Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court held in this case that the principles of double jeopardy bar the imposition of a consecutive sentence of eight years’ probation, imposed in 2015 by a judge who was not the plea judge, where Defendant originally had been sentenced in 2005 to an eight-year term of probation concurrent with his ten-year prison sentence. Specifically, Defendant was not resentenced to a term of consecutive probation when the original sentencing judge vacated the community parole supervision for life portion of his sentence. The court remanded the matter to the superior court for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth’s motion to correct and clarify the sentence as moot on the ground that Defendant’s sentence had been completed before the motion was filed. View "Commonwealth v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

In appropriate circumstances a judge has discretion to impose a concurrent State prison sentence nunc pro tunc to the commencement of a house of correction sentence then being served.Defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for credit for time served in a house of correction for one set of offenses while he was awaiting trial on a second-unrelated set of offenses. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court judge’s order denying the motion for jail credit, holding that although Defendant was not entitled as of right to the credit he sought, the superior court judge failed to consider whether the circumstances warranted ordering Defendant’s concurrent State prison sentence to commence nunc pro tunc to commencement of the house of correction sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Lydon" on Justia Law

In 1969, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of assault with intent to rob. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. After the denial of Defendant’s seventh motion for a new trial Defendant sought leave to appeal pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. A single justice of the court denied such leave, concluding that the motion failed to present a “new and substantial question.” The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding that, despite Defendant’s assertion, Defendant’s appeal ought not be permitted to proceed despite the longstanding rule that the decision of the gatekeeper is “final and unreviewable.” View "Commonwealth v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Private Counsel Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services (collectively, CPCS) has the sole authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211D for the assignment of counsel to indigent criminal defendants, and a judge may not override that authority to accommodate a preference for attorneys willing to assume a more collaborative role in drug court proceedings.CPCS brought this petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking an order affirming CPCS’s independent authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211D to select and supervise attorneys for indigent defendants in the pilot program it launched in the drug court. This action arose after a district court justice removed CPCS attorneys from drug court cases to which they had been assigned and excluded CPCS attorneys from assignment to any new case in the drug court. The Supreme Judicial Court held that where a drug court defendant who is indigent is alleged to have violated the terms of probation, the judge must appoint CPCS as counsel, and counsel assigned by CPCS may be removed only for cause after a hearing. View "Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Division of the District Court Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its extraordinary power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial. The Court held (1) any error committed by trial counsel during trial did not alter the jury’s verdict, and therefore, Defendant received constitutionally effective assistance of counsel; and (2) testimony elicited from the medical examiner did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. View "Commonwealth v. Montrond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, filed a petition for parole, which the Parole Board denied. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the nature of certiorari alleging that the board violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and cognate state provisions. The superior court allowed the board’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the motion judge erred in allowing the board’s motion to dismiss because the board failed first to file the administrative record pursuant to a standing order of the superior court; and (2) contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Plaintiff’s commuted life sentence remains a “life sentence” within the meaning of 120 Code Mass. Regs. 301.01(5). The court remanded the case for further development of the record. View "Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

In 1983, Defendant was convicted of one count of arson in a dwelling house and eight counts of murder in the second degree. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, asserting newly discovered evidence regarding the conditions under which he confessed to the crime and recent fire research. A superior court judge allowed the motion, concluding that the newly discovered evidence cast real doubt on the justice of Defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding that, under the totality of the judge’s findings and the confluence-of-factors analysis developed subsequent to her decision in this case, the judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that justice was not done in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court clarified the application of the Florida v. Jardines warrant requirement to a search in a multifamily home. The Court held (1) the side yard of Defendant’s multifamily home in this case was a “constitutionally protected area," and law enforcement’s intrusion into that area to search for a weapon implicated the constitutional warrant requirement; and (2) the superior court properly allowed Defendants’ motions to suppress the loaded sawed-off shotgun found under the porch because the warrantless intrusion here was an unlawful physical intrusion into the curtilage of the residence, therefore violating the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Leslie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted one provision in the habitual criminal statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, 25(a), which provides for an enhanced penalty where a defendant has two prior convictions resulting in prison sentences of three or more years, to require that the underlying convictions arise from separate incidents or episodes of criminal behavior. In so holding, the Court affirmed the superior court order dismissing the habitual offender portions of the indictments currently pending against Defendant, holding that the Commonwealth failed to provide the grand jury with sufficient evidence to support the habitual offender portions of the indictments. View "Commonwealth v. Garvey" on Justia Law

A jury found Earl T. Fulgiam and Michael T. Corbin guilty as joint venturers of murder in the first degree of Kevin Thomas, Jr. and Billie Marie Kee. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain cellular telephone records; (2) the admission of fingerprint cards attributed to Defendants did not violate Defendants’ right to confront witnesses against them; (3) the trial judge did not err in admitting a fingerprint analyst’s testimony related to the fingerprint analysis; and (4) the prosecutor permissibly inferred that a “team” of men committed the murders. View "Commonwealth v. Fulgiam" on Justia Law