Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Juvenile Law
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A child was removed from her mother's care by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) shortly after birth due to neglect. The child spent most of her life in foster care. In February 2019, a Juvenile Court judge awarded custody to the child's father, a New Hampshire resident, despite the absence of an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) report. The child went missing after moving to New Hampshire with her father and is presumed dead. The father was later convicted of her murder.The journalist sought access to audio recordings of the February 2019 hearings where custody was awarded to the father. The Juvenile Court judge denied the request, applying the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (URIP). The journalist filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the good cause standard under Rule 7(b) of the URIP was the appropriate test for evaluating the journalist's request. The court found that the privacy interests of the parties involved were minimal, given the extensive public disclosure of the case details. The court also recognized the significant public interest in understanding the child welfare system and the circumstances leading to the child's death.The court concluded that the journalist demonstrated good cause for the release of the February 2019 hearing recordings for use in a documentary, subject to specific redactions and conditions. The order denying the motion for access was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for the release of the recordings with the specified limitations. View "Care and Protection of Adele" on Justia Law

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A juvenile was found delinquent on firearm charges and guilty on a youthful offender indictment for one of the offenses. At the trial, the juvenile was nineteen years old, and the Commonwealth called his mother to testify about events that occurred when he was seventeen. The juvenile argued that the parent-child witness disqualification statute, which prohibits testimony by a parent against their minor child, should have precluded his mother's testimony even though he was no longer a minor at the time of trial. He also claimed that the trial judge made several errors in admitting other evidence and that his sentence was unlawful and unconstitutional.The juvenile was charged in a delinquency complaint with possession of a firearm without a firearm identification card, unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding device, and improper storage of a firearm. He was subsequently indicted as a youthful offender for the large capacity feeding device charge. The juvenile filed a motion to prevent the Commonwealth from calling his mother as a witness, invoking the parent-child witness disqualification statute. The motion judge denied the motion, reasoning that the statute applied only to testimony against a minor child, and the juvenile was no longer a minor.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with the trial judge's interpretation that the statutory prohibition of testimony by a parent against their minor child does not apply once the child has reached the age of eighteen. The court found no prejudicial error in the admission of other evidence, although it concluded that the judge should not have admitted a detective's testimony that a firearm depicted in still images was "identical" to the firearm admitted in evidence, nor two hearsay statements. Regarding the juvenile's sentence, the court agreed that the judge erred in not issuing written findings explaining the sentence but concluded that this error did not prejudice the juvenile. The court affirmed the juvenile's delinquency and youthful offender adjudications and declined to vacate his sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Rajiv R." on Justia Law

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A juvenile was involved in an altercation at the Barnstable District and Juvenile Court, where he was charged with disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The incident was captured on video, showing the juvenile and the victim engaging in a physical fight. The juvenile had a prior continuance without a finding (CWOF) after admitting to sufficient facts for an assault and battery charge.The Juvenile Court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on both charges and sentenced him to one year of probation for each. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge because a CWOF after an admission to sufficient facts should not count as a prior offense under G. L. c. 119, § 52. The Appeals Court did not review the case as it was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a CWOF entered after an admission to sufficient facts is sufficient to establish a first offense under § 52. Therefore, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency for both disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The court affirmed the adjudications, concluding that the juvenile did not act in self-defense and that his actions met the criteria for disorderly conduct. View "Commonwealth v. Fayad F." on Justia Law

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In 2013, an eleven-year-old juvenile was charged with rape of a child by force and assault and battery on a child with substantial injury after allegedly biting his four-year-old cousin's penis. The rape charge was dismissed, and the juvenile was placed on one year of pretrial probation for the reduced charge of simple assault and battery. The juvenile completed probation without incident, and the charge was dismissed. In 2023, the now twenty-two-year-old juvenile, with no other record, petitioned to expunge his record under a statute allowing expungement if the offense is no longer a crime.The Juvenile Court denied the expungement petition. The court found that the offenses of rape of a child by force and assault and battery remain criminal acts, regardless of the age of the perpetrator, and thus do not qualify for expungement under the statute. The court also noted that the juvenile's records were ineligible for time-based expungement due to the serious nature of the offenses.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Juvenile Court's decision. The court held that the 2018 legislative change, which excluded children under twelve from the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction, did not alter the definition of what constitutes a "crime" for the purposes of expungement under the statute. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry is whether the conduct itself has been decriminalized, not whether the individual can be prosecuted due to age. Since the conduct in question remains criminal, the juvenile's records do not qualify for expungement. View "Commonwealth v. Ambrose A." on Justia Law

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A juvenile was seen masturbating in a parked car and was charged with open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, a felony. At trial, the jury was also instructed on the lesser included offense of indecent exposure, a misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months in jail. The jury found the juvenile delinquent only of the lesser included offense. The juvenile, who had no prior offenses, argued that the delinquency adjudication must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Juvenile Court judge denied the motion to dismiss and sentenced the juvenile to a continuance without a finding until his nineteenth birthday, after which the charge was dismissed. The juvenile appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court to address whether the Juvenile Court retained jurisdiction over a first offense of a minor misdemeanor after a jury trial.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that once the jury found the juvenile delinquent only of a minor misdemeanor and it was undisputed that it was his first offense, the Juvenile Court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the delinquency adjudication should have been dismissed and recorded only as a Wallace W. determination. The court vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded the matter to the Juvenile Court with instructions to make the appropriate entry. View "Commonwealth v. Vince V." on Justia Law

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In two separate cases, mothers petitioned the Juvenile Court to involuntarily commit their children for inpatient care due to substance use disorders under Massachusetts General Laws c. 123, § 35. E.S. was committed for ninety days, and J.P. for thirty days, following hearings where family members and court clinicians testified about the juveniles' substance use and behaviors.In the case of E.S., the Bristol County Juvenile Court judge found clear and convincing evidence of a substance use disorder, citing E.S.'s history of alcohol and marijuana use, recent positive tests for fentanyl, and concerning behaviors such as stumbling and passing out. The judge also found a likelihood of serious harm due to the imminent risk posed by E.S.'s substance use and the lack of immediate outpatient care options. E.S.'s commitment was affirmed on appeal.For J.P., the Essex County Juvenile Court judge ordered commitment based on testimony about J.P.'s daily marijuana use, behavioral changes, and a single incident of driving under the influence. However, the court clinician did not find J.P. to be a danger to himself or others. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court found the evidence insufficient to support a likelihood of serious harm, noting the lack of clear evidence of imminent risk. J.P.'s commitment order was reversed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a finding of a substance use disorder under § 35 must be supported by clinical evidence to comply with substantive due process. The court affirmed E.S.'s commitment but reversed and vacated J.P.'s commitment, remanding the case for entry of an order consistent with its opinion. View "In the Matter of J.P." on Justia Law

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A juvenile was indicted as a youthful offender for unarmed carjacking, unarmed assault with intent to rob, and assault and battery on an elder. The charges stemmed from an incident where the juvenile, after escaping from a secure facility, attacked an elderly man and stole his car. The juvenile pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years in a house of correction followed by five years of probation.The Juvenile Court initially sentenced the juvenile to a house of correction, but after multiple probation violations, including missing appointments and being involved in new offenses, the court sentenced him to State prison. The juvenile appealed the sentence, arguing it was unlawful and that the judge did not adequately consider his well-being and the impact of recent literature on juvenile brain development.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile's sentence was lawful under G. L. c. 119, § 58, which allows for adult sentences, including State prison, for youthful offenders. The court determined that the Juvenile Court judge had appropriately considered the juvenile's criminal history, noncompliance with probation, and the need for public safety. The court also concluded that the judge did not need to make specific written findings on the impact of juvenile brain development literature.Additionally, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the Appellate Division of the Superior Court is authorized to review sentences to State prison imposed by the Juvenile Court on youthful offenders. This ensures that youthful offenders have the same procedural safeguards as adult criminal defendants. The court affirmed the juvenile's sentence and allowed for the appeal to the Appellate Division. View "Commonwealth v. Y." on Justia Law

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The juvenile in this case was on probation after being adjudicated as a youthful offender for breaking and entering a vehicle with intent to commit a felony. While on probation, he began experiencing severe mental health issues, including hallucinations and delusions, which led him to obtain a firearm illegally. His mother called the police, and he was found in possession of a loaded firearm without a license. This led to new criminal charges and a notice of probation violation for not obeying state laws.The Juvenile Court judge found that the juvenile violated his probation by possessing the firearm and revoked his probation, sentencing him to incarceration. The judge ruled that the defense of lack of criminal responsibility was not available in probation violation hearings but considered the juvenile's mental illness in determining the disposition. The juvenile appealed, arguing that due process requires allowing the defense of lack of criminal responsibility in probation violation hearings.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility is not required in probation violation hearings. The court reasoned that the primary inquiry in such hearings is whether the probationer violated a condition of probation, not whether the probationer is criminally responsible. However, the court acknowledged that evidence of mental illness is relevant to determining whether a violation was willful and in deciding the appropriate disposition. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no error in the judge's ruling or abuse of discretion in revoking the juvenile's probation and imposing a sentence of incarceration. View "Commonwealth v. Z." on Justia Law

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The defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment of a child and witness intimidation after attacking her twelve-year-old son. The incident began with an argument about the son's dental braces, leading the defendant to contemplate suicide. The next morning, she attempted to kill her son by stabbing him in the neck and trying to drown him. The son managed to escape and tried to call 911, but the defendant took his phone and told the dispatcher everything was fine. The son eventually called the police, who found him injured and the defendant attempting to harm herself.The defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and attempted murder. After a bench trial, the Superior Court judge found her not guilty by reason of mental illness for the assault and attempted murder charges but guilty of reckless endangerment and witness intimidation. She was sentenced to five years of probation with conditions, including no unsupervised contact with her children and GPS monitoring for two years. The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the convictions, finding sufficient evidence that the defendant was criminally responsible for her actions after the attack. The court determined that the defendant understood the criminality of preventing her son from calling 911 and could conform her conduct to the law. The court also found the indictment for reckless endangerment was not impermissibly ambiguous and that the GPS monitoring condition of probation was reasonable. The court affirmed the convictions and the probation condition. View "Commonwealth v. Rezac" on Justia Law

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In November 2004, a sixteen-year-old juvenile stalked and robbed a victim at gunpoint, repeatedly raped her in her home, and then bound, gagged, and robbed her roommate when she arrived. He was sentenced to state prison for aggravated rape and other offenses, with a period of parole ineligibility compliant with constitutional requirements. After serving his prison term, he was placed on probation for the remaining nonhomicide offenses.In March 2007, the juvenile was adjudicated as a youthful offender and sentenced to sixteen to twenty years in state prison for aggravated rape, with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other offenses. In 2021, following a court decision, his sentence was restructured to comply with constitutional requirements, reducing his parole ineligibility to fifteen years. He was released from prison in January 2022 and began a five-year probation term. In August 2022, he was arrested for new offenses, leading to a probation violation notice and detention.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the restructured sentence, including the probation term, did not violate constitutional protections against cruel or unusual punishment. The court emphasized that the probation term provided the juvenile with an opportunity for rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. The court also noted that any potential further incarceration resulting from a probation violation would be subject to constitutional constraints, ensuring that the juvenile would not be treated more harshly than a juvenile convicted of murder for parole eligibility purposes. The court affirmed the order denying the juvenile's motion for relief from unlawful restraint. View "Commonwealth v. Sajid S." on Justia Law