Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs here were commissioners of the Bristol County Mosquito Control Project, which operates under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 252 and is subject to oversight by the State Reclamation and Mosquito Control Board. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 252, 14D they had the authority to hire and set compensation rates for the Project's employees and to retain counsel. Plaintiffs also sought an order of mandamus requiring the Treasurer and Receiver General to pay those employees salary increases. A superior court judge granted summary judgment for the Board and Treasurer. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the record was insufficient to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate in this case. Remanded. View "Comm'rs of Bristol County Mosquito Control Dist. v. State Reclamation & Mosquito Control Bd." on Justia Law

Leo Lawless, who held a license to practice pharmacy in the Commonwealth, had his license revoked by the Board of Registration in Pharmacy for a minimum of two years. Lawless failed to appear at an adjudicatory hearing, and the board entered an order by default. The board also imposed conditions on reinstatement. The Supreme Court affirmed the board's decision, holding (1) Lawless failed to demonstrate that the Board's decision to dispose of the adjudicatory hearing proceeding by default was improper; and (2) the board did not abuse its discretion in deciding to revoke Lawless's license as the appropriate sanction in this case. View "Lawless v. Bd. of Registration in Pharmacy" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) assessed a penalty against Plaintiff for improper handling and disposal of roof shingles that contained asbestos. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, pursuant to the Administrative Penalties Act, it was entitled to a notice of noncompliance and the opportunity to cure any violations before the imposition of a penalty. The commissioner of the DEP affirmed the penalty after accepting the recommendation of a hearing officer, finding that Plaintiff's failure to comply fell within one of the exceptions to the notice requirement because it was "willful and not the result of error." The hearing officer interpreted this language, otherwise called the "willfulness exception," as requiring only a showing of the "intent to do an act that violates the law if done." The Supreme Court affirmed the agency's disposition but on different grounds, holding (1) the DEP's decision was based on an error of law because its interpretation of the willfulness exception did not comport with the clear meaning of the relevant statute; but (2) Plaintiff's conduct was willful and not the result of error within the meaning of the Act because Plaintiff knew or should have known of the likely presence of asbestos in the shingles. View "Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

James Walsh, an electrician, became a member of the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) when he began teaching at a vocational school. Before the effective date of his retirement in 2006, Defendant applied to MTRS to increase his anticipated retirement allowance by adding to his creditable service through the buyback of three years of creditable service based on his work experience as an electrician. MTRS assessed buyback interest to commence as of 1977, the beginning of the three-year period for which Walsh sought trade service credit. Walsh appealed, claiming that buyback interest should not have begun to accrue until 1987, when he became a member of the MTRS. The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) reversed, holding (1) the regulation promulgated by MTRS was a valid exercise of MTRS's statutory authority; and (2) CRAB's failure to assess interest in accordance with 807 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05 was an error of law. View "Mass. Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant, a New Hampshire resident, was issued a temporary nonresident unrestricted license to carry firearms in Massachusetts. After Defendant alarmed employees at a medical office during his medical appointment by informing them he was armed, the firearms records bureau revoked Defendant's license, determining that he was no longer a "suitable person" to possess a firearm in Massachusetts. The district court ordered that Defendant's license be reinstated, but the superior court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the "suitable person" requirement set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 131 applies to temporary nonresident licenses issued pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 140, 131F; but (2) in the absence of regulations further defining unsuitability, no reasonable ground existed to revoke Defendant's license. Remanded. View "Firearms Records Bureau v. Simkin" on Justia Law

The Stefanidises divided a parcel into Lot A and Lot B. The Stefanidses converted the building on Lot A into three condominium units and applied for a variance to built a two-family house on Lot B. The variance was approved, but the Stefanidses failed to record the variance. Pursuant to a subsequently granted building permit, the Stefanidses began to clear and prepare the site. More than one year after the variance was granted, Plaintiff, who lived in one of the units on Lot A, requested that the building commission revoke the building permit on the ground that the Stefanidses failed to record the variance within one year. The commissioner denied the request, and the zoning board of appeals upheld the commissioner's denial. The land court affirmed, determining that the variance had not lapsed because the Stefanidses had taken substantial steps in reliance upon it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on the facts of this case, the variance had become effective and had not lapsed. View "Grady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Peabody" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' employment with the Department of Correction was terminated due to allegations that Plaintiffs used excessive force against an inmate. Plaintiffs appealed the termination order to the Civil Service Commission. After a single commissioner held a hearing, the Commission voted three-to-two in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered they be reinstated. The superior court reversed and remanded to the Commission with instructions that the single commissioner who conducted the hearing no longer participate in the case. After a hearing before the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) magistrate, the magistrate recommended that the Commission affirm the Department's decision to terminate Plaintiffs' employment. Only four of the five members of the Commission voted on the magistrate's recommendation, and the vote resulted in a two-to-two tie. The Commission consequently dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. The superior court judge also concluded the tie vote effectively dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal and upheld the Department's termination order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where a hearing officer recommends affirmance of the decision of an appointing authority and the Commission proceedings result in a tie vote, the initial decision of the hearing officer becomes the final decision of the Commission. View "McGuiness v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

In 1995, when he was fourteen years old, Plaintiff was adjudicated a delinquent child with respect to certain firearm charges. In 2010, Plaintiff applied for an unrestricted Class A license to carry firearms. The City of Boston denied the application, finding that Plaintiff had a disqualifying conviction. Plaintiff filed a complaint for judicial review, alleging, among other things, that he did not have any convictions or adjudications on his juvenile record that would disqualify him under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 131(d)(i) from obtaining a license. The municipal court dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiff was statutorily disqualified from possessing a license to carry a firearm due to his adjudication as a delinquent child for possession of a firearm without license. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that section 131(d)(i), as applied to his circumstances, violated his right to keep and bear arms under the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the challenged statute did not infringe on Plaintiff's Second Amendment rights. Remanded. View "Chardin v. Police Comm'r of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, doing business as Spencer Brook Strings (SBS), rented string instruments to students in the Concord-Carlisle Regional School District. In 2011, the school district invited vendors of string instruments to bid to rent instruments to the parents of children in the school district and selected Music and Arts (M&A) as the winning bid. The school district then published on school Web sites a letter advising parents that M&A was the music rental company for Concord public schools. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that, by providing M&A with their "endorsement" and by failing to advertise SBS as a participating music rental company, Defendants had used their official positions to secure for M&A unwarranted privileges not available to similarly situated individuals in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, 23(b)(2)(ii). The judge denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a finding of a violation of chapter 268A, 23(b)(2)(ii) by the State Ethics Commission after an adjudicatory proceeding and a request for rescission by the municipal agency were prerequisites to the filing of a complaint seeking rescission under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, 23(a); and (2) neither prerequisite was met in this case. View "Leder v. Superintendent of Schs." on Justia Law

The Fall River zoning board of appeals (Board) granted the C.B.L. Realty Trust (Trust) a variance for certain real property owned by it. The Fall River building inspector subsequently issued a notice of violation, ordering the trust to cease and desist from violating a Fall River zoning ordinance that concerned execution of the ordinance. The Board reversed the building inspector's order. Plaintiff, E & J Properties, LLC, commenced this action in the Land Court challenging the Board's decision. The Land Court affirmed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly considered whether the city ordinance had been violated, as alleged in the notice of violation, on account of the Trust's failure to comply with the Board's variance decision within some specified "reasonable time"; and (2) the Board's decision that the variance did not require demolition within a particular time period was both legally tenable and reasonable. View "E & J Props., LLC v. Medas" on Justia Law