Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pleaded guilty to several crimes in connection with an arrest for attempted burglary and other offenses. Appellant moved to vacate two of his convictions of attempted armed burglary and his conviction of possessing a burglarious tool or implement pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), asserting (1) the convictions of attempted burglary were duplicative, and (2) his conviction for possessing a burglarious instrument should be vacated because the indictment failed to state a crime. The superior court judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the denial of Appellant’s motion for postconviction relief, holding (1) Appellant’s multiple convictions and punishments for attempted armed burglary were for separate attempts, and therefore, his multiple convictions and punishments did not violate double jeopardy; but (2) the indictment charging possession of a burglarious tool or implement failed to allege a crime, and therefore, Appellant’s conviction must be vacated. View "Commonwealth v. Dykens" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery while armed and masked and attempted robbery. On appeal, Defendant argued, inter alia, that the judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial, which alleged that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion to suppress statements Defendant made to police more than six hours after his arrest, in violation of the safe harbor rule as established in Commonwealth v. Rosario. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err by (1) denying Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because volunteered, unsolicited statements made six hours after arrest and before presentment do not require suppression; and (3) denying Defendant’s motion for postconviction discovery. View "Commonwealth v. McWilliams" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on seven charges, including armed assault in a dwelling and breaking and entering in the daytime. Defendant moved to suppress the victim’s out-of-court and in-court identifications of Defendant as the intruder he had struggled with in his home. The motion judge, applying the common-law principles of fairness in Commonwealth v. Jones, allowed the motion to suppress, concluding that, through no fault of the police, the identifications were “impermissibly tainted by the suggestive circumstances.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the motion to suppress the identifications. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and of armed assault with intent to murder. The Supreme Judicial court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated the trial court order denying Defendant’s first motion for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the decedent’s out-of-court statement about who had shot him; (2) the performance of Defendant’s first counsel was ineffective, and it is necessary to vacate the denial of Defendant’s first motion for a new trial and to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Defendant was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance; and (3) any impropriety on the part of the prosecutor did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. View "Commonwealth v. Celester" on Justia Law

Abinel Zenon was charged with assault and battery, among other offenses. Zenon sought certain third-party records to support his claim that the alleged victim was, in fact, the first aggressor. A judge of the district court issued a protective order concerning these records, apparently following the protocol set forth in Commonwealth v. Dwyer. Zenon subsequently filed various motions for relief from the protective order, but these motions were only partially successful. Thereafter, Zenon filed this petition for relief from a protective order. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied relief without holding a hearing after treating the petition as one filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Zenon had an adequate alternative remedy. View "Zenon v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was arraigned in the municipal court on drug-related and firearm-related charges. The court gave Defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 and released him on personal recognizance. Defendant subsequently failed to appear at a pretrial hearing and was found to be in default. Thereafter, Defendant was charged with a new crime. At his arraignment on the new charge, the court denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Defendant’s bail, concluding that he was not subject to bail revocation because he had defaulted in the prior matter, was no longer “on release,” and therefore did not commit the new crime during his period of release. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case with directions to vacate the lower court’s ruling for the reasons set forth in Commonwealth v. Morales, also decided today, which held that a defendant on release pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, who defaults for failing to appear and is subsequently charged with committing a new crime, is subject to having his bail revoked. View "Commonwealth v. Jaiman" on Justia Law

Defendant was arraigned in the district court on criminal charges in four separate matters. The court gave defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 and released him on personal recognizance. Defendant failed to appear at a subsequent hearing and was found in default. Thereafter, Defendant was arraigned on a new charge. At his arraignment, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Defendant’s bail in the four criminal matters. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant was no longer subject to bail revocation because he had defaulted in the prior matters, was thus no longer “on release,” and therefore did not commit the new crime during the period of release. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case with directions to vacate the lower court’s ruling for the reasons set forth in Commonwealth v. Morales, also decided today, which held that a defendant on release pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, who defaults for failing to appear and is subsequently charged with committing a new crime, is subject to having his bail revoked. View "Commonwealth v. Fontanez" on Justia Law

Defendant was arraigned in the municipal court on a larceny charge. The court gave defendant the bail revocation warning pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58 and released him on personal recognizance. Defendant failed to appear at a subsequent hearing and was found in default. Defendant was subsequently charged with committing assault and battery of a family or household member. At his arraignment on the new charge, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Defendant’s bail or recognizance in the larceny matter. The municipal court judge denied the motion, concluding that Defendant was no longer subject to bail revocation because he defaulted in the prior larceny matter and, therefore, did not commit the new crime during the period of release. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case with directions to vacate the lower court’s ruling, holding that a defendant on release pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, who defaults for failing to appear and is subsequently charged with committing a new crime, is subject to having his bail revoked. View "Commonwealth v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant was investigated for, but not indicted for, a 1974 murder. More than twenty-five years later, DNA analysis of tissue taken from under the fingernails of the victim led to Defendant’s indictment for the murder. In 2012, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Just before Defendant filed his appellate brief with the Supreme Judicial Court, he filed a motion to stay the execution of his sentence. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a paper towel that the police seized from Defendant’s vehicle, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the murder indictment on the ground that the Commonwealth recklessly or negligently delayed indicting him for thirty-two years, as Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the preindictment delay; (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E; and (4) the single justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to stay execution of sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Dame" on Justia Law

Joshua Charbonneau was charged with larceny over $250. The Holyoke District Court issued an amended standing order on March 31, 2015 providing that a defendant was to tender a defendant-capped plea no later than 2 p.m. the day before trial. Because Charbonneau’s trial was scheduled to occur after the effective date of the standing order, his option to tender a defendant-capped plea at trial was foreclosed. Charbonneau petitioned for relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, claiming an inviolable statutory right to tender a defendant-capped plea on the day of trial. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the standing order insofar as it purported to preclude the tender of a defendant-capped plea on the day of trial, holding that the standing order conflicted with and impaired a defendant’s right to tender a defendant-capped plea as provided in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12. View "Charbonneau v. Holyoke Div. of Dist. Court Dep’t" on Justia Law