Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stevenson moved to dismiss indictments charging aggravated rape of a child with force, G. L. 265, 22B; and five counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 14, G. L. 265, 13B.1, arguing that the Commonwealth offered only hearsay testimony from the investigating officer. The judge allowed the motion, reasoning that the Commonwealth's exclusive reliance on such testimony in this case constituted "extraordinary circumstances" and that "there was no good reason for [the complainant] not to testify." The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the case does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting a variance from its general approval of indictments returned on the basis of hearsay testimony. Stevenson was provided with a detailed report of what the complainant told the officer, and of follow-up interviews with potential witnesses. A defendant has no right to require the Commonwealth to call witnesses to testify before the grand jury so that he might have transcripts of their testimony to use at trial. The grand jury heard all the information available to the police at the time; if the members had been uncertain about returning indictments based on the hearsay testimony regarding a 14-year-old case, they could have requested further evidence. View "Commonwealth v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted on a theory of felony-murder in the 2008 shooting death of a Brockton taxicab driver. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, agreeing that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before admitting to the shooting during a recorded interview. The defendant subsequently requested that the police stop talking to him, but any error in continuing the interview was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of other evidence. The court upheld the introduction of a witness's grand jury testimony after the witness claimed a loss of memory; the court’s failure to strike, upon request, another witness's testimony after learning that he had violated a sequestration order; and the court’s the failure to give a requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Denying relief under G. L. 278, 33E, the court reasoned that some of the defendant's statements to police were not made voluntarily and should not have been admitted, but that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Neves" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. 269, 10(a); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. 269, 10(h); carrying a loaded firearm, G. L. 269, 10(n); assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, G. L. 265, 15A; and two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. 265, 15B(b), stemming from a shooting at a 2008 Dorchester, Boston cookout. The jury separately found that defendant previously had been convicted of two violent crimes and was subject to enhanced penalties under the armed career criminal act, G. L. 269, 10G (ACCA). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, expressing "serious doubt" whether the jury impermissibly based the convictions of the greater and lesser included offenses on the same act, and concluding that the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon must be vacated. the conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The court also vacated the ACCA conviction, finding its residual clause invalid, that assault and battery is not categorically a "violent crime," and assault and battery upon a public employee does not qualify as a "violent crime" under the force clause. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Beal" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in two shooting deaths on theories of premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, rejecting challenges to introduction in evidence of weapons and related items that he lawfully owned and that were not alleged to have been used in the shooting; the denial of defendant’s request that the jury be instructed on voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of reasonable provocation; to the instruction that was given that the jury must "find" the defendant was intoxicated; and to portions of the prosecutor's closing argument in several respects. View "Commonwealth v. Valentin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants Branden Mattier and Domunique Grice were convicted on indictments charging one count each of conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny. Mattier was also convicted on an indictment charging one count of identity fraud. The convictions arose from Defendants’ attempt to defraud The One Fund Boston by claiming that a long-deceased aunt had been injured in the 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Mattier’s identity fraud conviction failed as a matter of law, but Defendants’ remaining convictions were based on sufficient legally obtained evidence; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of Mattier’s warrantless arrest for the identity fraud and attempted larceny charges; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying the motion to strike for cause jurors who donated to One Fund; and (4) the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments did not require reversal. View "Commonwealth v. Mattier" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree and other offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for relief from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a). The superior court denied the motion. Appellant sought direct appellate review. At issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether, on direct appeal, the Court properly applied Commonwealth v. Zanetti to determine that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Appellant’s motion for relief from unlawful restraint, holding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict Appellant, and the application of Zanetti to Appellant’s case did not violate ex post facto principles or Appellant's due process rights. View "Commonwealth v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Justice Ainooson commenced an action in the superior court against several individual defendants. After an extension of time to effect service was allowed, Ainooson moved to waive service or to deem the defendants served. The judge allowed the motion but then vacated her allowance after the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. A different judge then ordered Ainooson to make service by regular mail at his own expense with no further extensions allowed. Ainooson filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition challenging the rulings. Before the single justice ruled on the petition, the superior court dismissed the complaint. The single justice denied extraordinary relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying extraordinary relief. View "Ainooson v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on thirty indictments, ten each charging armed robbery while masked, home invasion, and kidnapping. The Appeals Court affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding eyewitness identification in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriguez. Defendant, however, neither requested the instruction nor objected to its admission. In the alternative, Defendant claimed that counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a request, Defendant may not attribute the omission of a Rodriguez eyewitness identification instruction to judicial error and, consequently, Defendant was not entitled to review on that ground; and (2) counsel’s failure to request a Rodriguez instruction in this case was error, but the error was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Navarro" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on three indictments charging conspiracy, attempted larceny, and identity fraud. Defendant appealed his convictions and filed a motion for stay of the execution of his sentence pending appeal. The trial judge denied the motion. Defendant appealed and filed a motion for stay of the execution of the sentence in the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court granted Defendant’s application for direct appellate review of his appeal. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for stay in the Supreme Judicial Court. A single justice denied the motion. Defendant appealed and filed a motion for an expedited ruling. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not err in finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for stay. View "Commonwealth v. Mattier" on Justia Law

DiMasi, a former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, resigned from his position in 2009 and began receiving retirement benefits from the State Board of Retirement (board). A federal grand jury subsequently indicted DiMasi for violating several federal laws while in office. Consequently, the board voted to suspend DiMasi’s retirement allowance. DiMasi sought judicial review, and the municipal court entered summary judgment in favor of DiMasi. The board appealed. Thereafter, a federal jury found DiMasi guilty of seven counts of the superseding indictment. On September 9, 2011, DiMasi was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The board again voted to suspend payment of DiMasi’s retirement allowance. A hearing officer concluded that DiMasi’s convictions became “final” for purposes of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4) when he was sentenced, and therefore, DiMasi forfeited his retirement allowance as of September 9, 2011. On January 14, 2014, all of DiMasi’s direct appeals were exhausted. The municipal court agreed with the board that the term “final” meant the date when DiMasi was sentenced and not the date when all of his direct appeals were exhausted. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that in the context of pension forfeiture, a “final conviction” occurs when an individual is sentenced and not at the conclusion of the appellate process. View "DiMasi v. State Bd. of Retirement" on Justia Law