Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Private Counsel Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services (collectively, CPCS) has the sole authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211D for the assignment of counsel to indigent criminal defendants, and a judge may not override that authority to accommodate a preference for attorneys willing to assume a more collaborative role in drug court proceedings.CPCS brought this petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking an order affirming CPCS’s independent authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211D to select and supervise attorneys for indigent defendants in the pilot program it launched in the drug court. This action arose after a district court justice removed CPCS attorneys from drug court cases to which they had been assigned and excluded CPCS attorneys from assignment to any new case in the drug court. The Supreme Judicial Court held that where a drug court defendant who is indigent is alleged to have violated the terms of probation, the judge must appoint CPCS as counsel, and counsel assigned by CPCS may be removed only for cause after a hearing. View "Deputy Chief Counsel for the Public Defender Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Acting First Justice of the Lowell Division of the District Court Department" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and declined to exercise its extraordinary power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial. The Court held (1) any error committed by trial counsel during trial did not alter the jury’s verdict, and therefore, Defendant received constitutionally effective assistance of counsel; and (2) testimony elicited from the medical examiner did not violate Defendant’s right of confrontation pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. View "Commonwealth v. Montrond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, filed a petition for parole, which the Parole Board denied. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the nature of certiorari alleging that the board violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and cognate state provisions. The superior court allowed the board’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the motion judge erred in allowing the board’s motion to dismiss because the board failed first to file the administrative record pursuant to a standing order of the superior court; and (2) contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Plaintiff’s commuted life sentence remains a “life sentence” within the meaning of 120 Code Mass. Regs. 301.01(5). The court remanded the case for further development of the record. View "Crowell v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

In 1983, Defendant was convicted of one count of arson in a dwelling house and eight counts of murder in the second degree. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, asserting newly discovered evidence regarding the conditions under which he confessed to the crime and recent fire research. A superior court judge allowed the motion, concluding that the newly discovered evidence cast real doubt on the justice of Defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding that, under the totality of the judge’s findings and the confluence-of-factors analysis developed subsequent to her decision in this case, the judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that justice was not done in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court clarified the application of the Florida v. Jardines warrant requirement to a search in a multifamily home. The Court held (1) the side yard of Defendant’s multifamily home in this case was a “constitutionally protected area," and law enforcement’s intrusion into that area to search for a weapon implicated the constitutional warrant requirement; and (2) the superior court properly allowed Defendants’ motions to suppress the loaded sawed-off shotgun found under the porch because the warrantless intrusion here was an unlawful physical intrusion into the curtilage of the residence, therefore violating the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. View "Commonwealth v. Leslie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted one provision in the habitual criminal statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, 25(a), which provides for an enhanced penalty where a defendant has two prior convictions resulting in prison sentences of three or more years, to require that the underlying convictions arise from separate incidents or episodes of criminal behavior. In so holding, the Court affirmed the superior court order dismissing the habitual offender portions of the indictments currently pending against Defendant, holding that the Commonwealth failed to provide the grand jury with sufficient evidence to support the habitual offender portions of the indictments. View "Commonwealth v. Garvey" on Justia Law

A jury found Earl T. Fulgiam and Michael T. Corbin guilty as joint venturers of murder in the first degree of Kevin Thomas, Jr. and Billie Marie Kee. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and declined to grant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain cellular telephone records; (2) the admission of fingerprint cards attributed to Defendants did not violate Defendants’ right to confront witnesses against them; (3) the trial judge did not err in admitting a fingerprint analyst’s testimony related to the fingerprint analysis; and (4) the prosecutor permissibly inferred that a “team” of men committed the murders. View "Commonwealth v. Fulgiam" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and deliberate premeditation, holding that there was no error in this case warranting reversal, nor was there any reason for the Court to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or order a new trial. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a statement Defendant made to police; (2) the evidentiary rulings challenged by Defendant were unavailing; (3) there was no prejudicial error in the jury instructions; (4) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to dismiss several jurors for cause; (5) any potential prejudice to Defendant from the prosecutor’s closing argument was mitigated by a comprehensive limiting instruction; and (6) Defendant’s mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole is constitutional. View "Commonwealth v. Colton" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the denial of two Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petitions he filed related to ongoing trial court proceedings. The subject petitions were the fourth and fifth such petitions Appellant had filed in the county court seeking extraordinary relief from interlocutory trial courts rulings or otherwise related to ongoing trial court proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments and placed Appellant on notice that any subsequent attempt to seek relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, where Appellant has an adequate alternative remedy or fails to comply with S.J.C. Rule 2:21, may result in restriction of future filings or other action by the Court. View "Afrasiabi v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition seeking interlocutory relief from an order of the superior court temporarily committing him to the Massachusetts Treatment Center pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123A, 12(e) pending a probable cause determination on the Commonwealth’s petition for Appellant’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person. A single justice denied relief on the ground that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary appellate process. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that all of Appellant’s arguments as to the merits of his petition could be raised on appeal from an adverse final judgment in this matter. View "Schumacher v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law