonwealth improperly excluded black men from the jury. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding no pattern after Defendant’s second objection to the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory challenges on black men. View "Commonwealth v. Robertson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute but reversed Defendant’s conviction of criminal trespass, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for criminal trespassing.Defendant was arrested for selling cocaine in the parking lot of a grocery store. On appeal from his convictions, Defendant challenged his convictions and the denial of his motion to suppress evidence related to his cell phone that was seized during a search incident to his arrest. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding (1) a law enforcement officer’s testimony about the content of one of Defendant’s text massages did not constitute impermissible hearsay and was properly admitted; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction of criminal trespass. View "Commonwealth v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and possession of a firearm without a license, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error in the proceedings belowSpecifically, the Court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Defendant’s motions for funds for an expert and for a continuance on the eve of trial; (2) there are no grounds for the Court to exercise its extraordinary authority to reduce the verdict from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree or manslaughter; and (3) Defendant did not preserve his claim that his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment was violated because the courtroom was closed during jury empanelment. The Court, however, remanded the matter for resentencing consistent with Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District., 466 Mass. 655 (2013). View "Commonwealth v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that, in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), juvenile delinquency adjudications for violent offenses may serve as predicate offenses for adults under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10G.Defendant was indicted at age eighteen for unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant had twice between adjudicated delinquent for crimes of violence, and therefore, the Commonwealth charged Defendant with violating the ACCA. While the case was proceeding, a superior court judge sua sponte raised the issue of whether it was a violation of due process to use juvenile adjudications to enhance sentencing in the same manner as adult convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court allowed Defendant’s application for direct appellate review and held that qualifying juvenile adjudications may be used as a predicate offense for enhanced penalties under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10G. View "Commonwealth v. Baez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions, holding that the prosecutor’s closing argument telling the jury of critical corroborative evidence that was not presented at trial was prejudicial error.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts of rape of a child and one count of indecent assault and battery upon a child. Defendant appealed, asserting three claims of error. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the superior court for a new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper closing argument, which the Court held could have influenced the jury to convict. The Court then addressed Defendant’s other two claims of error by holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the expert testimony of the treating physician of the victim, and (2) the judge did not unfairly limit the jury’s consideration of the Bowden defense by instructing the jury to decide the case based solely on the evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree and declined to exercise its extraordinary power to set aside or reduce the verdict under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel failed and that the trial judge did not commit reversible error in her rulings.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in admitting portions of a recorded police interview; (2) the trial judge properly admitted testimony regarding an argument a witness had with the victim; (3) the judge did not err in disallowing defense counsel’s line of questioning to a witness; and (4) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the proceedings below. View "Commonwealth v. Cruzado" on Justia Law