Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

B.V.G., a young woman with intellectual disabilities, has been in the sole custody of her father for many years. He was named her temporary guardian when B.V.G. reached age 18. Her maternal grandfather sought to intervene in B.V.G.'s father's permanent guardianship proceedings, asserting that his relationship with B.V.G. has been restricted by her father, that B.V.G. has indicated expressly her desire to communicate with him and has sought contact with him via social media, and that such a relationship is in B.V.G.'s best interests. Concluding that the grandfather lacked standing because he was not an "interested person" within the meaning of G.L. 190B, 5-306(c), a judge denied the motion. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, on different grounds. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed, first holding that the grandfather had standing. The statute is intended to provide a means by which an individual interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person can advocate on behalf of that person and the Massachusetts implementation of the Uniform Probate Code encourages a broad right of advocacy in favor of an incapacitated person's protected interest in a limited guardianship. Once a judge has concluded that a proposed intervener is an "interested person," nothing more is required to establish that person's entitlement to intervene. View "Guardianship of B.V.G." on Justia Law

Two weeks before Defendant’s eighteenth birthday, delinquency complaints were filed alleging two counts of rape of a child under sixteen. Defendant appeared in the juvenile court and was duly arraigned. After Defendant turned eighteen, the Commonwealth sought youthful offender indictments against Defendant on the basis of a subset of the acts that were the subject of the complaints. After the indictments were returned, the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on all of the delinquency complaints. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictments. In Mogelinski I, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the youthful offender indictments under the facts of this case. Thereafter, the Commonwealth brought a new complaint in the juvenile court against Defendant essentially identical to those where nolle prosequi was previously entered in order to seek a transfer hearing. The juvenile court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court, in fact, had jurisdiction to proceed on the basis of the newly filed complaint. View "Commonwealth v. Mogelinkski" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the crimes. Defendant was sentenced in 1994 to two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole. At the time of his sentencing, the distinction between consecutive and concurrent sentences had little practical impact, but the Supreme Judicial Court’s subsequent decisions in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. and Commonwealth v. Brown changed that. In the wake of the Court’s decisions in Diatchenko and Brown, Defendant moved for resentencing. The trial court judge concluded that Defendant was entitled to a resentencing proceeding on the issue of whether the sentences should be imposed consecutively or concurrently. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that a trial court judge, in resentencing a juvenile offender originally sentenced to multiple consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole, may conduct a sentencing hearing to consider resentencing the juvenile offender to concurrent terms. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Costa" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the shooting of a fourteen-year-old. Defendant was seventeen years and five months old at the time of his arrest for the shooting. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he made to the police after waiving his Miranda rights, arguing that their introduction at trial was error given the common-law rule that, ordinarily, a juvenile must be given a meaningful opportunity to consult with an interested adult before waiving his Miranda rights, an opportunity he did not have. Several years after Defendant was convicted, the Legislature enacted St. 2013, ch. 2013 (2013 act), which amended various statutory provisions to treat seventeen year olds as juveniles. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the 2013 act did not affect this case because it is prospective in its application and does not modify the interested adult rule; but (2) the interest adult rule is now extended, on a prospective basis, to seventeen year old defendants. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after fifteen years. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his mandatory life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a mandatory life sentence with eligibility for parole after fifteen years for a juvenile homicide offender convicted of murder in the second degree does not offend the Eighth Amendment or article 26 or other constitutional rights; and (2) Defendant’s challenges to his underlying conviction were without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Okoro" on Justia Law

In 2013, Gregory Diatchenko filed the present action seeking a declaration that, because he was seventeen at the time he committed the offense leading to his conviction of murder in the first degree, his mandatory sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional. Following Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the mandatory imposition of such a sentence was unconstitutional. The Court held that a juvenile homicide offender who receives a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment must be afforded the opportunity for release on parole. Diatchenko and another petitioner, both of whom became immediately eligible for parole pursuant to the Court’s decision in Diatchenko I, contended that, to ensure their opportunity for release through parole was meaningful, they must have access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the decision on their parole applications. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the petitioners, holding (1) the procedural protections of representation by counsel and the opportunity to obtain expert assistance in connection with that initial parole hearing are necessary for juvenile homicide offenders serving a mandatory life sentence; and (2) such offenders are entitled to limited judicial review of a parole board decision denying initial parole. View "Diatchenko v. District Attorney" on Justia Law

At a hearing before a Juvenile Court judge, a juvenile admitted to sufficient facts with respect to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen or older. The juvenile subsequently filed a motion seeking relief from the obligation to register as a sex offender. A judge denied the juvenile’s motion for relief from registration, determining that the juvenile posed a risk of reoffense and would be required to register with the Sex Offender Registry Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge’s ultimate determination that the juvenile should not be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender did not constitute an abuse of her discretion. View "L.L. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Petitioners Ronald Watts and Kevin Aguirre were charged by way of complaints issued in district court with criminal offenses that Petitioners allegedly committed when they were each seventeen years old. The Governor subsequently signed St. 2013 ch. 84 (Act), which extended the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to persons who were seventeen years old at the time of committing an offense. Petitioners moved to dismiss the district court charges against them pursuant to the Act, claiming that the district courts lacked jurisdiction over them because they were seventeen at the time the alleged offenses occurred and when the criminal proceedings had begun. The Supreme Judicial Court denied Petitioners’ motions, holding that the Act does not apply retroactively to cases involving juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense and whose criminal cases in the superior court or district court were begun prior to, and were pending on, the effective date of the Act.View "Watts v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

When Muniur M. was fourteen years old, he was charged with delinquency by reason of rape of a child with force. Muniur later admitted to sufficient facts to warrant an adjudication of delinquency on the charge of statutory rape. The juvenile court judge adjudicated Muniur delinquent and committed him to the Department of Youth Services but suspended the commitment and placed him on probation. Over eighteen years later, Muniur filed a motion to vacate his admission and for a new trial, alleging that his father forced him to admit to sufficient facts. After a nonevidentiary hearing, the district court judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judge’s order and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the judge erred by not allowing evidence to be taken, and tested by cross-examination, on the substantial issue of the voluntariness of Muniur’s admission. View "Commonwealth v. Muniur M." on Justia Law

Defendant committed murder when he was seventeen years old. Defendant was subsequently convicted in the superior court of murder in the first degree and related weapons charges. While Brown was awaiting trial, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. The statutory sentencing scheme in Massachusetts requires, however, that all defendants over the age of fourteen who are convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Consequently, Defendant's sentencing was stayed until the Maine Supreme Court could render an opinion regarding the issue. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of Miller and Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, in which the Court held that all life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Consequently, the Court held that Defendant may not be sentenced to life without parole. Remanded for sentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law