Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After allegations of professional misconduct, the Board of Registration of Social Workers suspended Sandra Clark's license to practice as a licensed independent clinical social worker for five years. A single justice of the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's order. The Supreme Court affirmed the single justice's judgment, holding that the decision of the justice correctly rejected Clark's claims of error, as (1) Clark failed to demonstrate that the Board's decision to suspend her license was not supported by substantial evidence, or that it was arbitrary or capricious or based on any error of law; and (2) the Board's proceedings did not violate Clark's due process rights. View "Clark v. Bd. of Registration of Social Workers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought employment as a police officer with the Boston police department. On three occasions, the department extended conditional offers of appointment to Plaintiff, each of which was contingent upon her successful completion of a psychological screening process. On each occasion, department psychiatrists found Plaintiff psychologically unqualified for the job and bypassed her for appointment as a police officer. The civil service commission concluded that the department failed to meet its burden of establishing a reasonable justification for bypassing Plaintiff and ordered that her name be restored to the department's list of individuals certified for appointment. The superior court vacated the commission's order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the superior court correctly found that the commission erred in the manner in which it considered expert testimony from another proceeding; but (2) because the commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence independent of this extraneous evidence, the error did not prejudice the department. View "Boston Police Dep't v. Kavaleski" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on Plaintiff's application for direct appellate review of a decision of the superior court affirming a decision of the contributory retirement appeal board. The case required the Court to decide whether the $200 fixed annual compensation threshold set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 3(2)(d) applies to elected officials who are otherwise eligible to become members of the contributory retirement system for public employees and whether health insurance contributions and professional association dues paid on behalf of such an official are to be considered as fixed annual compensation for the purposes of this subsection. The Court affirmed the superior court, holding (1) the $200 threshold applies to "any person," including an elected official, otherwise eligible for membership under chapter 32; and (2) the value of health insurance contributions and association dues does not qualify as fixed annual compensation. View "Rotondi v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

This appeal, filed by brothers Gary and Dennis Baasch (Appellants), concerned disputed land located in Howard County. After a bench trial, the district court for Howard County denied Gary Baasch's counterclaim for quiet title. The court found that husband and wife Paul and Betty Lou Obermiller (Appellees) owned all the land they claimed to own, that the fence constructed by Appellants was on Appellees' land, and that Gary Baasch did not own any of the disputed land. The court also found that Appellants had trespassed, ordered them to remove the fence, and enjoined them from blocking access to the land owned by Appellees. The Supreme Court vacated the board's decision, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) Appellees were the rightful owners of the disputed land; (2) because Appellees owned the land, Appellants' intentional installation of a fence on the land constituted a continuous trespass; and (3) Appellees were entitled to an injunction. Remanded. View "Schoeller v. Bd. of Registration of Funeral Dirs. & Embalmers" on Justia Law

Petitioners, attorneys who were the subject of disciplinary proceedings, challenged the validity of two aspects of the Commonwealth's workers' compensation, claiming (1) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, 7C, which authorizes the senior judge of the department of industrial accidents to suspend the right of an attorney to "practice or appear before the department," violated the separation of powers explicitly provided for under article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) 452 Mass Code Regs. 1.19(3), which precludes recovery of an employee's costs and attorney's fees if the employee does not accept an insurer's offer to pay the full amount of the compensation claim, conflicted with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 15, 13A(5), which governs the award of attorney's fees and expenses where a claim proceeds to the hearing stage. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) chapter 152, section 7C is invalid as a violation of article 30 insofar as it authorizes the senior judge of the department to suspend attorneys from appearing before the department; and (2) section 1.19(3) is a valid interpretation of chapter 152, section 13A. Remanded. View "Ellis v. Dep't of Indus. Accidents" on Justia Law

Ernest Murphy was employed by the Commonwealth as a superior court judge for eight years. Following the publication of libelous articles about Murphy's performance of his judicial duties, and his subsequent receipt of hate mail and death threats, Murphy was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder and was unable to continue performing the essential duties of his job. The state board of retirement rejected his application for accidental disability retirement benefits pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws 32, 7, and this denial was upheld by the contributory retirement appeal board (CRAB). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Murphy was entitled to receive accidental disability retirement benefits on the grounds that he was permanently disabled from performing the essential duties of his job by reason of a personal injury sustained as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties. The Court affirmed, holding that Murphy did not sustain his disabling injuries while in the performance of his judicial duties, as (1) Murphy was not engaged in judicial work during the time he opened and read the death threat; and (2) the act of opening and reading his mail was, in itself, not a judicial duty. View "Murphy v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

The Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, 40, requires a conservation commission to issue a decision on a requested order of conditions within 21 days after holding a public hearing on the applicant's notice of intent to perform work covered by the act. Following the owner’s request for an extension, a hearing on his application for construction of a pile-supported pier and floating dock was held on April 6; the commission voted to deny the application on April 27 and mailed notice on April 28, 22 days after the hearing. The department reversed, based on the commission’s failure to timely act. In the meantime, the commission issued an enforcement order, based on work being done on the applicant’s property. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an applicant may waive the statutory time restriction, but any waiver must be voluntary in fact, its duration defined and reasonable in length, and notice of the waiver's duration must be a matter of public record, available to all interested persons. In this case, the applicant is entitled to proceed under the order issued by the department. View "Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham" on Justia Law

Before 1997, the authority operated the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Boston extension of the turnpike, and the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels, crossing under Boston Harbor to connect downtown o the East Boston section. In 1997, while the massive "Big Dig" project was underway, the Legislature placed within authority stewardship the integrated system of roadways, bridges, tunnels, and other facilities known as the MHS, which included the Boston extension and the tunnels it had operated before, as well as the central artery, the central artery north area, and the Ted Williams Tunnel. G.L. c. 81A, 3. The authority was authorized to charge tolls "for transit over or through the [MHS] or any part thereof," and to adjust tolls so that, when supplemented by other revenues, they pay all the expenses of the MHS. The authority required drivers traveling through the Sumner and Williams Tunnels, and the Weston and Allston-Brighton interchanges of the Boston extension, to pay a toll, but did not charge a toll to drivers traveling through the Callahan Tunnel, the central artery, or the CANA. Plaintiffs claimed that tolls were unconstitutional to the extent they were spent on the nontolled portions of the MHS. The trial court dismissed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. MA Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, inter alia, that the city council's vote to remove Charles Turner, an elected Boston city councillor convicted of attempted extortion and other Federal crimes, was void, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. At issue were two certified questions: (1) Did the Charter of the City of Boston, or any other provision of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, authorize the Boston City Council to promulgate Rule 40A of the Rules of the Boston City Council and employ it to remove an incumbent Councillor from office before he was sentenced and removed automatically by operation of M.G.L.c. 279, section 30? and (2) If so, is Rule 40A a civil or a criminal provision of law? The court answered that the city council was authorized to promulgate Rule 40A but did not have the authority to employ the rule to remove Turner from office. In light of this answer, the court need not provide an answer to the second question. View "Turner & others v. City of Boston & others" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a private college, brought suit against a town and a local zoning authority (defendants), seeking, among other things, a declaration that its proposed development of residential and education facilities for older adults (Regis East) qualified for protection under the Dover Amendment, G.L.c. 40A, section 3, second par. The Dover Amendment exempted from certain local zoning laws or structures that were to be used by nonprofit educational institutions for "educational purposes." Because the court could not conclude that plaintiff "has no reasonable expectation" of demonstrating that Regis East would primarily operate in furtherance of educational purposes, the court vacated and remanded. View "Regis College v. Town of Weston & others." on Justia Law