Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During an armed home invasion at a Dudley apartment, Muller and an accomplice, who subsequently pleaded guilty, shot and killed two occupants and critically wounded a third. Muller was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree, on the theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, armed assault with intent to murder, armed home invasion and unlawful possession of a firearm. At trial, Muller admitted that he had shot the victims; his primary defense was that he lacked criminal responsibility because of mental illness and cocaine addiction. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. While the jury instructions were erroneous in failing to clarify that the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol does not preclude the defense of lack of criminal responsibility where the mental disease or defect, standing alone, causes the defendant to lose the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Although the instruction regarding the inference of sanity was error, the judge ameliorated the error where he specifically instructed the jury that they did not have to draw such an inference, especially in light of the jury's view of the expert medical testimony. View "Commonwealth v. Muller" on Justia Law

Double jeopardy principles did not preclude the Commonwealth from retrying Defendant on a complaint charging a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 24(1)(a)(1) on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle with a percentage of alcohol in his blood of .08 or greater (per se violation) after a jury acquitted Defendant on the theory of operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (impaired ability violation). The Commonwealth prosecuted the case on both theories, and the jury reached a verdict on the impaired ability violation only. After a new complaint issued charging a per se violation of chapter 90, section 24(1)(a)(1), Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as a violation of his double jeopardy rights.The judge denied the motion. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that retrial was constitutionally permitted where the Commonwealth prosecuted the case on both theories and the jury reached a verdict on only one of those theories. View "Commonwealth v. Hebb" on Justia Law

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A requires law enforcement to take reasonable measures to serve abuse prevention orders, and in order for the service of the orders to be reasonable, the manner of service must comply with the terms of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.A district court judge granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence relating to, and discovered as a result of, the stop of his vehicle, finding that the purpose of the stop was to serve an abuse prevention order. The Supreme Judicial Court answered in the negative a question reported by the judge asking whether chapter 209A authorizes the police to effectuate a motor vehicle stop to serve a civil abuse prevention order. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that whether a stop to serve a chapter 209A order is reasonable depends on an objective assessment of the necessity of doing so in light of all facts known to law enforcement at the time. View "Commonwealth v. Sanborn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant, holding that the search warrant lacked probable cause.Defendant was indicted on various charges in connection with the possession of an unlicensed firearm. Two of those charges included sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered from a safe pursuant to a search warrant and also moved to dismiss the sentence enhancements. Both motions were denied. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the denial of both motions and remanded the matters to the county court, holding (1) the search warrant that yielded a gun, a magazine, and ammunition lacked probable cause; and (2) the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to the grand jury to support the armed career criminal enhancements. View "Commonwealth v. Mora" on Justia Law

The designation of prima facie evidence in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 37 - pursuant to which an individual commits larceny if, with the intent to defraud, he obtains goods or services in exchange for a check that the individual wrote knowing there were insufficient funds in the account from which the check draws - and the instruction stemming from the statute are unconstitutional.Defendant appealed his conviction of four counts of larceny by uttering a false check, arguing that the prima facie designation in the statute and the related instruction are constitutionally infirm because an individual’s failure to pay a check within two days of notice of dishonor does not have a sufficiently logical connection to the individual’s knowledge of insufficient funds or intent to defraud at the time the check was written. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Defendant but nonetheless affirmed his convictions because the instructional error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Littles" on Justia Law

In these two cases, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) contended that when it unsuccessfully seeks after July 23, 2013 to reclassify a level two sex offender as a level three sex offender, that individual is reclassified a level two sex offender for purposes of Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 6 NE 3d 530 (Mass. 2014), and therefore, SORB may publish the individual’s registry information on the Internet. In Moe, the Supreme Judicial Court permanently enjoined SORB from publishing on the Internet the registry information of any individual who was classified as a level two sex offender on or before July 12, 2013 unless that individual is later reclassified a level two or level three sex offender. In the instant cases, a hearing officer denied SORB’s motion for reclassification and retained the earlier level two classification. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded to the superior court for the issuance of a permanent injunction barring publication of each plaintiff’s registry information on the Internet unless and until the offender is reclassified a level three sex offender, holding that, under Moe, a sex offender is “reclassified” only where a hearing officer allows SORB’s motion to increase his classification based on new information indicating an increased risk of sexual recidivism. View "Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 326573 v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

Defendant was determined to be a sexually dangerous person (SDP) pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A and was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for an indeterminate period of from one day to life. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) is a constitutionally inadequate basis for commitment as an SDP. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment and order for Defendant’s civil commitment as an SDP, holding (1) an ASPD diagnosis is adequate to satisfy the definitional requirements of an SDP where the Commonwealth also proves that, as a result of the ASPD, the individual is likely to engage in sexual offenses if not civilly committed; and (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motions in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding his likelihood of reoffense and in precluding the admission of risk category labels for the Static-99R risk assessment tool. View "Commonwealth v. George" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The court held (1) while not overwhelming, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a matter of law to support Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree, and therefore, there was no error in the judge’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a required finding; but (2) the trial judge’s failure to require an explanation of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of a prospective juror, who was African-American, was error, and because the error constituted structural error for which prejudice is presumed, the case must be remanded to the superior court for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

Since 2009, AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. (ASGCC) has been operating a free hypodermic needle access program in a village in Barnstable. The Town of Barnstable ordered the cessation of the program, asserting that ASGCC was in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 27 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, 215. In response to the Town’s cease and desist order, ASGCC filed this action seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that its nonsale needle access program was not statutorily prohibited. The superior court judge reported the question to the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court allowed ASGCC’s application for direct appellate review. The court remanded the matter to the superior court for entry of a declaration that neither statute prohibits ASGCC from engaging in free distribution of hypodermic needles and an injunction permanently enjoining enforcement of the Town’s order to cease and desist, holding that the plain language of the statutes does not proscribe free distribution of hypodermic needs by a private individual or organization such as ASGCC that does not operate a program implemented by the Department of Public Health. View "AIDS Support Group of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable" on Justia Law

The trial judge erred by permitting the Commonwealth to respond to Defendant’s affirmative defense of entrapment by introducing evidence of three prior convictions despite Defendant’s objection that they were too stale to be probative of his predisposition to commit the crime. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for distribution of heroin, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge erred in admitting Defendant’s prior bad acts underlying the three prior convictions where the acts all took place at least nineteen years before the crime charged in this case; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Commonwealth v. Denton" on Justia Law