Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was found guilty of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen. While Plaintiff was still incarcerated, the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) recommended that Plaintiff be classified as a level three sex offender. Plaintiff challenged the recommendation. A SORB hearing officer determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff was appropriately classified as a level two offender. The superior court affirmed the level two classification. At issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was the standard of proof that the SORB must satisfy in order to classify a convicted sex offender under the provisions of the sex offender registry law. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the decision of the superior court affirming SORB’s classification of Plaintiff as a level two sex offender, holding that due process requires that a sex offender’s risk level be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Remanded for entry of an order to SORB to conduct an evidentiary hearing de novo under the heightened standard. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The town of Randolph bypassed Plaintiff, a police officer with the town, and appointed three candidates with lower scores on the police sergeant’s examination to its three open police sergeant positions. Plaintiff appealed. The Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal. Plaintiff sought review of the Commission’s decision in the superior court. A superior court judge denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and entered judgment for the Commission. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding (1) the record did not support the concern that the town’s flawed procedure for selecting candidates reflected a departure from basic merit principles; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support a reasonable justification for the town’s bypass. View "Sherman v. Town of Randolph" on Justia Law

The Town of Hanover decided to bypass Plaintiff, a police officer with the town, and appoint two candidates with lower scores on the police sergeant’s examination to its open police sergeant positions. Plaintiff appealed the town’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, arguing that, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31, 2(b), where an appointing authority promotes a candidate other than the candidate ranked highest on the certification list, the promotion is not effective until the appointing authority’s statement of reasons for the bypass have been “received by the administrator” and that the administrator may not delegate that function to the town’s appointing authority. The Commission denied the appeal. A superior court judge allowed Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and and remanded the matter to the human resources division (HRD) to decide whether the bypass reasons should be approved. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding (1) the administrator may delegate its administrative function to receive statements of reasons supporting bypass promotions, and it was practicable to do so in this case; and (2) the judge erred in remanding the matter to the HRD without conducting his own review of whether the Commission’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Malloch v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

John Doe was adjudicated a delinquent juvenile by reason of sex offenses and was committed to the Department of Youth Services. Defendant was later found to be a sexually dangerous person and was civilly committed for a period of from one day to life. Twenty years after Doe committed the offenses the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) classified him as a level three sex offender. Doe was later discharged from the treatment center based on the determination that he was no longer sexually dangerous. Doe brought this action contending, as relevant to this appeal, that the hearing examiner’s determination that he is a level three sex offender was unsupported by substantial evidence, in part because the evidence underlying the classification was stale where the hearing resulting in the final classification took place more than three years before Defendant’s discharge. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Doe and remanded the matter, holding that because Doe’s final classification was was not based on current evidence of the relevant risk factors, Doe was entitled to a new evidentiary hearing at which SORB will bear the burden of establishing Doe’s current risk of reoffense and dangerousness to the community. View "Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3839 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 7083, was serving a criminal sentence and had been civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person when the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) notified him of its recommendation that he be classified as a level three sex offender. When a classification hearing took place in February 2012 Doe’s earliest parole eligibility date was ten months away and a trial on Doe’s petition for discharged was eighteen months away. Doe requested that the classification hearing be continued or left open. The hearing examiner denied the requests and classified Doe as a level three sex offender. The superior court and appeals court affirmed. Doe appealed, arguing that, by scheduling the classification hearing based on his earliest possible parole eligibility date, the information relied on by the hearing examiner in reaching a classification decision will have become stale by the time Doe is released from confinement. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated SORB’s decision and the superior court’s order affirming that determination, holding that, because the 2012 classification of Doe as a level three sex offender will not reflect an evaluation of his current level of risk at the time of his discharge from the treatment center, the decision classifying Doe as a level three offender is invalid. View "Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

George and Sandra Schussel filed no tax returns between 1989 and 2007. In 2007, George was convicted of federal conspiracy and tax evasion charges. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Revenue issued the Schussels a notice of failure to file Massachusetts income tax returns for the years 1993 to 1995. The Schussels filed tax returns for those years, but the Commissioner determined that the returns were “false or fraudulent” or to have been filed with an intent to evade taxes. Consequently, the Commissioner imposed a “double assessment” against the Schussels. The Commission denied the Schussels request for abatement of the double assessment. The Appellate Tax Board and the Appeals Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decisions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Schussels’ claim that they were entitled to relief from the double assessment under an amnesty program established by the Commissioner in 2009 was not properly before the Court. View "Schussel v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

When a fire caused by NSTAR Electric and Gas Company employees damaged a building owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), two insurers paid the claims of the building’s tenants. The insurers then brought this complaint against NSTAR Electric Company and NSTAR Electric & Gas Company (collectively, NSTAR) seeking to recover for the claims paid. NSTAR moved for partial summary judgment, contending that, to the extent to which the insurers sought recovery for business interruption losses, the claims were barred by Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy Tariff No. 200A, filed with and approved by the Department of Public Utilities, and in effect when the explosion occurred. The tariff contained a limitation of liability clause that limited NSTAR from liability to nonresidential customers for special, indirect, or consequential damages resulting from the utility’s gross negligence. A judge of the superior court allowed NSTAR’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that a tariff filed with and approved by a regulatory agency may limit a public utility’s liability. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the limitation of liability clause in the tariff precluded Plaintiffs’ claims to recover for business interruption and other consequential or economic damages. View "Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the financial institution excise tax (FIET) liability of GATE Holdings, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of The First Marblehead Corporation (FMC). The Appellate Tax Board concluded (1) Gate qualified as a “financial institution” within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 1 and was entitled to apportion its income pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 63, 2A; but (2) in applying the apportionment rules of section 2A, all of Gate’s taxable property, which consisted of securitized student loans, was properly assigned to Massachusetts, rather than States outside the Commonwealth, which resulted in a greater FIET liability than anticipated by Gate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly concluded that section 2A(e)(vi)(B) creates a rebuttable presumption that where a taxpayer seeks to assign loans to a location that is not a regular place of that taxpayer’s business, the loans should be assigned to its commercial domicile; (2) all of the student loans were properly located at Gate’s commercial domicile in Massachusetts; and (3) the Board’s decisions did not violate the due process or commerce clause. View "First Marblehead Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

John Doe, who was thirty-one years old, pleaded guilty to several sex offenses that he committed when he was a juvenile. Seven years later, Doe was classified as a level one sex offender. The classification was upheld by a judge of the superior court. Doe appealed, arguing that he should not be required to register as a sex offender in light of scientific research showing that adolescent brains are different from adult brains and in light of the long period of time that had elapsed since his last offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court judge’s decision upholding the hearing examiner’s classification determination, holding that the hearing examiner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

After electrical outages arising from Tropical Storm Irene on August 28, 2011 and a snowstorm two months later, the Department of Public Utilities entered orders against three utility companies - National Grid, NSTAR Electric Company (NSTAR), and Western Massachusetts Electric Company (WMEC) - that imposed monetary penalties for the utilities’ failure to restore service to their customers “in a safe and reasonably prompt manner.” The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Department applied the appropriate reasonableness standard in finding that the utilities violated their duty to restore service in a safe and reasonably prompt manner; (2) the Department’s findings regarding National Grid and WMEC were supported by substantial evidence, but its finding that NSTAR failed timely to respond to priority two and three wires-down calls was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) with two exceptions, the Department made the necessary findings and did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of monetary penalties. Remanded. View "Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils." on Justia Law