Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The town of Randolph bypassed Plaintiff, a police officer with the town, and appointed three candidates with lower scores on the police sergeant’s examination to its three open police sergeant positions. Plaintiff appealed. The Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal. Plaintiff sought review of the Commission’s decision in the superior court. A superior court judge denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and entered judgment for the Commission. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding (1) the record did not support the concern that the town’s flawed procedure for selecting candidates reflected a departure from basic merit principles; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support a reasonable justification for the town’s bypass. View "Sherman v. Town of Randolph" on Justia Law

The Town of Hanover decided to bypass Plaintiff, a police officer with the town, and appoint two candidates with lower scores on the police sergeant’s examination to its open police sergeant positions. Plaintiff appealed the town’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, arguing that, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31, 2(b), where an appointing authority promotes a candidate other than the candidate ranked highest on the certification list, the promotion is not effective until the appointing authority’s statement of reasons for the bypass have been “received by the administrator” and that the administrator may not delegate that function to the town’s appointing authority. The Commission denied the appeal. A superior court judge allowed Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and and remanded the matter to the human resources division (HRD) to decide whether the bypass reasons should be approved. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding (1) the administrator may delegate its administrative function to receive statements of reasons supporting bypass promotions, and it was practicable to do so in this case; and (2) the judge erred in remanding the matter to the HRD without conducting his own review of whether the Commission’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Malloch v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a male, was a candidate for the December, 2010 police academy class. When Plaintiff was not admitted, he brought a claim of sex discrimination against the Boston Police Department and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division, alleging discrimination arising from the Department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the preferential treatment of female candidates was justified because “gender was a valid bona fide occupational qualification.” The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing, holding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete and imminent so as to confer proper standing on Plaintiff. View "Pugsley v. Police Dep’t of Boston" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were licensed Massachusetts real estate brokerage firms and some of their members and shareholders. Defendants classified Plaintiffs, licensed real estate salespersons, as independent contractors. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that Defendants violated the independent contractor statute by not classifying Plaintiffs as employees. On this count of the complaint, the trial judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the independent contractor statute did not control under these circumstances to the salespersons in this industry. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court judge did not err in concluding that the independent contractor statute does not apply to real estate salespersons. View "Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases leased taxicabs and licenses, called “medallions,” for each taxicab. Plaintiffs claimed that they were employees of certain taxicab owners, radio associations, and a taxicab garage (collectively, Defendants) but were misclassified as independent contractors. Defendants argued that their relationships with Plaintiffs must be considered in the context of a municipal regulation (Rule 403), which explicitly permits drivers to operate as independent contractors. Plaintiffs argued that the municipal regulation could not override the independent contractor statute, under which an individual performing any service is presumed to be an employee. The superior court concluded that Plaintiffs provided a service to Defendants but denied summary judgment on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the provision of taxi services was within the usual course of Defendants’ businesses. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court’s order, holding (1) Rule 403 is not contrary to the policies undergirding the independent contractor statute; and (2) because the the medallion owners and radio associations had, in complying with Rule 403, satisfied each prong of the independent contractor test, summary judgment should have been granted to those defendants on count one of the complaints, misclassification as independent contractors. View "Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former school principal of six years in the Town of Erving, sought contribution by the Town to the cost of her group health insurance premiums. The Town had adopted Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32B, 9E (“the statute”), which required it to contribute over fifty percent of the health insurance premiums of all of its retirees. Before employing Plaintiff, however, the Town enacted a policy under which it would only contribute to the group health insurance premiums of retired employees who had retired after a minimum of ten years of employment with the Town. Consequently, the Town determined that Plaintiff was not eligible for contribution by the Town to her health insurance premiums. Plaintiff filed suit asserting that the Town violated her right to payment to a portion of her group medical insurance premiums as statutorily required. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Town from enforcing its policy. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the terms of the statute govern whether and in what amounts the Town must contribute to the cost of a retiree’s health insurance premiums; and (2) the Town’s retirement policy imposing a minimum term of service as a prerequisite to premium contributions from the Town is invalid. View "Galenski v. Town of Erving" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees at Dunkin’ Donuts stores, brought suit against Defendants, a Dunkin’ Donuts franchisee and the entity that performed management functions for those stores, alleging that Defendants had implemented a no-tipping policy at some of their stores in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A (the Tips Act). The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the no-tipping policy was not a violation of the Tips Act. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Tips Act allows an employer to maintain a no-tipping policy; (2) an employer may be liable under the Tips Act if the employer fails clearly to communicate the no-tipping policy to customers, who subsequently leave tips that are retained by the employer; and (3) an employer may not be held liable if the employer clearly communicates the no-tipping policy to customers, who nonetheless leave tips that are retained by the employer. View "Meshna v. Scrivanos" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Governor nominated Michael McCarthy for a Massachusetts judgeship. The nomination failed to garner the necessary votes for confirmation. Nearly one month later, Mary-Ellen Manning, a former member of the Executive Council, who had initially abstained from voting, delivered a letter to the Governor stating that she consented to the appointment of McCarthy. Neither the Governor nor the Secretary took further steps regarding McCarthy’s nomination in response to the letter. In 2013,the Governor resubmitted McCarthy’s nomination to the Council for the same judicial position. The nomination again failed to garner the votes needed for confirmation. The Governor never signed, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth never issued, a commission to McCarthy. McCarthy and Manning later filed a complaint against the Governor and the Secretary seeking to establish that McCarthy’s first nomination had resulted in his successful appointment to the judgeship, and therefore, McCarthy was entitled to a commission for that office. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court declined to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the Governor took no action to effectuate a judicial appointment and the Secretary had no legal duty to act, Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. View "McCarthy v. The Governor" on Justia Law

In 2009, the City of Somerville unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums. Neither the city nor the school committee of Somerville, the collective bargaining agent of the city for the purpose of dealing with school employees, engaged in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board determined that the city and the school committee violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(5) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(1) by unilaterally reducing contributions for retired employees’ health insurance premiums. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the city and the school committee did not violate these statutory provisions when the city unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. View "City of Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law