Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Attorney General issued four citations to Plaintiffs for failing to pay the prevailing wage to certain employees. Plaintiffs appealed the citations to the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 27C(b)(4). Kimberly Fletcher, a DALA administrative magistrate, heard Plaintiffs’ appeal but resigned before DALA issued a decision on the appeal. Shelly Taylor, the chief administrative magistrate of DALA, subsequently reviewed Fletcher’s proposed decision and took over responsibility for deciding the appeal. The DALA then issued a decision on Plaintiffs’ appeal, which affirmed the fourth citation and vacated the first three. Fletcher’s and Taylor’s rationales for vacation differed, however. The superior court affirmed the DALA decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court was correct in affirming the fourth citation; (2) the DALA chief administrative magistrate has the authority to review and approve a hearing officer’s decision in a section 27C(b)(4) appeal before a final opinion issues; and (3) under these circumstances, Taylor’s actions in completing the section 27C(b)(4) hearing and administrative decision process were appropriate. View "Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. v. Div. of Admin. Law Appeals" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were commissioners of the Bristol County Mosquito Control Project, which operates under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 252 and is subject to oversight by the State Reclamation and Mosquito Control Board. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 252, 14D they had the authority to hire and set compensation rates for the Project's employees and to retain counsel. Plaintiffs also sought an order of mandamus requiring the Treasurer and Receiver General to pay those employees salary increases. A superior court judge granted summary judgment for the Board and Treasurer. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the record was insufficient to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate in this case. Remanded. View "Comm'rs of Bristol County Mosquito Control Dist. v. State Reclamation & Mosquito Control Bd." on Justia Law

James Walsh, an electrician, became a member of the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) when he began teaching at a vocational school. Before the effective date of his retirement in 2006, Defendant applied to MTRS to increase his anticipated retirement allowance by adding to his creditable service through the buyback of three years of creditable service based on his work experience as an electrician. MTRS assessed buyback interest to commence as of 1977, the beginning of the three-year period for which Walsh sought trade service credit. Walsh appealed, claiming that buyback interest should not have begun to accrue until 1987, when he became a member of the MTRS. The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) reversed, holding (1) the regulation promulgated by MTRS was a valid exercise of MTRS's statutory authority; and (2) CRAB's failure to assess interest in accordance with 807 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05 was an error of law. View "Mass. Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants for failing to pay compensation he alleged was owed to him under an employment contract. The complaint asserted claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Wage Act. The superior court dismissed all but Plaintiff's claim under the Wage Act, concluding that the Wage Act was the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid claims, thereby preempting Plaintiff's common-law claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend the Wage Act to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages, and therefore, Plaintiff's common-law claims should not have been dismissed. Remanded. View "Lipsitt v. Plaud" on Justia Law

The City of Boston transferred a Boston police sergeant who served as a union representative due to what the City said were ongoing concerns about the officer's supervisory authority. The Boston Police Superior Officers Federation (union) sought to enforce a provision of its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City, which prohibited the involuntary transfer of certain union representatives between stations or assignments. A grievance arbitrator concluded that the City had violated the CBA and awarded the officer damages and reinstatement to his original position. The superior court confirmed the award. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for judgment vacating the award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in invalidating the officer's transfer, where assignment and transfer of officers within the Boston police department are nondelegable statutory powers of the Boston police commissioner. View "City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n" on Justia Law

Employee's wife underwent surgery for removal of a brain tumor. After her tumor returned, Employer terminated Employee's employment. Employer terminated Employee because Employer was financially responsible for Employee's wife's medical condition through its health plan. Employee sued for employment discrimination, among other claims. The superior court granted Employer's motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that Employee's claim of employment discrimination did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the theory that Employer fired Employee because his wife was handicapped was not recognized in the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court reversed with respect with regard to the employment discrimination claim, holding (1) associational discrimination based on handicap is prohibited under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(16); and (2) Employee alleged a plausible set of facts for relief in alleging that he was fired because of his association with his handicapped wife. View "Flagg v. Alimed, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of a public employee contributory retirement system, pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child. Plaintiff resigned his position of twenty-seven years upon being charged. The retirement board denied Plaintiff's application for voluntary superannuation retirement based on a finding of forfeiture due to moral turpitude. The superior court reversed, and the appeals court affirmed. The board subsequently issued a check to Plaintiff representing his superannuation retirement benefits retroactive to the date of his resignation but did not include any interest. Plaintiff sought interest on the payment. The superior court concluded that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6C applied and ordered that interest be paid on the payment at a rate of twelve percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to a twelve percent interest rate pursuant to section 6C or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6H; and (2) under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 20(5)(c)(2), where a retirement board makes a legal error in denying retirement benefits that is corrected by a court, the plaintiff is entitled to an interest rate determined by the board's actuary. View "Herrick v. Essex Reg'l Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

A union and college were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a provision that the "granting or failure to grant tenure shall be arbitrable but any award is not binding." A professor at the college, who was a member of the union, was denied tenure and submitted a grievance to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the college violated the terms of the CBA and ordered that the professor be reinstated to his position. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitrator's award. The appeals court reversed, holding that the arbitrator's award was not binding on the college pursuant to the CBA, and therefore, the judge erred in confirming that arbitrator's award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the terms of the CBA, the college and the union did not agree to binding arbitration of a tenure denial determination and therefore did not agree to binding arbitration of the grievance in this case; and (2) because the arbitrator's award was nonbinding, the union was not entitled to have the award judicially confirmed and enforced. View "Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' employment with the Department of Correction was terminated due to allegations that Plaintiffs used excessive force against an inmate. Plaintiffs appealed the termination order to the Civil Service Commission. After a single commissioner held a hearing, the Commission voted three-to-two in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered they be reinstated. The superior court reversed and remanded to the Commission with instructions that the single commissioner who conducted the hearing no longer participate in the case. After a hearing before the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) magistrate, the magistrate recommended that the Commission affirm the Department's decision to terminate Plaintiffs' employment. Only four of the five members of the Commission voted on the magistrate's recommendation, and the vote resulted in a two-to-two tie. The Commission consequently dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. The superior court judge also concluded the tie vote effectively dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal and upheld the Department's termination order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where a hearing officer recommends affirmance of the decision of an appointing authority and the Commission proceedings result in a tie vote, the initial decision of the hearing officer becomes the final decision of the Commission. View "McGuiness v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Defendant filed this action against the Massachusetts Trial Court, alleging that it violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B by not selecting Defendant for two different promotions based on her age. A jury found in Defendant's favor with respect to one of the two positions. The trial judge then denied Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but granted its motion for a new trial. Both parties appealed. The appeals court reversed the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and vacated the order allowing the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court, holding that because the judge granted the motion for a new trial, the appeal was premature, and the case should not have proceeded to an appellate court. View "Zaniboni v. Mass. Trial Court" on Justia Law