Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The court granted the probationer's application for direct appellate review to consider whether his pending appeal from the revocation of his probation was rendered moot when he subsequently pleaded guilty to the crime on which that revocation was based. Because the court concluded that the probationer's claim of error, the reliability of the hearsay evidence used against him, pertained to the judge's factual finding that he violated his probation, the appeal was moot. View "Commonwealth v. Milot" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident, entered into an executive employment contract with defendant. A forum selection clause dictated that all disputes arising out of the contract or the employment relationship were to be resolved in courts situated in Erie County, New York, defendant's principal place of business. The court concluded that a forum selection clause operated as a special contract only when three conditions were met: the employer's claim was covered by the Massachusetts Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, sections 148, 150; the court of the forum state, applying its choice-of-law principles, would choose a law other than that of Massachusetts to govern the dispute; and application of the foreign law would deprive the employee of a substantive right guaranteed by the Wage Act. Under modern choice-of-law doctrines, these conditions rarely coincided. On the facts alleged in the case, a New York court, applying New York's choice-of-law doctrine, would certainly apply the Wage Act to this dispute. Therefore, the court held that because enforcement of the forum selection clause would not deprive plaintiff of the protections of the Wage Act, dismissal of the action was affirmed. View "Melia v. Zenhire, Inc., & another." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the city after he was injured by a falling tree during a softball game on a public field owned by the city. The city appealed the denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the ground that it was immune from suit pursuant to the recreational use statute, G.L.c. 21, section 17c. The city argued that it was entitled to immediate appellate review of the denial under the doctrine of present execution. Although the court held that the doctrine did not apply in the circumstances of the case, the court nonetheless considered the merits of the city's appeal and concluded that the denial of its motion for summary judgment was appropriate. View "Marcus v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed a petition in the Superior Court for the temporary commitment of David Gangi as a sexually dangerous person. At issue were the consequences of the Commonwealth's failure to meet procedural deadlines in sexually dangerous person proceedings initiated pursuant to G.L.c. 123A, 12(b). Because, in the present action, Gangi was confined for sixteen days more than the statutory minimum, and because this delay was not justified by any extraordinary circumstances, the court concluded that the Commonwealth's petition for civil commitment must be dismissed. View "Gangi v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2006, the city enacted an ordinance that, in essence, proscribed the installation of all but one of the fire protective signaling systems approved by 780 Code Mass. Regs. 907.14.3. At issue was whether the code preempted the ordinance. The court held that, whether construing the Legislature's stated intention of ensuring uniformity in building regulations either as an explicit statement of its desire to foreclose local action, or as a statutory purpose that would be frustrated thereby, the ordinance could not stand. View "St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral of Western Massachusetts, Inc. v. Fire Dept. of Springfield & another." on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of murder in the first degree, as well as related crimes. On appeal, Defendant Facey contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder conviction as a joint venturer; both defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed on defense of another; and Defendant Norris claimed he was entitled to a jury instruction that one of the elements of possession of a firearm was the lack of a license. The court rejected defendants' arguments, affirmed defendants' convictions, and declined to exercise its power to grant relief under G.L.c. 278, section 33E. View "Commonwealth v. Norris" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the town's solicitation of bids for the construction of a new police station. Barr Inc. submitted the lowest bid but the town determined that Barr was not a "responsible and eligible bidder," and that the contract should instead be awarded to the next-lowest bidder. Under G.L.c. 149, 44A(2)(D), contracts for the construction of public buildings estimated to cost above $100,000 "shall be awarded to the lowest responsible and eligible general bidder." At issue was whether, when an awarding authority was making a determination as to bidder responsibility, it was constrained to look only at materials compiled as part of the Department of Capital Asset Management's (DCAM's) contractor certification process. The court concluded that the competitive bidding statute placed no such restriction on awarding authorities. Therefore, the court could not conclude that the town exceeded its statutory authority by conducting an investigation into Barr's performance in past projects. View "Barr Inc. v. Town of Holliston" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, aggravated burglary, and armed assault in a dwelling. Defendant subsequently sought to vacate the conviction of armed assault in a dwelling on the ground that it was duplicative of the conviction of aggravated burglary. The court concluded that defendant was entitled to challenge whether two of the convictions arising from his guilty plea were barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy, but that his challenge failed because the convictions of armed assault in a dwelling and aggravated burglary were not duplicative. Accordingly, the denial of defendant's motion to vacate his conviction was affirmed. View "Commonwealth v. Negron" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct and acquitted of assault as a result of a verbal altercation with her boyfriend. Defendant received two years of straight probation, with conditions, and subsequently appealed from her conviction. At issue was whether the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, which became effective after defendant had engaged in disorderly conduct but before the time of her trial, and which changed the punishment for a first offense, constituted a repeal of the prior version of that statute but, pursuant to G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, did not affect the punishment incurred before the repeal took affect. Rejecting defendant's arguments, the court held that it saw no clearly expressed intention by the Legislature to have the 2009 amendment to G.L.c. 272, section 53, apply retroactively. The fact that a defendant who committed the offense of disorderly conduct before July 1, 2009, was not entitled to the benefit of the 2009 amendment may be, in defendant's view, an unfair consequence of G.L.c. 4, section 6, Second, but it did not rise to the level of repugnancy. View "Commonwealth v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth sought relief from an order of a Superior Court judge unsealing affidavits underlying seven search warrants executed against plaintiffs during the course of a Statewide investigation into online gambling conducted at internet cafes. While the court agreed with the Commonwealth that plaintiffs did not have a Fourth Amendment right per se to access such materials, the court nonetheless concluded that interests protected by the Fourth Amendment were properly considered under the "good cause" standard for impounding judicial records and that the judge did not abuse his discretion or commit any other error of law in weighing those interests in this case. As the court saw no merit in the Commonwealth's remaining arguments, the court affirmed the judgment. View "New England Internet Cafe, LLC & others v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County & another" on Justia Law