Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of criminal trespass. Before trial, Defendant requested a jury instruction on the defense of necessity, arguing that his conduct of being present in privately-owned buildings where he was the subject of no trespass orders, was justified as the only alternative for a homeless person to avoid exposure to the elements during periods of “extreme outdoor temperatures.” The judge denied the request. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the first six convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge erred in denying Defendant’s request for an instruction on the defense of necessity as to the six charges related to the incidents from February through April 2014; but (2) the judge did not err in denying a necessity defense instruction as to the seventh conviction stemming from Defendant’s June 2014 trespass. View "Commonwealth v. Magadini" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and abuse of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age. The Appeals Court affirmed on appeal. Defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor made an improper closing argument that created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s argument. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the cumulative effect of various improper statements in the prosecutor’s argument created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Remanded for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Dirgo" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was pursued and stopped for traveling at a "speed greater than is reasonable," G. L. c. 90, 17.1 While the vehicle was still in motion, the defendant got out, looked uncertainly toward the officers, and grabbed the side of his waist area. The officers gave chase. When the defendant was apprehended, he was carrying a firearm. Before defendant’s trial for firearms offenses, a Boston judge allowed his motion to suppress the evidence. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. Although operating at a "speed greater than is reasonable" provides a basis for a valid stop, an officer's suspicion that a violation has occurred must be supported by articulable facts sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person in the officer's position in forming that conclusion. The testifying officer provided nothing on the subject of speed beyond his conclusion that it was greater than reasonable. He did not estimate the vehicle's speed; compare its speed to other vehicles; provide any measurement from a radar gun or other device; or testify that the vehicle was traveling faster than the posted speed limit. Nor was there evidence regarding traffic on the road, its use at the time by pedestrians or others, or other safety considerations. The Commonwealth failed to prove that the stop was lawful. View "Commonwealth v. Teixeira-Furtado" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and declined to exercise its powers under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial, holding that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in (1) denying Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty as to the theory of murder by extreme atrocity or cruelty; (2) denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) admitting into evidence police accusations during the interrogations of Defendant; (4) admitting a statement of the codefendant under the joint venture exception to the hearsay rule; (5) admitting recorded jailhouse telephone calls; and (6) instructing the jury. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried for first degree murder, home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated assault and battery (by means of a dangerous weapon), carrying an unlicensed firearm and trafficking in cocaine. The jury deadlocked on nine of the charges and found defendant not guilty on the tenth (cocaine). The trial judge declared a mistrial. Defendant was retried, and in the middle of jury deliberations in the second trial, an issue regarding a juror's compliance with the judge's instruction not to consult outside research came up. After an inquiry, the judge dismissed one juror and found that the others were not affected by exposure to the extraneous information. The jury continued to deliberate, and a week later found defendant guilty on four indictments charging first-degree murder, home invasion and armed robbery. The issues raised before the Supreme Court in this case centered on five questions reported by a Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney's ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated on, or were discharged from, the attorney's client's case. The Supreme Court held that Rule 3.5 (c) generally applied to attorneys in their representation of litigants in trials on and after July 1, 2015, but an attorney representing a party in a case that was tried to a jury and concluded before that date may contact jurors on that case pursuant to rule 3.5 (c) if the case was pending on appeal as of July 1, 2015, or the appeal period had not run as of that date. "If an attorney is entitled to initiate contact with jurors who were discharged prior to July 1, 2015, because the case at issue is pending on appeal or the appeal period has not yet run, the attorney is treated the same as an attorney contacting jurors discharged after July 1, 2015; the attorney is not required to seek prior court approval, but is required to adhere to the notice requirements set out in this opinion." View "Massachusetts v. Moore" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree. The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Defendant’s application for further review to address the issue of the admissibility of two out-of-court statements made by Eric Snow, a purported joint venturer in the murders. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Snow’s statements; and (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting a third party’s testimony that she heard Snow tell Defendant that Defendant had “made his bones.” View "Commonwealth v. Winquist" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder with aggravated rape as the predicate felony. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal, holding (1) the admission of cellular site location information evidence that was obtained without a search warrant did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (2) the search of Defendant’s cellular telephone was not supported by probable cause, and the search warrant was overly broad, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the judge erred in his treatment of a note written to the judge by a juror during trial, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Broom" on Justia Law

Probationer was placed on probation supervision after pleading guilty to one count of possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute. A notice of probation violation later issued alleging that Probationer violated the conditions of his probation by sexually assaulting a seventeen-year-old girl. At the probation violation hearing, Probationer sought to call the alleged victim as a witness. The judge concluded that it was inherently “inconsistent” to allow the alleged victim to be called to testify by Probationer after her hearsay statements were admitted in evidence when offered by the probation department. The judge then found that Probationer violated his probation by committing a new offense. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order revoking Probationer’s probation, holding that the judge erred by determining that where there is good cause to admit an alleged victim’s hearsay, a probationer may not call the witness to stand to challenge the accuracy and veracity of the hearsay account. View "Commonwealth v. Hartfield" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several firearms offenses, each of which had associated with it an armed criminal sentence enhancement charge under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, 10G, which provides sentence enhancements for designated firearms offenses where a defendant has previously been convicted of one or more “violent crimes” or “serious drug offenses,” or a combination of the two. Defendant was sentenced under section 10G(c) to a mandatory minimum prison term of from fifteen years to fifteen years and one day. Defendant appealed, arguing that his armed career criminal convictions could not stand because his five previous drug convictions were encompassed in a single prosecution and, as such, should be counted as a single predicate offense for purposes of section 10G, and therefore within the scope of level one under 10G(a), rather than level three under 10G(c). The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and vacated the convictions, holding that where the previous convictions of predicate offenses forming the basis of the sentence enhancement charge were all part of a single prosecution, they properly should be treated as a single predicate conviction for purposes of section 10G. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Resende" on Justia Law

Defendant's six-month-old daughter, Jahanna, was rushed to the emergency room, unconscious and unresponsive. She was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Brain scans showed retinal hemorrhages, subdural hematoma, and brain swelling, symptoms called "the triad" associated with shaken baby syndrome. Defendant, Jahanna's sole caretaker when she became unconscious, claimed that Jahanna accidentally fell from the couch where she was sitting and landed on the wooden floor. After Jahanna's physicians concluded that her injuries could not have been caused by an accidental fall from the couch, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury (head injury), G. L. c. 265, 13J(b), and assault and battery on a child causing bodily injury (fractured vertebrae), G. L. c. 265, 13J(a), but was found not guilty on allegations concerning a fractured tibia and fractured ribs. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, noting the debate surrounding shaken baby syndrome and that the defense attorney did not retain a medical expert to offer opinion testimony or to assist him in cross-examining the Commonwealth's medical experts. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because, by not providing the jury with the other side of the debate, his attorney "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." View "Commonwealth v. Millien" on Justia Law