Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff commenced an action in the Superior Court, claiming that defendants wrongfully subjected them to a mandatory furlough plan that was ordered by the Governor. A superior Court judge allowed defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed and the court transferred the case on its own motion. Because the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to offer a valid statutory basis to challenge the implementation of the furlough plan, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Massachusetts State Police Commissioned Officers Assoc. & others v. Commonwealth & others" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the city after he was injured by a falling tree during a softball game on a public field owned by the city. The city appealed the denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the ground that it was immune from suit pursuant to the recreational use statute, G.L.c. 21, section 17c. The city argued that it was entitled to immediate appellate review of the denial under the doctrine of present execution. Although the court held that the doctrine did not apply in the circumstances of the case, the court nonetheless considered the merits of the city's appeal and concluded that the denial of its motion for summary judgment was appropriate. View "Marcus v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the town's solicitation of bids for the construction of a new police station. Barr Inc. submitted the lowest bid but the town determined that Barr was not a "responsible and eligible bidder," and that the contract should instead be awarded to the next-lowest bidder. Under G.L.c. 149, 44A(2)(D), contracts for the construction of public buildings estimated to cost above $100,000 "shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible general bidder." At issue was whether, when an awarding authority was making a determination as to bidder responsibility, it was constrained to look only at materials compiled as part of the Department of Capital Asset Management's (DCAM's) contractor certification process. The court concluded that the competitive bidding statute placed no such restriction on awarding authorities. Therefore, the court could not conclude that the town exceeded its statutory authority by conducting an investigation into Barr's performance in past projects. View "Barr Inc. v. Town of Holliston" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth sought relief from an order of a Superior Court judge unsealing affidavits underlying seven search warrants executed against plaintiffs during the course of a Statewide investigation into online gambling conducted at internet cafes. While the court agreed with the Commonwealth that plaintiffs did not have a Fourth Amendment right per se to access such materials, the court nonetheless concluded that interests protected by the Fourth Amendment were properly considered under the "good cause" standard for impounding judicial records and that the judge did not abuse his discretion or commit any other error of law in weighing those interests in this case. As the court saw no merit in the Commonwealth's remaining arguments, the court affirmed the judgment. View "New England Internet Cafe, LLC & others v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County & another" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, the court construed the payment obligations of municipalities participating in G.L.c. 41, section 108L, (Quinn Bill), a local statute establishing a career incentive pay program for police officers. The underlying case arose when the Commonwealth, facing budgetary constraints, substantially cut reimbursements. Plaintiffs subsequently contended that clauses in the collective bargaining agreements (CBA) impermissibly conflict with the statute, which they viewed as requiring the city to pay 100% of benefits irrespective of reimbursement. The court held that the CBAs did not conflict with the statute and were valid. Section 108L required only that municipalities pay one-half the amounts specified in the payment provision, plus any amount actually received from the Commonwealth. Municipalities could agree to pay more, but the statute did not require it. Therefore, the cases were remanded to the county court, where the single justice was directed to issue a declaration stating that, with respect to section 108L, the CBAs between the city and the various police unions were valid and enforceable. View "Adams v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant board of health of Southbridge (board) approving a "minor modification" to the site assignment for an existing landfill and related processing facility in that town under G.L.c. 111, section 150A. At issue was whether plaintiffs had standing to seek judicial review of the Superior Court of the board's decision. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the Superior Court judge had authority to allow plaintiffs' motion to extend the time for filing their notice of appeal. The court concluded, however, that on the record before the court, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision in the Superior Court as persons "aggrieved" and plaintiffs' substantive challenges to the decision lacked merit. View "Board of Health of Sturbridge & others v. Board of Health of Southbridge & another." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an appeal from a decision of the board approving a minor modification to the site assignment for an existing landfill and related processing facility pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, section 14. At issue was plaintiff's standing to seek judicial review in the Superior Court of the board's decision. The court concluded that on the record before it, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision in the Superior Court as persons "aggrieved" and, nevertheless, plaintiffs' substantive challenges to the decision lacked merit. View "Board of Health of Sturbridge & others v. Board of Health of Southbridge & another. " on Justia Law

This case involved Commonwealth Care, a state-initiated program that provided structured premium assistance for low-income Massachusetts residents. In 2009, the Legislature made certain changes to the eligibility requirements of Commonwealth Care, enacted in a two-part supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 2010. Section 31(a) of the appropriation excluded all aliens who were federally ineligible under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 8 U.S.C. 1601-1646, from participation in Commonwealth Care. Plaintiffs were individuals who either have been terminated from Commonwealth Care or have been denied eligibility solely as a result of their alienage. The court held that section 31(a) could not pass strict scrutiny and that the discrimination against legal immigrants that its limiting language embodied violated their rights to equal protection under the Massachusetts Constitution. View "Finch & others v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. & others" on Justia Law

This matter came before the court on a reservation and report by a single justice of the court of a decision and final order of the department approving a power purchase agreement (PPA) that National Grid entered into with Cape Wind. The four parties that brought the appeal were all interveners in the department's proceeding. They claim that the PPA violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution; the department improperly found that the PPA was cost effective and in the public interest; the contract should have been solicited through competitive bidding and subject to a cap on its size; and the department erroneously both approved a method for recovering costs from all distribution customers and required that the contract facilitate financing of a renewable energy generation source. The interveners sought reversal of the department's decision and order, and a remand to the department for further proceedings. The court reviewed the department's decision under G.L.c. 25, section 5, and gave deference to the department's expertise and experience, remanding to the county court where the single justice will affirm the department's decision. View "Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 1)" on Justia Law

The court addressed a procedural question that related to Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 1). At issue was whether the department committed error in denying the third motion filed by the Alliance to reopen the administrative record in the proceeding that the court reviewed in Alliance III. The court applied the more deferential standard of review that generally applied to procedural decisions by agencies on whether to reopen an administrative record and held that the department did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen a closed record in a completed proceeding in order to accept more information on the same points. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court where the decision of the department denying the motion to reopen the record was to be affirmed. View "Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utilities & others (No. 2)" on Justia Law