Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The school zone statute punishes individuals who commit certain enumerated drug offenses within 300 feet of a school or 100 feet of a public park or playground. Defendant was a passenger in a motor vehicle that was driven on a public roadway past a public park and stopped at a red light. When the light turned green, law enforcement officers stopped the vehicle, at which point the vehicle was no longer within 100 feet of the public park. The officers searched the vehicle and found drugs and a firearm. Defendant was arrested and charged with a number of offenses, including committing a drug offense within one hundred feet of a public park, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32J. Defendant moved to dismiss the park zone charge, arguing that the school zone statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. The judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that application of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32J to Defendant, under the facts and circumstances of this case, would be overreaching. View "Commonwealth v. Peterson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior and resisting arrest. The Appeals Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the judgment of conviction of resisting arrest; but (2) reversed the judgment of conviction of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, holding that there was insufficient evidence that Defendant’s conduct caused any person to experience “shock” or “alarm,” as required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 16. Because Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the first four elements of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, the case was remanded for entry of a conviction of the lesser included offense of indecent exposure. View "Commonwealth v. Maguire" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony murder, armed home invasion, and armed assault with intent to rob. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge should have provided the jury with a felony murder merger instruction. The trial judge granted the motion as to the felony murder conviction but did not disturb Defendant’s remaining convictions. At Defendant’s retrial, a second jury found Defendant not guilty of the single charge of felony murder. In this appeal, Defendant argued, inter alia, that he cannot be guilty of his armed home invasion and armed assault with intent to rob convictions because the second jury acquitted him of felony murder predicated upon the same underlying felonies. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the second trial cannot spare Defendant from the consequences of convictions properly decided by a different jury; and (2) Defendant’s claims of error in the first trial were unavailing. View "Commonwealth v. Resende" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) Defendant has not shown that the presence of police officers during the grand jury proceedings caused a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for the appointment of a special prosecutor; (3) the trial judge did not commit prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings challenged by Defendant; (4) statements made by the prosecutor during his opening statement and closing argument did not warrant reversal; and (5) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Holley" on Justia Law

In a four-count complaint, Defendant was charged with several criminal offenses. Defendant pleaded guilty as to counts one and four. The municipal court judge dismissed counts two and three for lack of probable cause. The Commonwealth appealed. The Appeals Court reversed the dismissal of these counts. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, while Defendant conceded that probable cause existed to support counts two and three, the complaint was also adequate to charge Defendant with each offense and to establish jurisdiction in the municipal court. View "Commonwealth v. Hardin" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a class B substance. Defendant was sentenced to a one-year term of probation and the probation supervision fees and the victim-witness assessment. The Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi on the underlying complaint after a judge granted Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that Annie Dookhan, the discredited analyst at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute at the center of misconduct allegations, performed the analysis of the substances seized during Defendant’s arrest. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for return of property, including probation supervision fees and the victim-witness assessment. The judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there is no statutory basis for a refund of victim-witness assessments or probation fees where a defendant’s conviction is vacated after the withdrawal of a guilty plea. View "Commonwealth v. Martin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a family or household member in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 13M(a). On appellate review, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under the statute because he was not involved in a “substantive dating relationship” with the person he was charged with assaulting. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the evidence warranted a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was involved in a “substantive dating relationship” with the person he was charged with assaulting, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 13M(c). View "Commonwealth v. Dustin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged in three different indictments with three criminal offenses. Each of the cases were pending in the superior court where the court imposed a unified bail. The total bail in the three cases was $3,000. After Petitioner defaulted, the court revoked the previous order of bail and set a new unified bail in the amount of $13,000. The court then held a bail forfeiture hearing in which the court allowed forfeiture in one case. Petitioner forfeited $500 in that case. After the bail forfeiture, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 asking the county court to vacate the bail orders, release him, order his $500 to be returned, and dismiss all three superior court cases. The single justice denied relief with the exception of holding that once the default had been removed, the $500 in bail should not have been forfeited. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err in denying relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 and properly held that Petitioner may seek return of the forfeited bail in the superior court. View "Tavares v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder. Defendant was also convicted of nine other charges, including home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the conviction of murder in the first degree and declined to exercise its power under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial; but (2) reversed Defendant’s conviction with respect to the charge of home invasion, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Bois" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pleaded guilty to indecent assault and battery. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or for a new trial, arguing that his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective by advising Defendant that he would need to “register” if he pleaded guilty to a sex offense without explaining the consequences of sex offender registration. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that Defendant failed to establish that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that plea counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in giving this advice in 2002, and the question of whether such advice would be constitutionally ineffective based on the current statutory scheme for sex offender registration is best left for another day. View "Commonwealth v. Sylvester" on Justia Law