Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Trenea Figgs was a participant in the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Section 8 program, which was administered by the Boston Housing Authority. After the discovery by police officers of marijuana and a loaded firearm in Figgs’s apartment, the BHA notified Figgs of its intent to terminate her participation in the Section 8 program due to violations of her lease. A hearing officer concluded that termination of Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy was proper in light of her serious lease violation. The Housing Court reversed and ordered the BHA to reinstate Figgs’s Section 8 housing subsidy. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the Housing Court, holding that, notwithstanding the enactment of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32L, which decriminalized the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, the hearing officer properly concluded that Figgs violated her lease based on evidence of other criminal activity in Figgs’s rental premises, and the violation warranted Figgs’s termination from the Section 8 program. View "Figgs v. Boston Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he unsuccessfully tried to flip into an inflatable pool from a trampoline that had been set up directly adjacent to the pool in the backyard of a property he was renting from Defendants. Plaintiff filed a claim for negligence against Defendants for setting up and maintaining the trampoline next to the pool and for failing to warn him of the danger of jumping from the trampoline into the pool. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants. The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a landowner has a duty to remedy an open and obvious danger where he has created and maintained that danger with the knowledge that lawful entrants would choose to encounter it despite the obvious risk of doing so; and (2) the judge erred in instructing the jury to cease deliberations if they concluded that the danger was open and obvious, and should have further instructed the jury that a landowner is not relieved from remedying open and obvious dangers where he can or should anticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the lawful entrant notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. View "Dos Santos v. Coleta" on Justia Law

Landlord and Tenant entered into a twelve-year lease for commercial space. The lease required a separate guaranty agreement to be executed by Guarantor. Tenant stopped making rent payments a couple of years later, and thereafter, Landlord reentered and took possession of the premises, thereby terminating the lease. Landlord subsequently filed suit against Tenant and Guarantor for damages arising from the breach of contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to Landlord as to liability and awarded damages in the amount of $1,092,653, for which Tenant and Guarantor were jointly liable. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated the judgment assessing damages and remanded. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the part of the judgment finding Tenant liable for breach of the lease and assessing damages for the period before termination of the lease in the amount of $37,276 plus prejudgment interest; and (2) vacated the part of the judgment assessing damages for the period following termination of the lease and awarding attorney's fees. View "275 Washington St. Corp. v. Hudson River Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Chukwuma Azubuko for failure to pay rent. Azubuko, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Commonwealth, two cities, and a town, asserting various constitutional, statutory, and common-law claims and contending that these governmental entities were liable for paying his rent. A district court judge dismissed the third-party claims and later dismissed the underlying complaint when Plaintiff and Azubuko failed to appear. Azubuko subsequently sought mandamus relief. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied Azubuko's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the single justice correctly denied the request for mandamus relief, as Azubuko had another remedy, namely, an appeal from the final judgment of the trial court dismissing his third-party complaint. View "Azubuko v. City of Boston" on Justia Law