Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the Energy Facilities Siting Board approved the petition of Brockton Power Company LLC to build and operate a combined-cycle energy generating facility powered by natural gas and ultra-low sulfur distillate in the City of Brockton. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Board’s decision. In 2009, while the consolidated appeal was pending, Brockton Power submitted a project change filing (PCF) to the Board seeking approval of three changes to its project. The Board denied one of Brockton Power’s proposed changes but approved the two other project changes. Both Brockton Power and the City appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Board’s PCF decision in all respects, holding (1) the procedure the Board adopted to review potentially material changes to Brockton Power’s project did not constitute an abuse of its discretion; (2) the Board’s approval of Brockton Power’s proposed use of water from the City’s advanced wastewater reclamation facility for the facility’s cooling tower was not invalid; and (3) the Board did not err by concluding that the CO emissions from a gas-only plant satisfied statutory standards. View "Brockton Power Co. LLC v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd." on Justia Law

The Sex Offender Registry Board notified Petitioner that it had preliminarily classified him as a level three sex offender. Petitioner requested a hearing. After the hearing had been completed but before the hearing examiner had rendered a decision, a successor examiner was appointed. The successor examiner then issued his decision classifying Petitioner as a level three offender. The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision. Petitioner sought an order directing the Board to produce a transcript of his classification hearing under 803 Code Mass. Regs. 4.22(4), which directs the Board to provide a successor hearing examiner and the parties with a copy of the transcript where the successor examiner is appointed after the presentation of evidence is complete and the record closed. Despite this requirement, no copy of the classification transcript was ever provided to Petitioner. Petitioner’s request was denied. Petitioner then filed a mandamus petition in the county court seeking to compel the Board to provide a copy of the hearing transcript. A single justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the single justice and remanded the case to the county court where an order shall enter directing the Board to produce a copy of the transcript. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

A Massachusetts regulation requires that each “entrance” to a public building or facility be accessible persons with disabilities. J.M. Hollister, LLC (Hollister) operated a retail store in Kingston with three doorways. At issue in this case was whether the three doorways constituted separate entrances or a single integrated entrance. Hollister applied for a variance from its obligation to make all public entrances to the store handicapped accessible. The board ultimately denied the variance and ordered Hollister to bring the store into compliance. The superior court affirmed the board’s decision that the doorways constituted separate entrances and found that there was substantial evidence to support the denial of a variance. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the board reasonably could conclude from the evidence that the three doorways were not integrated but rather constituted separate access points into the store in both form and function; and (2) the board’s denial of the variance was based on substantial evidence. View "J.M. Hollister, LLC v. Architectural Access Bd." on Justia Law

Patricia Campatelli, the Register of Probate and Insolvency for Suffolk County, was suspended with pay pending further investigation of allegations of inappropriate conduct and mismanagement in the performance of her duties. Campatelli filed a complaint in the county court seeking a judgment declaring that the three court officials who placed her on administrative leave did not possess the authority to suspend her pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 4. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department, the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, and the Court Administrator possessed the authority to suspend Campatelli with pay. View "Campatelli v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the town of Hanover, filed suit against Defendant, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters, alleging that Defendant engaged in abuse of process in prior legal proceedings by maintaining the litigation, providing legal counsel, and controlling the plaintiffs’ interests, despite not being named a plaintiff in the suit. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the “anti-SLAPP” statute, asserting that the town’s claims against it were solely based on Defendant’s constitutionally protected right to petition. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that Defendant did not have standing to bring its motion under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant showed that the suit against it was based on protected petitioning activity; (2) the town did not meet its burden of showing that Defendant’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law; and (3) therefore, Defendant’s special motion to dismiss should be allowed. View "Town of Hanover v. New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of two adjacent unimproved lots in the town of Scituate. The lots were located in a flood plain and watershed protection district (FPWP district). Plaintiff applied for special permits from the Town’s planning board to construct residential dwellings on the lots. The Board denied the applications, concluding that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that her lots were not “subject to flooding” within the meaning of the applicable zoning bylaw. A land court judge affirmed the Board’s decision. The appeals court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the appeals court adopted an incorrect definition of the phrase “subject to flooding,” and the land court judge adopted the correct meaning of the phrase. View "Doherty v. Planning Bd. of Scituate" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned thirty-six acres of land in Hampden. The Division of Fisheries and Wildlife (Division), a unit of the Department of Environmental Protection, restricted Petitioners’ ability to construct a home on their land by delineating the property as a “priority habitat” for the eastern box turtle, a “species of special concern” under 321 Mass. Code Regs. 10.90. Petitioners challenged the validity of the priority habitat regulations insofar as they allowed the Division to designate priority habitat without affording landowners the procedural protections due under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA) to those owning property within significant habitats. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Division, concluding that the regulations did not exceed the scope of the Division’s authority as granted by MESA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the priority habitat regulations were a reasonable implementation of the enabling statute. View "Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Attorney General issued four citations to Plaintiffs for failing to pay the prevailing wage to certain employees. Plaintiffs appealed the citations to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 27C(b)(4). Kimberly Fletcher, a DALA administrative magistrate, heard Plaintiffs’ appeal but resigned before DALA issued a decision on the appeal. Shelly Taylor, the chief administrative magistrate of DALA, subsequently reviewed Fletcher’s proposed decision and took over responsibility for deciding the appeal. The DALA then issued a decision on Plaintiffs’ appeal, which affirmed the fourth citation and vacated the first three. Fletcher’s and Taylor’s rationales for vacation differed, however. The superior court affirmed the DALA decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court was correct in affirming the fourth citation; (2) the DALA chief administrative magistrate has the authority to review and approve a hearing officer’s decision in a section 27C(b)(4) appeal before a final opinion issues; and (3) under these circumstances, Taylor’s actions in completing the section 27C(b)(4) hearing and administrative decision process were appropriate. View "Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeals" on Justia Law

John Doe, a female, pleaded guilty to several federal charges stemming from her prior management of an escort service, including sex trafficking of children. A hearing examiner of the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) classified Doe as a level one sex offender after determining that Doe presented a low risk of reoffense and attendant degree of dangerousness. The superior court affirmed SORB's classification determination of Doe as a level one sex offender. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the matter to SORB, holding (1) it was arbitrary and capricious for SORB to classify Doe's risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness without considering the substantial evidence presented at the hearing regarding the effect of gender on recidivism; and (2) under the circumstances, the hearing examiner abused his discretion by denying Doe's motion for funds for an expert witness. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a consumer telephone service complaint against Verizon New England. The Department of Telecommunications and Cable eventually dismissed Plaintiff's claim as moot because, during the course of the proceedings, Plaintiff's customer relationship with Verizon had been terminated. On appeal, a single justice dismissed Plaintiff's complaint because it failed to comply with the timely filing requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5. Plaintiff appealed to the full court. The Department subsequently afforded Plaintiff a renewed opportunity to pursue a timely appeal under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5, and Plaintiff chose to do so. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ruling of the single justice that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5 governs appeals from final orders issued by the Department; and (2) declared the remainder of the matter moot because Plaintiff filed a new petition for judicial review within the time period required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 25, 5. Remanded. View "Olmstead v. Dep't of Telecommunications & Cable" on Justia Law