Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a noncitizen, admitted into the United States as a refugee. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a complaint charging him with, among other counts, assault by means of a dangerous weapon. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon on the basis that his attorney did not make a reasonable inquiry regarding Defendant’s citizenship and therefore did not learn that he was a refugee. The motion judge concluded that counsel’s performance was deficient but that Defendant was not prejudiced by the attorney’s deficient performance. The motion judge denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial and motions for reconsideration, holding (1) constitutionally effective representation of a criminal defendant requires defense counsel to make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether the defendant is a citizen of the United States and, if not, to make a reasonable inquiry into the defendant’s immigration status, including whether the defendant was admitted into this country as a refugee; and (2) in determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, “special circumstances” regarding immigration consequences, including a defendant’s status as a refugee or asylee, should be given substantial weight in determining whether the defendant suffered prejudice. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The bulk of the evidence at trial derived from the testimony of a single witness, James Jackson. One and one-half years after Defendant’s conviction, another individual, Debra Bell, came forward, claiming in an affidavit that she was with Jackson using drugs and having sex in a bathroom at the time the shooting took place, and therefore, Jackson could not have seen the shooting. Defendant moved to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence based on Bell’s affidavit. Bell died, however, before the judge acted in it. The judge denied the motion for a new trial, concluding that Bell’s affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding that there was a substantial issue as to whether Bell’s affidavit fell within a narrow, constitutionally based exception to the hearsay rule that applies where otherwise inadmissible hearsay is critical to the defense and bears persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness. View "Commonwealth v. Drayton" on Justia Law

Petitioner and two other plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Committee for Public Counsel Services and several associated attorneys alleging violations of their due process rights. The superior court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that Petitioner had failed to take the necessary steps to perfect it. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal of his appeal. After his efforts to appeal stalled in the superior court Petitioner filed petitions in the county court for relief in the nature of mandamus and pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 asking the single justice to direct the superior court clerk to assemble the record for purposes of his appeal. The single justice denied the petitions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice was within his discretion in denying the petitions where Petitioner did not first pursue available alternatives before seeking extraordinary relief from the Court. View "Skandha v. Clerk of Superior Court for Civil Bus. in Suffolk County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and four related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to grant relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that the trial judge did not err by (1) declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of the murder charge; (2) instructing the jury on the concept of malice in relation to murder under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty; (3) allowing the jury to consider evidence that, contrary to Defendant’s argument, was not hearsay; and (4) denying Defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty on the two charges relating to one of the victims of Defendant’s non-murder-related crimes. View "Commonwealth v. Spinucci" on Justia Law

Defendants, Jason Estabrook and Adam Bradley, were indicted for murder and related crimes. At issue in this case was the superior court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to suppress historical cellular site location information (CSLI) pertaining to Bradley’s cellular telephone that police officers obtained without a search warrant and then later reobtained pursuant to a warrant. The judge also refused to suppress statements Defendants made to police following the receipt of Bradley’s CSLI. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth does not violate a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy when it requests up to six hours of historical CSLI without obtaining a search warrant; (2) because the Commonwealth requested two weeks of historical CSLI in this case, a search warrant was required; but (3) many of Defendants’ statements and Bradley’s CSLI were not subject to suppression due to the CSLI that was first obtained unlawfully because (i) Defendants’ statements were not made in response to being confronted by the tainted CSLI, and (ii) the search warrant was supported by probable cause derived from information obtained independently rather than through the tainted CSLI. View "Commonwealth v. Estabrook" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial judge denied. Defendant appealed from his conviction and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, claiming that the trial judge erred on the eve of trial by denying Defendant’s motion for disclosure of the identity of an informant who, according to a report prepared by the FBI, had heard that Defendant’s friend, and not the defendant, had shot the victim. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded for further proceedings in connection with Defendant’s motion for disclosure of the informant’s identity but did not now see cause to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Bonnett" on Justia Law

Defendant was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree based on a theory of felony-murder, with armed home invasion as the predicate felony. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, he filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking a finding of not guilty on the felony-murder conviction or, in the alternative, a new trial on the murder charge. The trial judge granted a new trial, concluding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that there had been two separate and distinct assaults; but (2) the jury had not been adequately instructed that to convict Defendant of felony-murder based on the armed home invasion, the jurors were required to find two separate and distinct assaults. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his murder conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judge’s order denying the request for a finding of not guilty on the charge of murder in the first degree, with armed home invasion as the predicate felony, holding that the Commonwealth presented evidence that would warrant a finding that Defendant committed two separate assaults, one to support a conviction of armed home invasion and a separate and distinct assault that constituted the homicide. View "Commonwealth v. Scott" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped a vehicle based on the officer’s detection of an odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. During the course of the stop, police discovered sixty Percocet pills. Defendant, a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the stop, was charged with several drug-related offenses all in connection with the pills. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the pills. The motion judge denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that there was at best reasonable suspicion to believe that a civil marijuana infraction was occurring, but not probable cause, and therefore, the stop was impermissible. View "Commonwealth v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and furnishing alcohol to a minor. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial judge erred in permitting an expert witness who was not present when the victim’s “rape kit” examination was performed to testify about how the various swabs she tested had been collected, and the error was prejudicial; and (2) the trial judge erred in closing the rape shield hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim’s prior sexual contact with the individual to whom the victim first reported the alleged rape without conducting the four-prong framework required for court room closures under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Waller v. Georgia. View "Commonwealth v. Jones" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of stalking, criminal harassment, restraining order violations, and perjury charges. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant’s act of posting on his Facebook page a photograph of himself holding a gun and the words, “Make no mistake of my will to succeed in bring you two idiots to justice,” constituted a threat within the meaning of the stalking statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 43(a). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant’s conviction of stalking and otherwise affirmed, holding that the evidence of Defendant’s intent concerning the creation of the Facebook profile was insufficient with respect both to whether the page constituted a threat within the scope of section 43(a)(2) and to the reasonableness of the victim’s fear. View "Commonwealth v. Walters" on Justia Law