Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On August 20, 2009, Defendant was charged with possession of a class B substance with intent to distribute and committing this violation within 1,000 feet of a preschool facility in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32J. While Defendant's case was pending, on August 2, 2012, the Governor signed into law a crime bill that amended chapter 94C section 32J by reducing the radius of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet. Thereafter, Defendant moved to dismiss his school zone violation, alleging that the crime bill applied to all cases alleging a school zone violation that had not been adjudicated before August 2, 2012. The trial judge denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the judge's order, holding that the portion of the crime bill reducing the radius of the school zone applies to all cases alleging a school zone violation for which a guilty plea had not been accepted or conviction entered as of August 2, 2012, regardless whether the alleged violation was committed before that date. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Pagan" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his license had been suspended for operating while under the influence of alcohol (OUI). The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the admission of certain documents from the registry of motor vehicles without live testimony from a registry employee violated Defendant's confrontation rights to the extent that the registry documents included an attestation of notice, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Defendant violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, 23, third par, which governs operating a motor vehicle after suspension of a license on the basis of an OUI, and therefore, the judge erred in imposing a sixty-day sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Lee" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute and committing this violation within 1,000 feet of a preschool facility in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32J. While Defendant's case was pending, on August 2, 2012, the Governor signed into law a crime bill that amended chapter 94C section 32J by reducing the radius of the school zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet. Defendant moved to dismiss the school zone violation, claiming that the crime bill applied to all cases alleging a school zone violation that had not been adjudicated before August 2, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the portion of the crime bill that reduces the radius of the Drug-Free School Zone from 1,000 feet to 300 feet applied to all cases alleging a school zone violation for which a guilty plea had not been accepted or conviction entered as of August 2, 2012, regardless of whether the alleged violation was committed before August 2, 2012. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bradley" on Justia Law

In 1996, Defendant pled guilty to various offenses, including uttering a false instrument, larceny, and receiving stolen property. Fifteen years later, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, contending that the plea judge did not conduct a sufficient colloquy regarding his rights to a trial by jury. The plea judge that accepted Defendant's guilty pleas allowed Defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas after declining to apply a presumption of regularity to the proceeding because the judge lacked confidence that his plea colloquy had been adequate. The Supreme Court vacated the judge's order, holding that the judge's belief that certain plea colloquies he conducted over a period of years may have been inadequate was insufficient to dispel the presumption of regularity or to support the withdrawal of Defendant's pleas. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Cartagena" on Justia Law

After a police officer stopped Defendant's vehicle and conducted two field sobriety tests, the officer arrested Defendant. Defendant pleaded guilty to several alcohol-related driving offenses. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of additional alcohol-related driving offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding (1) the trial judge erred in admitting the officer's opinion that Defendant's "ability to drive was diminished" by his consumption of alcohol, but the error was harmless; (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting the officer's opinion that Defendant was "probably impaired"; and (3) where the indictment charging Defendant identified the statute that Defendant allegedly violated but failed to allege an essential element of proof in describing the offense, due process did not require vacating the Defendant's conviction arising from his guilty plea where he had fair notice of the crime charged and failed to show that he did not understand that he was pleading guilty to the crime. View "Commonwealth v. Canty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs here were commissioners of the Bristol County Mosquito Control Project, which operates under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 252 and is subject to oversight by the State Reclamation and Mosquito Control Board. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 252, 14D they had the authority to hire and set compensation rates for the Project's employees and to retain counsel. Plaintiffs also sought an order of mandamus requiring the Treasurer and Receiver General to pay those employees salary increases. A superior court judge granted summary judgment for the Board and Treasurer. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the record was insufficient to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate in this case. Remanded. View "Comm'rs of Bristol County Mosquito Control Dist. v. State Reclamation & Mosquito Control Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped and subsequently arrested at a sobriety checkpoint conducted by the state police. Thereafter, Defendant was charged with operating under the influence of alcohol, third offense. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence related to his arrest, arguing that the officer who made the initial stop of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint - the screening officer - failed to comply with the applicable guidelines for that checkpoint. The district court judge allowed the motion. On appeal, the parties agreed that the judge based his decision to allow the motion to suppress on an erroneous finding of fact. The point of dispute was whether the screening officer had the authority to question Defendant before directing him to a secondary screening area. The Supreme Court vacated the order allowing the motion to suppress, holding that a factual finding must be made as to whether the officer's questions were proper or improper according to the guidelines applicable to the particular sobriety checkpoint at which Defendant was stopped. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Gray" on Justia Law

Leo Lawless, who held a license to practice pharmacy in the Commonwealth, had his license revoked by the Board of Registration in Pharmacy for a minimum of two years. Lawless failed to appear at an adjudicatory hearing, and the board entered an order by default. The board also imposed conditions on reinstatement. The Supreme Court affirmed the board's decision, holding (1) Lawless failed to demonstrate that the Board's decision to dispose of the adjudicatory hearing proceeding by default was improper; and (2) the board did not abuse its discretion in deciding to revoke Lawless's license as the appropriate sanction in this case. View "Lawless v. Bd. of Registration in Pharmacy" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for armed robbery and being a habitual offender. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the admission of his prearraignment statements that were made more than six hours after his arrest. A superior court judge allowed Defendant's motion to suppress after citing Commonwealth v. Rosario, which establishes a rule that a statement made by a person under arrest, if made beyond six hours after the arrest, will be inadmissible in evidence absent a valid waiver of the person's right to timely presentment to a court for arraignment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the six-hour rule set out in Rosario applied to all of Defendant's statements at issue here because the statements were the product of police questioning to which the Rosario rule applied. View "Commonwealth v. Fortunato" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of a Class B controlled substance, cocaine. During trial, a ballistics certificate and two certificates of drug analysis were admitted into evidence without testimony from the analysts who had prepared them. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the certificates were admitted without a showing of the unavailability of the analysts or a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. The appeals court affirmed the firearms conviction but reversed the drug conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, holding that the improper admission of the certificates at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Defendant conceded that he possessed both the gun and cocaine and agreed that the jury be instructed that the Commonwealth had proven all elements of both charges beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Commonwealth v. Ramsey" on Justia Law