Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Commonwealth appealed from orders of a judge in the Juvenile Court dismissing two youthful offender indictments charging the juvenile with statutory rape. The juvenile has Asperger's Syndrome, as does the complainant. The judge ordered the dismissal after finding that the juvenile had suffered presumptive and actual prejudice from the "Commonwealth's willful and repeated failure to comply with discovery orders." The court concluded that, while the judge erred in dismissing the indictments on the ground that there was insufficient evidence presented to the grand jury, the judge did not abuse her discretion in deciding that dismissal of the youthful offender indictments with prejudice was necessary to cure the prejudice caused to the juvenile's right to a fair trial by the prosecutor's egregious misconduct in wilfully and repeatedly violating the discovery order. View "Commonwealth v. Washington W." on Justia Law

Defendant, a juvenile, was charged in a complaint with being a delinquent child for breaking and entering a motor vehicle in the nighttime, with the intent to commit a felony. At issue was whether G.L.c. 119, section 58, empowered a Juvenile Court judge to continue a delinquency case without a finding and place the juvenile under the supervision of the probation department, notwithstanding a jury's prior verdict of delinquency. Based on the text of the statute, its placement within the broader statutory scheme, and the underlying philosophy of the juvenile justice system, the court concluded that it did. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court, where an order shall enter affirming the Juvenile Court judge's order. View "Commonwealth v. Magnus M." on Justia Law

Defendant, who was under fourteen-years-old at the time of the alleged offense, was subsequently indicted when defendant was twenty-three-years-old on six charges of rape of a child with force and two charges of indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. At issue was whether a person who committed an offense at an age under 14, but who was not apprehended until after he or she had passed the age of 18, could be prosecuted. The court held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to try the person for that offense under G.L.c. 119, section 72A, after indictment, provided that a judge in the Juvenile Court had determined that there was probable cause to believe that the person committed the offense charged and that the interests of the public required that the person be tried for the offenses instead of being discharged. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Commonwealth v. Porges" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the Juvenile Court's determination that her daughter was in need of care and protection and dispensed with the need for the child's parents' consent to adoption, guardianship, custody, or other disposition of the child, which effectively terminated the parents' rights. At issue was whether G.L.c. 233, section 82, which in certain circumstances allowed the admission into evidence in a civil proceeding of "out-of-court statements of a child under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed on or with the child," applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements but ten years of age or older at the time of trial. The court held that the statute applied where the child was under the age of ten when she made the statements, regardless of her age at the time of the trial. Therefore, the court held that the hearsay statements made by the child when she was under the age of ten but admitted in evidence when she was eleven years of age were properly admitted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Juvenile Court's decree.

A juvenile was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on the grounds of a school in violation of G.L. c. 269, 10(j) when a knife, a recent birthday gift from his father, dropped out of his pocket during shop class and had been seen by the instructor who reported the juvenile to the dean. At issue was whether a knife that was not a per se dangerous weapon enumerated in G.L. c. 269, 10(b), could constitute a "dangerous weapon" as that term was used in section 10(j), when that knife was not being used in a dangerous manner. The court held that the phrase "dangerous weapon," as used in section 10(j), must be interpreted as incorporating the common law definition of that phrase. The definition included knives that were "designed and constructed to produce death, or great bodily harm" but that were not necessarily stilletos, daggers, dirk knives, or the other objects listed in section 10(j). Such knives were dangerous per se under the common law and thus prohibited from schools under section 10(j). The court also held that, although it appeared unlikely that the two-inch folding knife carried by the juvenile constituted a dangerous weapon within the common law definition, the court remanded to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings to determine the design, purpose, and construction of the knife.

The mother of a child who was the subject of care and protection in a proceeding in Juvenile Court appealed from a judgment denying her petition for relief from an order placing the child in temporary custody of the Department of Children and Families ("department"). At issue was whether the denial of extraordinary relief was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the judge's findings clearly supported her determination where the department made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child by placing the mother in two successive foster homes to help her learn better parenting skills and there was no reason to believe that a third placement would have been more successful. The court also held that the judge did not err in holding that the child was suffering from serious abuse or neglect in the mother's custody.