Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police and his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress and concluding that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant made a knowing, willing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights and that his statements were otherwise voluntarily made; and (2) the motion judge did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress a witness's identification of Defendant, as Defendant failed to demonstrate a likelihood that a motion to suppress this evidence would have been successful. View "Commonwealth v. Jules" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by the City in 1983 and was discharged from his employment in 2007. At the time of his departure, Plaintiff had accrued fifty days of unused vacation time. Plaintiff was not paid for those vacation days on the day of his termination. Plaintiff filed an action alleging that the City violated the Wage Act when it failed to pay him for his accrued vacation days on the day he was terminated. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's claim, finding that although the manner of the City's payments to Plaintiff violated the express language of the Wage Act, the City nevertheless compensation Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City could not cast its payments to Plaintiff as vacation pay after the fact and that Plaintiff was entitled to recover his vacation pay in addition to costs and attorney's fees. View "Dixon v. City of Malden" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and two counts of illegal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in limiting cross-examination of the Commonwealth's principal witness; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting a police officer's testimony, which, contrary to Defendant's assertion, did not improperly vouch for the principal witness's testimony; (3) the trial judge did not err in declining to sequester the police witnesses who were involved in the investigation and who had conducted interviews of the principal witness; and (4) the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for Commonwealth witnesses or misstate evidence during his closing argument. View "Commonwealth v. Ahart" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a document in the county court entitled "Defendant-Appellant's Interlocutory Appeal on Confrontation Clause With a Known Confidential Informant - Sixth Amendment" that was not accompanied by copies of any relevant papers from the criminal case pending against Defendant in the district court. A single justice of the Supreme Court denied relief without a hearing. The full Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to meet his most basic obligations as an appellant in the full court because, among other things, his brief failed to contain adequate appellate argument, and his record appendix contained numerous items that were not before the single justice. View "Azubuko v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

When Plaintiff became the subject of a federal indictment, the school department (Defendant) suspended her without pay from her position as a school adjustment counselor. Ultimately, the indictment was dismissed. Plaintiff sought reinstatement to her position, but Defendant terminated her employment. Plaintiff filed a grievance challenging the termination, and an arbitrator ordered that she be reinstated. Plaintiff then filed an action seeking confirmation of the arbitration award and back pay for the period of her suspension an the period between her termination and reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration award but granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to Plaintiff's back pay claims. The appeals court affirmed the denial of back pay with respect to the period between Plaintiff's termination and reinstatement but reversed with respect to the period of her suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed. Remanded. View "Serrazina v. Springfield Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for aggravated rape, indecent assault and battery, and other related offenses. The charges were based on five separate incidents involving five female victims. During the pretrial proceedings, the Commonwealth provided discovery to Defendant that included records related to medical treatment that some of the alleged victims received following the incidents. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for discovery that included the request for additional medical treatment or follow up visits any victim had pertaining to the indicted offenses. The superior court allowed the motion with respect to any follow up medical visits. The Commonwealth sought relief from that order, arguing that the order was improper because it required the Commonwealth to inquire of the alleged victims whether they sought or had follow-up treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the judge was only allowing Defendant's request to the extent it required the Commonwealth to provide information in its possession. View "Commonwealth v. Castillo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. Defendant appealed, arguing error in the admission of evidence, the prosecutor's closing argument, and the judge's instructions to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not palpably err in admitting a 911 recording of the victim stating three times, "I've been stabbed"; (2) the prosecutor did not improperly attempt to evoke sympathy from the jury by playing, during his closing argument, the 911 recording; and (3) the trial court did not prejudicially err in its instructions to the jury on self-defense. View "Commonwealth v. Harris" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a dispute over property rights in a beach parcel. Two families, Plaintiffs and Defendants, owned the property upland from the beach. In 2004, Plaintiffs filed an action in the land court to quiet title, claiming they owned a fractional interest in the beach or, in the alternative, enjoyed a prescriptive easement to use it and land leading to it. Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs had no interest in the beach as it was presently located because their title interest dated to an 1841 deed that created the parcel, and the beach no longer existed as it did in 1841. The land court judge granted summary judgment for Defendants on the title claim and determined that Plaintiffs had not met their burden of establishing a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the judgment declaring that Plaintiffs did not have title interest in the beach as it currently existed since their interest was to a beach now submerged in the Atlantic Ocean; and (2) vacated the portion of the judgment relating to the prescriptive easement claim, as the judge's findings of fact were insufficient to permit appellate review of the judgment. Remanded. View "White v. Hartigan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received housing assistance through the Massachusetts rental voucher program. Plaintiff rented an apartment in Chelsea and received her voucher through the Chelsea Housing Authority. In 2009, Plaintiff received notice from the Authority that it was terminating her voucher because she did not report changes in family composition and in the family's income within thirty days of the change as required by the conditions of her voucher. After a hearing, the Authority's grievance panel upheld the termination. The Board of Commissioners affirmed, as did the superior court and appeals court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was unlawful for the Authority to proceed to the grievance panel hearing without first offering Plaintiff the opportunity to engage in settlement negotiations; (2) the regulations Plaintiff was found to have violated were impermissibly vague; and (3) the grievance panel's factual findings were insufficient. Remanded. View "Rivas v. Chelsea Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as superintendent of schools in the town of North Brookfield until 2005. Plaintiff's employment contract provided that, on his retirement, Plaintiff would be reimbursed thereafter for a percentage of his health insurance premiums on an annual basis. In 2006, Plaintiff sent a request for reimbursement for a fixed percentage of the premium costs for his health insurance policy from the date of retirement. When the town refused to honor the request Plaintiff filed this action against the school committee and the town for breach of contract and specific performance of the contract. The superior court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Defendants argued that the obligation to reimburse Plaintiff for a percentage of his health insurance costs annually for his life signaled that Plaintiff's final employment contract was a lifetime agreement that exceeded six years in duration and therefore violated Mass. Gen. Laws 71, 41. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the employment contract at issue in this case was valid and enforceable even though the reimbursement clause would presumptively exceed six years, as a contract that has expired may include enforceable obligations to be performed by the parties thereafter. View "O'Neill v. Sch. Comm. of N. Brookfield" on Justia Law