Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants in this case were licensed Massachusetts real estate brokerage firms and some of their members and shareholders. Defendants classified Plaintiffs, licensed real estate salespersons, as independent contractors. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that Defendants violated the independent contractor statute by not classifying Plaintiffs as employees. On this count of the complaint, the trial judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the independent contractor statute did not control under these circumstances to the salespersons in this industry. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court judge did not err in concluding that the independent contractor statute does not apply to real estate salespersons. View "Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases leased taxicabs and licenses, called “medallions,” for each taxicab. Plaintiffs claimed that they were employees of certain taxicab owners, radio associations, and a taxicab garage (collectively, Defendants) but were misclassified as independent contractors. Defendants argued that their relationships with Plaintiffs must be considered in the context of a municipal regulation (Rule 403), which explicitly permits drivers to operate as independent contractors. Plaintiffs argued that the municipal regulation could not override the independent contractor statute, under which an individual performing any service is presumed to be an employee. The superior court concluded that Plaintiffs provided a service to Defendants but denied summary judgment on the grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the provision of taxi services was within the usual course of Defendants’ businesses. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court’s order, holding (1) Rule 403 is not contrary to the policies undergirding the independent contractor statute; and (2) because the the medallion owners and radio associations had, in complying with Rule 403, satisfied each prong of the independent contractor test, summary judgment should have been granted to those defendants on count one of the complaints, misclassification as independent contractors. View "Sebago v. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former school principal of six years in the Town of Erving, sought contribution by the Town to the cost of her group health insurance premiums. The Town had adopted Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32B, 9E (“the statute”), which required it to contribute over fifty percent of the health insurance premiums of all of its retirees. Before employing Plaintiff, however, the Town enacted a policy under which it would only contribute to the group health insurance premiums of retired employees who had retired after a minimum of ten years of employment with the Town. Consequently, the Town determined that Plaintiff was not eligible for contribution by the Town to her health insurance premiums. Plaintiff filed suit asserting that the Town violated her right to payment to a portion of her group medical insurance premiums as statutorily required. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Town from enforcing its policy. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the terms of the statute govern whether and in what amounts the Town must contribute to the cost of a retiree’s health insurance premiums; and (2) the Town’s retirement policy imposing a minimum term of service as a prerequisite to premium contributions from the Town is invalid. View "Galenski v. Town of Erving" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees at Dunkin’ Donuts stores, brought suit against Defendants, a Dunkin’ Donuts franchisee and the entity that performed management functions for those stores, alleging that Defendants had implemented a no-tipping policy at some of their stores in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A (the Tips Act). The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the no-tipping policy was not a violation of the Tips Act. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Tips Act allows an employer to maintain a no-tipping policy; (2) an employer may be liable under the Tips Act if the employer fails clearly to communicate the no-tipping policy to customers, who subsequently leave tips that are retained by the employer; and (3) an employer may not be held liable if the employer clearly communicates the no-tipping policy to customers, who nonetheless leave tips that are retained by the employer. View "Meshna v. Scrivanos" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Governor nominated Michael McCarthy for a Massachusetts judgeship. The nomination failed to garner the necessary votes for confirmation. Nearly one month later, Mary-Ellen Manning, a former member of the Executive Council, who had initially abstained from voting, delivered a letter to the Governor stating that she consented to the appointment of McCarthy. Neither the Governor nor the Secretary took further steps regarding McCarthy’s nomination in response to the letter. In 2013,the Governor resubmitted McCarthy’s nomination to the Council for the same judicial position. The nomination again failed to garner the votes needed for confirmation. The Governor never signed, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth never issued, a commission to McCarthy. McCarthy and Manning later filed a complaint against the Governor and the Secretary seeking to establish that McCarthy’s first nomination had resulted in his successful appointment to the judgeship, and therefore, McCarthy was entitled to a commission for that office. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court declined to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the Governor took no action to effectuate a judicial appointment and the Secretary had no legal duty to act, Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. View "McCarthy v. The Governor" on Justia Law

In 2009, the City of Somerville unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums. Neither the city nor the school committee of Somerville, the collective bargaining agent of the city for the purpose of dealing with school employees, engaged in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board determined that the city and the school committee violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(5) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(1) by unilaterally reducing contributions for retired employees’ health insurance premiums. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the city and the school committee did not violate these statutory provisions when the city unilaterally reduced its percentage contribution to retired employees’ health insurance premiums without engaging in collective bargaining over the matter with current employees. View "City of Somerville v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against his former employer, the Attleboro Housing Authority (AHA), for alleged violations of the Wage Act, claiming (1) the AHA intentionally misclassified his position, thereby failing to pay him the wages to which he was entitled; and (2) the AHA terminated him in retaliation for complaining about the nonpayment of earned wages. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on both claims and awarded damages against the AHA. The parties then filed numerous posttrial motions, to no avail. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Wage Act; (2) reinstatement to employment is not an available remedy for violations of the Wage Act; and (3) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on damages or, in the alternative, for additur. View "Fernandes v. Attleboro Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Petitioners, Carolyn Faulk and Stanley Howard, commenced an action against Faulk’s former employer, CVS Caremark Corporation, and two of her former supervisors (collectively, Respondents), alleging that Respondents wrongfully terminated Faulk’s employment and discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender. The complaint further alleged that Howard had provided financial support to Faulk after her employment was terminated and that Howard sought damages from CVS on that basis. The trial court dismissed Howard’s claims for lack of standing and ultimately dismissed the entire complaint. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 challenging the trial court’s denial of Faulk’s request for counsel and the dismissal of Howard’s claims. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ claim regarding Faulk’s request for the appointed of counsel was moot; and (2) Howard had an adequate alternative remedy to challenge the dismissal of his claims by way of direct appeal. View "Faulk v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law

After the Town of Athol unilaterally increased copayment amounts that members of the Professional Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F. (Union) pay for medical services under their health insurance plans, the Union filed a grievance under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). An arbitrator determined that the Town violated the CBA by making the changes unilaterally. The Town filed a complaint in the superior court seeking to vacate the award and other relief. The superior court confirmed the portion of the award compelling the parties to collectively bargain over changes to copayment rates and vacated two remedial aspects of the award. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed in part, holding that the superior court judge erred in vacating any portion of the award. Remanded for entry of a judgment confirming the award in its entirety. View "Town of Athol v. Prof’l Firefighters of Athol, Local 1751, I.A.F.F." on Justia Law

For over twenty years, Plaintiff worked as a ninth grade science teacher. In 2004, Plaintiff was arrested for the purchase and possession of child pornography. In 2006, Plaintiff resigned his position. In 2007, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to eleven counts of purchasing and possessing child pornography. After his arrest but prior to his plea and sentencing, Plaintiff filed a retirement application with the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System (MTRS). Plaintiff received retirement benefits until 2009, at which time the MTRS Board concluded that Plaintiff’s pension was forfeited by operation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4) due to his convictions. The superior court vacated the decision of the Board on the basis that there was not a direct link between Plaintiff’s criminal offenses and his position as a teacher. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that forfeiture of Plaintiff’s retirement benefits under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 51(4) was not warranted because Plaintiff’s offenses neither directly involved Plaintiff’s position as a teacher nor contravened a particular law applicable to that position. View "Garney v. Mass. Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law