Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a subcontractor, filed an action to enforce a mechanic's lien on certain land. More than a year later, Defendants, acting as principal debtor and the surety, executed and recorded a surety bond to dissolve the lien pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 254, 14. The bond named Plaintiff as an obligee. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to include Defendants as defendants in the underlying complaint and to add a claim to enforce the bond against them. At issue was whether Plaintiff's amendment of its original complaint constituted timely commencement of its action to enforce a bond pursuant to section 14. The lower court found that although Plaintiff had not filed the amended complaint within ninety days of receipt of notice of the bond, service of its motion to amend on Defendants within that ninety-day period satisfied the section 14 requirement that a claimant have "commenced" a civil action within that period in order to enforce the bond. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commencement requirement in section 14 was satisfied on the facts of this case because the amendment to the complaint related back to the date on which Plaintiff filed its original action against Corporation. View "Nes Rentals v. Me. Drilling & Blasting, Inc." on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, John Irwin was convicted of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen. The appeals court later vacated Defendant's conviction and granted him a new trial, finding that the use of Irwin's prearrest silence as evidence of consciousness of guilty was a constitutionally impermissible comment on his privilege against self-incrimination. After the Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi, Irwin sought compensation for an erroneous felony conviction. A superior court judge denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss Irwin's judgment and allowed partial judgment on the pleadings, finding that Irwin was an eligible claimant under the erroneous convictions statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the doctrine of present execution, an interlocutory appeal in this case was appropriate; and (2) Irwin was not eligible to pursue his compensation claim because Irwin's conviction was not overturned on grounds tending to establish his innocence, and thus, he was not an eligible claimant under the statute. Remanded. View "Irwin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of a public employee contributory retirement system, pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child. Plaintiff resigned his position of twenty-seven years upon being charged. The retirement board denied Plaintiff's application for voluntary superannuation retirement based on a finding of forfeiture due to moral turpitude. The superior court reversed, and the appeals court affirmed. The board subsequently issued a check to Plaintiff representing his superannuation retirement benefits retroactive to the date of his resignation but did not include any interest. Plaintiff sought interest on the payment. The superior court concluded that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6C applied and ordered that interest be paid on the payment at a rate of twelve percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was not entitled to a twelve percent interest rate pursuant to section 6C or Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6H; and (2) under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 20(5)(c)(2), where a retirement board makes a legal error in denying retirement benefits that is corrected by a court, the plaintiff is entitled to an interest rate determined by the board's actuary. View "Herrick v. Essex Reg'l Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

A union and college were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a provision that the "granting or failure to grant tenure shall be arbitrable but any award is not binding." A professor at the college, who was a member of the union, was denied tenure and submitted a grievance to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the college violated the terms of the CBA and ordered that the professor be reinstated to his position. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitrator's award. The appeals court reversed, holding that the arbitrator's award was not binding on the college pursuant to the CBA, and therefore, the judge erred in confirming that arbitrator's award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the terms of the CBA, the college and the union did not agree to binding arbitration of a tenure denial determination and therefore did not agree to binding arbitration of the grievance in this case; and (2) because the arbitrator's award was nonbinding, the union was not entitled to have the award judicially confirmed and enforced. View "Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home through Lender. The monthly payment on the loan was $600 greater than Plaintiffs' total monthly income. After the mortgage was funded, it was sold and assigned to Bank. Servicer serviced the loan. After Plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action asserting violations of the Consumer Protection Act, the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, and the Borrower's Interest Act, and asserting that the loan was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. A superior court judge granted summary judgment to Defendants, Bank and Servicer, on all claims based on the ground that Defendants, as assignees, had no liability for the acts of Lender. The Supreme Court (1) reversed summary judgment in favor of Bank, holding that Bank was not shielded from liability as a matter of law by virtue of its status as an assignee and that Bank failed to establish the absence of material issues of disputed fact entitling it to judgment on any individual claim; and (2) affirmed summary judgment in favor of Servicer because Servicer was not shown to be an assignee and Plaintiffs offered no alternative basis on which Servicer might be held liable. Remanded. View "Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

While in the vicinity of a college, a campus police officer, appointed as a special State police officer pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 22C, 63, observed Defendant driving recklessly. The officer stopped Defendant's vehicle just beyond the heart of campus. Defendant was later placed under arrest and charged with operating while under the influence of alcohol, among other charges. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the campus police officer did not have the authority to stop him beyond the boundaries of the college campus. A motion judge granted the motion, concluding that the offense and stop essentially occurred off campus and that circumstances did not permit the stop to be made in the "environs surrounding the campus." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the campus police officer observed Defendant commit a criminal offense in or upon lands used by the college; (2) the traffic stop was either in or on those same lands or within the environs of the college; and (3) thus, the stop was permissible under section 63. View "Commonwealth v. Smeaton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and several firearms charges. At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded under the theory that Defendant, who did not possess the gun used in the offense, was guilty of the charged offenses as a joint venturer. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending, among other things, that his firearms convictions should be reversed because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his coventurer had not been issued a license to carry a loaded firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where a defendant is charged with a possessory firearms offense on a theory of joint venture, the defendant must raise the defense of license before trial, and Defendant in this case failed to do so; and (2) the remainder of Defendant's claims failed. View "Commonwealth v. Humphries" on Justia Law

Karla Brown brought a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank and others seeking rescission of a note and first mortgage securing that note, alleging that she was the victim of a predatory lending scheme. The mortgage was originated by Deutsche Bank's predecessor in interest in connection with the purchase of Brown's home. Deutsche Bank requested that First American Title Insurance Company defend Deutsche Bank's mortgage interest pursuant to the terms of its title insurance policy. First American refused coverage, claiming the lawsuit did not trigger its duty to defend because Brown was claiming she was misinformed as to the terms of the note rather than challenging that she granted the mortgage. Deutsche Bank subsequently brought this action seeking a judgment declaring First American had a duty to defend it in Brown's lawsuit. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of First American. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in Brown's complaint did not trigger First American's duty to defend because the complaint's claims were not specifically envisioned by the terms of the title insurance policy. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial judge erred in giving a consciousness of guilt instruction pertaining to flight where Defendant proceeded on a theory of self-defense and claimed his flight was the result of fear brought on by the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge properly acted within her discretion in giving an instruction on consciousness of guilt over Defendant's objection, where the judge instructed the jury that Defendant could not be convicted based on consciousness of guilt alone and did not use words tending to endorse as true any inference. View "Commonwealth v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Law Firm and its attorneys (collectively, Law Firm) to accomplish Plaintiff's foreclosure on a mortgage to certain property. A year after the foreclosure sale, while Law Firm was representing Plaintiff in negotiations for the sale of the foreclosed property, another law firm retained by Plaintiff sent a notice of claim to Law Firm alleging that Law Firm breached its obligations to Plaintiff by failing to inform Plaintiff of outstanding liens on the foreclosed property. After Law Firm concluded its representation of Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed an action against Law Firm, alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation. Law Firm moved for a protective order to preserve, among other things, the confidentiality of allegedly privileged communications to Law Firm's in-house counsel regarding Law Firm's reply to the notice of claim. The judge allowed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge correctly allowed Law Firm to invoke the attorney-client privilege to preserve the confidentiality of the communications. View "RFF Family P'ship v. Burns & Levinson, LLP" on Justia Law