Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Wetlands Protection Act, G.L. c. 131, 40, requires a conservation commission to issue a decision on a requested order of conditions within 21 days after holding a public hearing on the applicant's notice of intent to perform work covered by the act. Following the owner’s request for an extension, a hearing on his application for construction of a pile-supported pier and floating dock was held on April 6; the commission voted to deny the application on April 27 and mailed notice on April 28, 22 days after the hearing. The department reversed, based on the commission’s failure to timely act. In the meantime, the commission issued an enforcement order, based on work being done on the applicant’s property. The Supreme Judicial Court held that an applicant may waive the statutory time restriction, but any waiver must be voluntary in fact, its duration defined and reasonable in length, and notice of the waiver's duration must be a matter of public record, available to all interested persons. In this case, the applicant is entitled to proceed under the order issued by the department. View "Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham" on Justia Law

Before 1997, the authority operated the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Boston extension of the turnpike, and the Sumner and Callahan Tunnels, crossing under Boston Harbor to connect downtown o the East Boston section. In 1997, while the massive "Big Dig" project was underway, the Legislature placed within authority stewardship the integrated system of roadways, bridges, tunnels, and other facilities known as the MHS, which included the Boston extension and the tunnels it had operated before, as well as the central artery, the central artery north area, and the Ted Williams Tunnel. G.L. c. 81A, 3. The authority was authorized to charge tolls "for transit over or through the [MHS] or any part thereof," and to adjust tolls so that, when supplemented by other revenues, they pay all the expenses of the MHS. The authority required drivers traveling through the Sumner and Williams Tunnels, and the Weston and Allston-Brighton interchanges of the Boston extension, to pay a toll, but did not charge a toll to drivers traveling through the Callahan Tunnel, the central artery, or the CANA. Plaintiffs claimed that tolls were unconstitutional to the extent they were spent on the nontolled portions of the MHS. The trial court dismissed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murphy v. MA Turnpike Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging, inter alia, that the city council's vote to remove Charles Turner, an elected Boston city councillor convicted of attempted extortion and other Federal crimes, was void, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. At issue were two certified questions: (1) Did the Charter of the City of Boston, or any other provision of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, authorize the Boston City Council to promulgate Rule 40A of the Rules of the Boston City Council and employ it to remove an incumbent Councillor from office before he was sentenced and removed automatically by operation of M.G.L.c. 279, section 30? and (2) If so, is Rule 40A a civil or a criminal provision of law? The court answered that the city council was authorized to promulgate Rule 40A but did not have the authority to employ the rule to remove Turner from office. In light of this answer, the court need not provide an answer to the second question. View "Turner & others v. City of Boston & others" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a private college, brought suit against a town and a local zoning authority (defendants), seeking, among other things, a declaration that its proposed development of residential and education facilities for older adults (Regis East) qualified for protection under the Dover Amendment, G.L.c. 40A, section 3, second par. The Dover Amendment exempted from certain local zoning laws or structures that were to be used by nonprofit educational institutions for "educational purposes." Because the court could not conclude that plaintiff "has no reasonable expectation" of demonstrating that Regis East would primarily operate in furtherance of educational purposes, the court vacated and remanded. View "Regis College v. Town of Weston & others." on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action in the Superior Court, claiming that defendants wrongfully subjected them to a mandatory furlough plan that was ordered by the Governor. A superior Court judge allowed defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed and the court transferred the case on its own motion. Because the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to offer a valid statutory basis to challenge the implementation of the furlough plan, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Massachusetts State Police Commissioned Officers Assoc. & others v. Commonwealth & others" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the city after he was injured by a falling tree during a softball game on a public field owned by the city. The city appealed the denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the ground that it was immune from suit pursuant to the recreational use statute, G.L.c. 21, section 17c. The city argued that it was entitled to immediate appellate review of the denial under the doctrine of present execution. Although the court held that the doctrine did not apply in the circumstances of the case, the court nonetheless considered the merits of the city's appeal and concluded that the denial of its motion for summary judgment was appropriate. View "Marcus v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the town's solicitation of bids for the construction of a new police station. Barr Inc. submitted the lowest bid but the town determined that Barr was not a "responsible and eligible bidder," and that the contract should instead be awarded to the next-lowest bidder. Under G.L.c. 149, 44A(2)(D), contracts for the construction of public buildings estimated to cost above $100,000 "shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible general bidder." At issue was whether, when an awarding authority was making a determination as to bidder responsibility, it was constrained to look only at materials compiled as part of the Department of Capital Asset Management's (DCAM's) contractor certification process. The court concluded that the competitive bidding statute placed no such restriction on awarding authorities. Therefore, the court could not conclude that the town exceeded its statutory authority by conducting an investigation into Barr's performance in past projects. View "Barr Inc. v. Town of Holliston" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth sought relief from an order of a Superior Court judge unsealing affidavits underlying seven search warrants executed against plaintiffs during the course of a Statewide investigation into online gambling conducted at internet cafes. While the court agreed with the Commonwealth that plaintiffs did not have a Fourth Amendment right per se to access such materials, the court nonetheless concluded that interests protected by the Fourth Amendment were properly considered under the "good cause" standard for impounding judicial records and that the judge did not abuse his discretion or commit any other error of law in weighing those interests in this case. As the court saw no merit in the Commonwealth's remaining arguments, the court affirmed the judgment. View "New England Internet Cafe, LLC & others v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County & another" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, the court construed the payment obligations of municipalities participating in G.L.c. 41, section 108L, (Quinn Bill), a local statute establishing a career incentive pay program for police officers. The underlying case arose when the Commonwealth, facing budgetary constraints, substantially cut reimbursements. Plaintiffs subsequently contended that clauses in the collective bargaining agreements (CBA) impermissibly conflict with the statute, which they viewed as requiring the city to pay 100% of benefits irrespective of reimbursement. The court held that the CBAs did not conflict with the statute and were valid. Section 108L required only that municipalities pay one-half the amounts specified in the payment provision, plus any amount actually received from the Commonwealth. Municipalities could agree to pay more, but the statute did not require it. Therefore, the cases were remanded to the county court, where the single justice was directed to issue a declaration stating that, with respect to section 108L, the CBAs between the city and the various police unions were valid and enforceable. View "Adams v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Superior Court from a decision of the defendant board of health of Southbridge (board) approving a "minor modification" to the site assignment for an existing landfill and related processing facility in that town under G.L.c. 111, section 150A. At issue was whether plaintiffs had standing to seek judicial review of the Superior Court of the board's decision. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the Superior Court judge had authority to allow plaintiffs' motion to extend the time for filing their notice of appeal. The court concluded, however, that on the record before the court, plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review of the board's decision in the Superior Court as persons "aggrieved" and plaintiffs' substantive challenges to the decision lacked merit. View "Board of Health of Sturbridge & others v. Board of Health of Southbridge & another." on Justia Law