Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, Timothy Deal, Siegfried Golston, and Jeffrey Roberio, were juvenile homicide offenders serving mandatory indeterminate life sentences, and who had a constitutional right to a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." At issue in this case was the manner in which juvenile homicide offenders were classified and placed in Department of Correction (department) facilities. Specifically, the issue was whether the department's practice of using "discretionary override codes" to block qualifying juvenile homicide offenders from placement in a minimum security facility unless and until the individual received a positive parole vote violated: (1) G. L. c. 119, section 72B (as amended by St. 2014, c. 189, section 2); or (2) their right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arts. 12 and 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, or both Constitutions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the department's current classification practice violated G. L. c. 119, section 72B, because the department's failure to consider a juvenile homicide offender's suitability for minimum security classification on a case-by-case basis amounted to a categorical bar as proscribed by the statute. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the department's practice did not violate petitioners' constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation because there was no constitutionally protected expectation that a juvenile homicide offender would be released to the community after serving a statutorily prescribed portion of his sentence. View "Deal v. Comm'r of Correction" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant delivered his cellular telephone to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice on several matters. In 2014, the Commonwealth filed a second motion for judicial approval of a grand jury subpoena to compel Defendant’s attorney to produce the cellular phone. The judge authorized the issuance of the subpoena, finding probable cause to believe that the telephone contained evidence of a crime under investigation by the grand jury. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judge’s order authorizing the issuance of a subpoena, holding that the attorney-client privilege protected Defendant against compelled production of the cellular telephone and that the protection afforded by the privilege could not be set aside based on a showing of probable cause. In 2016, the Commonwealth filed an application for an anticipatory search warrant pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276 1 to seize the telephone at the conclusion of a “legal advice period.” The superior court denied the application. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that a search warrant may issue for the seizure of the telephone because, absent such issuance, there is probable cause to believe that the telephone will be secreted from view. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape of a child, incest, and related sex offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge erred in ruling that Defendant’s first complaint evidence relating to her defense that she was the victim of rape by the complainant was inadmissible as a matter of law, but Defendant was not prejudiced by the error; (2) the trial judge did not err in excluding a statement proffered as evidence of the victim’s state of mind; (3) there was insufficient evidence to prove reckless endangerment based on “serious bodily injury”; and (4) notwithstanding any impropriety in the prosecutor’s sentencing remarks, there was no basis to conclude that the judge was influenced by those remarks, and therefore, resentencing was not necessary. View "Commonwealth v. Mayotte" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of the unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, alleging error in (1) the denial of his motions to suppress certain evidence; (2) the denial of his motion for a new trial; and (3) the admission of certain evidence at trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence after Defendant failed to appear at the scheduled motion hearing, but the denial of the motion did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial after the jurors were exposed to extraneous material during deliberations; and (3) there was no error in the admission of certain evidence at Defendant’s trial. View "Commonwealth v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident alien, pleaded guilty to an indictment alleging larceny of a motor vehicle. Defendant later moved to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the conviction, arguing that the judge accepted his plea without advising him that the guilty plea might have the consequences of exclusion from admission to the United States. The judge denied the motion. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding (1) the Commonwealth failed to prove that Defendant received the required warning regarding exclusion from admission to the United States; but (2) Defendant failed to show that he faced the consequence of exclusion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) a defendant satisfies the burden of showing that his conviction may have the consequences of exclusion from admission to the United States by showing that he has a bona fide desire to leave the country and reenter and that, if he were to do so, there would be a substantial risk that he would be excluded from admission because of his conviction; and (2) Defendant here met this burden, and because Defendant was not warned of this consequence during his plea colloquy, his conviction must be vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Valdez" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Defendant was not given an opportunity to consult with counsel before being required to decide whether to submit to a breathalyzer test. Defendant moved to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test, arguing that she had a right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to the breathalyzer test. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court reported a question of law asking whether the 2003 amendment to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 24, the statute establishing the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, now makes the decision by a defendant whether or not to take a breath test is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings requiring that the defendant be advised of his or her right to counsel prior to making that decision. The Supreme Judicial Court answered the reported question in the negative, holding that there is no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights before a defendant decides whether to submit to a breathalyzer test. View "Commonwealth v. Neary-French" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of armed robbery while masked. The trial judge granted Defendant’s motion for a mistrial, determining that a series of the prosecutor’s statements made during closing argument constituted prejudicial error. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that, although an order granting a mistrial is generally not appealable, the Supreme Judicial Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the motion was granted after the verdict and thus was equivalent to a motion for relief from a guilty verdict under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge’s order granting Defendant’s motion for a mistrial was not appealable. View "Commonwealth v. Brangan" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. Petitioner was a juvenile when the crime was committed. Thirty years later, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that any juvenile offender who had been convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole became eligible for parole within sixty days before the expiration of fifteen years of his life sentence. Therefore, Petitioner became immediately eligible to be considered for parole. Four out of seven members of the parole board panel voted in favor of parole. The parole board refused to grant a parole permit because, pursuant to a 2012 amendment to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 133A, a parole permit can only be granted by a vote of two-thirds of the parole board members on the panel. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the application of the amendment to his parole determination, rather than the version in effect at the time he committed the crime, was an ex post facto violation. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the parole board’s decision, holding (1) the supermajority amendment was applied retroactively to Petitioner; and (2) the amendment was, as applied to Petitioner, an ex post facto violation. View "Clay v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of criminal offenses in 2008. The Appeals Court affirmed. In 2012, the trial judge granted Defendant’s second motion for a new trial. The Appeals Court reversed, effectively reinstating Defendant’s convictions. The Supreme Judicial Court denied Defendant’s application for further appellate review. Defendant then filed a petition in the county court requesting that the single justice stay the reinstatement of his sentences pending a ruling on a petition for certiorari that he had filed in the United States Supreme Court. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice correctly denied the petition. View "Felton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of cocaine. The substances were subsequently tested at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute, and Annie Dookhan was one of two assistant analysts who signed the drug certificates. After Dookhan’s misconduct had been discovered, Defendant moved for a new trial, seeking to vacate his guilty pleas on the ground of Dookhan’s misconduct. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis to find that governmental misconduct occurred prior to the acceptance of Defendant’s guilty pleas or that any governmental misconduct rendered Defendant’s guilty pleas unintelligent or involuntary. View "Commonwealth v. Ruffin" on Justia Law