Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The term “bodily injury” as used in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 126, 18A and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 58 is that which results in physical injury. Through these two statutes, correction officers are granted additional compensation if the employee sustains bodily injury as a result of inmate violence during the course of his or her duties. Plaintiff, a correction officer, sued the sheriff, the sheriff’s department, and the Commonwealth to obtain compensation under the statutes. Plaintiff’s symptoms were an accelerated heart rate accompanied by light-headedness and difficulty breathing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that while Plaintiff may well have sustained an injury, he failed to show that he had a bodily injury within the meaning of chapter 126, section 18A. View "Modica v. Sheriff of Suffolk County" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Secretary of the Executive Office of Administration and Finance submitted to the legislature a request for an appropriation to fund collective bargaining agreements between the Commonwealth and two public employee unions reached more than one year earlier. The Department of Labor Relations concluded that by including information about anticipated fiscal effects of a legislative decision to fund collective bargaining agreements in his request for an appropriation, the Secretary violated its Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 7(b) duty and committed a prohibited practice under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150E, 10(a)(5) by failing to bargain in good faith. The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Secretary did not violate section 7(b) or commit a prohibited practice in violation of section 10(a)(5). View "Commissioner of Administration & Finance v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

Following a series of disciplinary reprimands and suspensions for misconduct, Plaintiff was removed from her positions as an assistant clerk-magistrate of the Salem Division of the District Court Department. Plaintiff brought this action challenging her removal, arguing that the decision to remove her exceeded the clerk-magistrate’s statutory authority, was arbitrary or capricious, and violated her due process rights. The superior court upheld the removal decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that it was appropriate for the clerk-magistrate to factor in the whole of Plaintiff’s disciplinary record in terminating her, and therefore, the clerk-magistrate’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious, due process was satisfied, and Plaintiff demonstrated no deviation from the governing statute or rules. View "Perullo v. Advisory Committee on Personnel Standards" on Justia Law

For the first decade of his employment with the Boston police department, Plaintiff was a patrol officer performing the full range of patrol officer duties. The department later placed Plaintiff on administrative duty due to his loss of cognitive function and memory and his “neuropsychological problem of speed and accuracy.” The Boston Patrolmen’s Association subsequently filed a grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf demanding that he be permitted to resume the duties of a patrol officer. An arbitrator found that the Department did not act unreasonably in placing Plaintiff on administrative duty. Plaintiff filed a discrimination lawsuit against the city. The motion judge allowed the city’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because there were facts in dispute as to whether Plaintiff was a qualified handicapped person capable of performing the full duties of a patrol officer without posing an unacceptably significant risk of serious injury to himself or others. View "Gannon v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

In 2007, Thomas Finneran, former Speaker of the House, pleaded guilty in federal district court to one count of obstruction of justice. The conviction stemmed from false testimony that Finneran had provided in relation to a federal court action challenging the 2001 redistricting act. Immediately after Finneran’s conviction, the State Retirement Board ceased payments of Finneran’s pension on the ground of his conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4). The hearing officer concluded that Finneran’s crime required the forfeiture of his pension under the statute because he had “been convicted of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to his office or position.” A municipal court judge reversed, concluding that there was no direct link between Finneran’s conviction and his position as a House Member and/or Speaker. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Finneran’s conviction of obstruction of justice was a “violation of the laws applicable to his office or position” and, therefore, required the statutory forfeiture of his pension. View "State Board of Retirement v. Finneran" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the meaning and application of the stockholders’ agreement between Babcock Power Inc. and its former executive, Eric Balles. Babcock terminated Balles’ employment after discovering that he was engaged in an extramarital affair with a female subordinate. Concluding that Balles had been terminated “for cause” under the terms of his stockholders’ agreement with the company, the company’s board of directors “repurchased” Balles’ stock at a minimal price, withheld subsequent dividends, and refused to pay Balles any severance. Balles sought declaratory relief seeking that the stock be returned to him along with the withheld dividends. Balles prevailed at a jury-waived trial on his claim for declaratory relief but was unsuccessful in his request to receive severance pay. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge properly reviewed the board’s decision on a de novo basis; (2) the judge did not err in determining that Balles’ conduct did not constitute “cause” as defined in the stockholders’ agreement; and (3) Balles was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to the terms of the stockholders’ agreement. View "Balles v. Babcock Power Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an action alleging claims of Medicare or Medicaid fraud and retaliation by his employer when he spoke up about the purported fraud. A federal district court judge allowed a motion to dismiss certain federal defendants and then remanded the case to the superior court. Petitioner appealed. The appeal remained pending when, in the superior court, the remaining defendants filed motions to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion in the county court that the single justice treated as a petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction because his appeal from the remand order remained pending in the federal court and seeking a stay in the superior court. A docket entry indicated that because Petitioner’s appeal remained pending, the status conference would be continued. Thereafter, the single justice denied the petition. Petitioner then filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21 seeking a stay in the trial court. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that this case did not present a situation where extraordinary relief from this Court was required, and the single justice correctly denied relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. View "Padmanabhan v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services" on Justia Law

Christine DeFelice, a part-time employee for the Stoneham school department, sought retroactive membership in the Stoneham retirement system based on a nine-week period during which she worked over thirty hours per week. The municipal retirement board granted DeFelice retroactive membership in the retirement system for the nine-week period but denied her membership for the subsequent time during which she remained a part-time employee. The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board reversed, concluding that the board was statutorily precluded from terminating the membership of individuals who had been granted membership in a retirement system and continued working for the same municipal employer. The superior court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) a municipal retirement board does not possess absolute discretion to terminate a part-time employee’s membership in a retirement system to which that board has granted the employee membership; and (2) a “separation from [an employee’s] service” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 3(1)(a)(i) does not occur when a part-time employee working two jobs for the same municipal employer ceases to work only one of those jobs. View "Retirement Board of Stoneham v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contracted with Defendants through small corporations that Plaintiffs apparently formed for this purpose. Plaintiffs, who performed services in Massachusetts as furniture delivery drivers, brought a putative class action against Defendants under the independent contractor statute, claiming that they had been misclassified as independent contractors. The trial judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempted the independent contractor statute in its entirety. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the grant of summary judgment, holding (1) while a portion of the independent contractor statute is preempted by the FAAAA, the remainder is severable and remains applicable to Plaintiffs’ misclassification claim; and (2) summary judgment dismissing the misclassification claim is not warranted on the separately asserted basis that Plaintiffs lack standing as individuals to assert claims for misclassification under the statute. View "Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union, Local 509 (Union) brought a declaratory judgment action against the Department of Mental Health (DMH) maintaining that certain contracts DMH made with private vendors were “privatization contracts” subject to the requirements of the Pacheco Law. The Union sought a declaration invalidating the contracts because DMH did not comply with the statutory prerequisites of the Pacheco Law. The case was dismissed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case. On remand, DMH again successfully moved to dismiss the Union’s declaratory judgment action on the basis that it was moot because the initial contracts had expired and the remaining extant renewal contracts were immune from challenge by virtue of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 53. The Union appealed, asserting that because the non-compliant initial contracts were invalid under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 54, so too were any renewal contracts made pursuant to them. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, holding that the protection afforded renewal contracts by section 53 is not extended to those renewal contracts made pursuant to timely challenged and subsequently invalidated privatization contracts under section 54. View "Service Employees International Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health" on Justia Law