Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from a superior court judge's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging violations of her state civil rights. Plaintiff contended that she had a right, secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and by art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, to attend a lecture that was open to the public, held on the campus of Tufts and that defendants violated the act when they excluded her from the lecture. Tufts, through its office of continuing education, presented a publicly advertised lecture on its campus entitled, "Dangers of Feeding Your Pet a Raw Diet." Plaintiff, who was an advocate of raw food diets for animals, sought to attend the lecture. At the time, she had not paid her bill for services rendered to her horse and defendants informed plaintiff that she was ineligible for continuing education services at Tufts. The court concluded that the circumstances of plaintiff's exclusion from the lecture did not amount to an interference with any claimed free speech right, and thus that the allowance of summary judgment on this claim was proper. The court also concluded that the allowance of summary judgment for defendants' on plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence was correct. View "Roman v. Trustees of Turfts College & others." on Justia Law

The Foggs challenged the issuance of a building permit to 81 Spooner Road, LLC (developer), by the building commissioner for the town of Brookline. At issue was whether a judge in the Land Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Fogg and his mother, on the issue of their standing as "aggrieved" persons under G.L.c. 40A, section 17. The court concluded that the developer failed to rebut the Foggs' presumption of standing. Because the Foggs were deemed to have standing, the judge properly eliminated that issue from the ensuring trial on the merits of the parties' complaints seeking judicial review of the board's decision to rescind the building permit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "81 Spooner Road, LLC vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline & others (and a companion case )" on Justia Law

An insurer appealed from a decision related to an employee's injury in a metal rolling machine accident. The court concluded that the board was not arbitrary or capricious in deciding that there was insufficient evidence to find that the employee was entitled under G.L.c. 152, section 51 to compensation based on an amount greater than his average weekly wage. But the court concluded that the board erred in finding that the employee's compensation should be based on the average weekly wage he earned when injured in 1980 rather than the out-of-state average weekly wage he earned when that injury recurred in 2003. The court also affirmed the board's decision to vacate the denial of recoupment for the insurer's overpayment of temporary total disability benefits between 1985 and 1988, but noted that, should the insurer decide to renew its claim for recoupment in a separate complaint filed with the department, its claim could prevail only if recoupment was equitable in the circumstances. View "Scott Wadsworth's Case" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for trafficking in cocaine. On the second day of trial, defense counsel discovered that the Commonwealth had violated a discovery order by failing to copy for the defense at least 500 pages of computer-generated information obtained during the police investigation. Defendant moved to dismiss the case but, for financial and emotional reasons, objected to any declaration of a mistrial. Finding that the Commonwealth had not intentionally violated the order, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. The judge further found that the newly disclosed materials contained information that any "reasonably diligent" defense counsel would want to review, and that to do so would take longer than a mere "brief delay." Therefore, the judge declared a mistrial over the defendant's objection. The court held that, based upon the facts of the case, the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that there was "manifest necessity" for a mistrial. There was no double jeopardy bar and defendant could be retried. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the county court for an entry of judgment denying the petition. View "Cruz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The court considered three petitions for relief under G.L.c. 211, section 3, that related to the OpenCourt pilot project, which broadcasts live by "streaming" over the Internet video and audio recordings of certain proceedings taking place in the Quincy District Court. Each petition challenged one or more orders of a judge in the Quincy District Court concerning the broadcasts and online posting of particular proceedings in two different criminal cases. The court concluded that any order restricting OpenCourt's ability to publish -- by "streaming live" over the Internet, publicly archiving on the Web site or otherwise -- existing audio and video recordings of court room proceedings represented a form of prior restraint on the freedoms of the press and speech protected by the First Amendment and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. Such an order could be upheld only if it was the least restrictive, reasonable measure necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest. In the Barnes case, the court vacated the order of the district court judge requiring the redaction of the minor alleged victim. In the Diorio case, the court concluded that Diorio had not met the heavy burden of justifying an order of prior restraint with respect to the specific proceedings at issue in his petition for relief. The court requested the Supreme Judicial Court's judiciary-media committee submit a set of guidelines of the operation of the OpenCourt project. View "Commonwealth v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of charges related to an armed robbery and appealed. The court concluded that the motion judge did not err in denying the motion to suppress, but that the trial judge erred in allowing the youthful offender adjudication of carjacking to be used as a predicate offense in finding defendant an armed career criminal, level three, under G.L.c. 269, section 10G(c). The court also concluded that defendant's convictions of assault by means of a dangerous weapon and armed robbery while masked were not duplicative, but that defendant's conviction of the unlawful possession of ammunition must be vacated where defendant had been convicted of carrying a loaded firearm. View "Commonwealth v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction of larceny of property over $250 by false pretenses. Defendant's principal argument on appeal was that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain his conviction. The court agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient and held, inter alia, that the evidence did not furnish a sufficient basis for concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly made a false statement about the imminent sale of the property at issue either at the time the loan was agreed to or at the time the loan funds were disbursed. View "Commonwealth v. McCauliff" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, the court construed the payment obligations of municipalities participating in G.L.c. 41, section 108L, (Quinn Bill), a local statute establishing a career incentive pay program for police officers. The underlying case arose when the Commonwealth, facing budgetary constraints, substantially cut reimbursements. Plaintiffs subsequently contended that clauses in the collective bargaining agreements (CBA) impermissibly conflict with the statute, which they viewed as requiring the city to pay 100% of benefits irrespective of reimbursement. The court held that the CBAs did not conflict with the statute and were valid. Section 108L required only that municipalities pay one-half the amounts specified in the payment provision, plus any amount actually received from the Commonwealth. Municipalities could agree to pay more, but the statute did not require it. Therefore, the cases were remanded to the county court, where the single justice was directed to issue a declaration stating that, with respect to section 108L, the CBAs between the city and the various police unions were valid and enforceable. View "Adams v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, as well as assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. On appeal defendant argued that the judge failed to conduct an appropriate voir dire of the prospective jurors during jury selection; his statement to police following his arrest on the day of the killing should have been suppressed; the judge erred in admitting a statement he made to another inmate; the prosecutor's closing argument was improper and created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice; and the judge erred when he instructed the jury that they must consider whether defendant "as a result of a mental illness, lacked the capacity to have the intent, knowledge, or state of mind necessary" to prove the crimes charged. The court addressed each issue and affirmed the convictions. After a complete review of the record, the court declined to exercise its authority under G.L.c. 278, section 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Bishop" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of failing to verify his sex offender registration information by refusing to provide certain secondary addresses, and was sentenced to lifetime parole. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the judge erred in denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty. Because the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to convict defendant, the court reversed. In light of this conclusion, the other issues defendant raised were moot. However, because there appeared to be some confusion concerning whether the complaint properly alleged that defendant could face lifetime parole, the court addressed it briefly. The court concluded that the complaint issued against defendant in this case did not meet requirements of art. 12. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed. View "Commonwealth v. Kateley" on Justia Law