Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a workers' compensation claimant, brought suit against defendant regarding the company's conduct in referring his claim to the insurance fraud bureau (IFB), communicating with fraud investigators and prosecutors regarding his activity and claim, and using criminal processes to gain leverage in dealings with him. At issue was whether summary judgment in favor of defendant was properly denied. The court held that defendant enjoyed qualified immunity regarding its reporting of potentially fraudulent activity but that summary judgment was inappropriate because all of plaintiff's claims rely, at least in part, on conduct falling outside the scope of the immunity. The court also held that portions of plaintiff's claims could be barred by workers' compensation exclusivity under G.L.c. 152, but that not one of plaintiff's counts was barred entirely such that the Superior Court would be without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the Superior Court denying summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Richard S. Higgins filed a workers' compensation claim with the Department of Industrial Accidents ("department") after he injured his back while working for the school department of Maynard. At issue was whether employees, who were subject to examinations conducted pursuant to G.L.c. 152, section 45, were entitled to discovery and production of reports made in connection with such examinations. The court held that, in the context of the workers' compensation scheme, a report of a physician's examination of an employee procured by the employer or insurer under section 45, that was related to the employee's work-related injury, could be used by the employee to cross-examine the impartial physician, regardless of whether such a report had been admitted in evidence at a hearing or otherwise placed at issue by the employer or insurer.

This action arose when claimant, a former customer service representative for Verizon New England, Inc. ("Verizon"), was denied unemployment benefits. At issue was whether the board of review of the division of unemployed assistance ("board") erred because Verizon took the "last step" in the termination process that entitled claimant to unemployment benefits. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, which affirmed the decision of the board, to deny claimant benefits because the court agreed with the board's conclusion that the claimant did not meet her burden of showing that her decision to leave was involuntary, where she was not compelled to apply for the termination, did not believe her job was in jeopardy, and left in part for personal reasons.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a general contractor at a residential construction site, alleging claims of negligence, cross negligence and/or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct which resulted in the deaths of two employees hired by the subcontractor that was hired by defendant. At issue was whether, pursuant to G.L. c. 152, 23, a general contractor that paid workers' compensation benefits to an employee of an uninsured subcontractor, was immune from liability for common law claims the employee could have against that general contractor. The court held that the plain language of section 23 did not release a general contractor that paid workers' compensation benefits to its uninsured subcontractor's employee and that G.L. c. 152, 18 made clear that suits were not barred against general contractors that were obligated to pay workers' compensation benefits to the uninsured subcontractor's employees. Accordingly, the immunity provided under section 23 did not apply to defendant and therefore, the court vacated summary judgment in favor of defendant and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, violation of G.L. c. 93A, 11, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with contractual and business relations and defendants filed counterclaims. At issue, among others, was whether actions taken by an employer against a former employee could violate G.L. c. 151B, 4(4), and (4A), sections of the antidiscrimination law that respectively prohibited retaliation and interference with a protected right. The court held that an employer or other person could be liable to a former employee under these sections for retaliatory or interfering conduct that occurred after the employment relationship had terminated. The court also affirmed in part and reversed in part the remaining issues in case.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, 3, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, 148 and 150, when plaintiff filed an action in superior court against his former employers and their officers. At issue was whether the justice erred by denying plaintiff's second petition of relief from an order granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration as to some of plaintiff's claims and staying his remaining claims pending arbitration. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying relief where plaintiff offered several arguments that the justice's order was wrong on the merits and each of his arguments could be addressed in an appeal from a final judgment and where plaintiff had an alternative interlocutory remedy, namely, a petition for relief under G.L.c. 231, 118.

Plaintiff served as an elementary school nurse during the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years but did not acquire professional teacher status under G.L. c. 71, sections 41 and 42. Defendant sent plaintiff a notice that she would not be employed for the following 2009-2010 school year because she did not have the proper professional standards. Plaintiff sued defendant asserting that she was entitled to reemployment where defendant failed to comply with the requirements under G.L. c. 71, section 42. At issue was whether the nonrenewal of plaintiff's employment should be treated as a "dismissal" within the meaning of section 42 and subject to the protections therein. The court held that the decision not to rehire a teacher on the experience of his or her term of employment cannot be equated to dismissal of a teacher during his or her term of employment. Therefore, plaintiff was not dismissed from her position and was not entitled to safeguards under section 42.