Justia Massachusetts Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, who admitted shooting his wife, but claimed “heat of passion,” was convicted of murder in the first degree with deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument based on failure to exclude a juror based on the juror's dual citizenship. The court properly admitted statements made by the victim, concerning marital trouble, as proof of the defendant's motive because he was made aware of the victim’s state of mind. Testimony by a friend that the victim had called her, "scared" and crying, and said that “she thought he was going to hit her" was properly admitted as an excited utterance. Admission of autopsy photographs was not unduly prejudicial. Admission of evidence concerning defendant's viewing of pornographic Web sites and of electronic communications describing sexual practices did not constitute impermissible character evidence of the defendant as an aggressor. Introduction of defendant’s firearms, with evidence of his training and certification as a firearms instructor was relevant to whether the murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The prosecutor’s comments that the victim's disclosure of infidelity was not the sort of provocation that would cause a reasonable adult male to lose his capacity for self-restraint because there were other options, properly made the distinction between a killing committed with "heat of passion" and one committed with premeditation; the jury instruction on “heat of passion” was appropriate.View "Commonwealth v. Tassinari" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the premeditated murder of his mother. Six years later, he sought a new trial, alleging that he had not been competent to stand trial. Defendant submitted an affidavit from a forensic psychologist, indicating "long standing mental disease … schizoaffective disorder with prominent paranoid delusions.” A neuropsychologist administered tests and submitted an affidavit indicating that the defendant has demonstrated symptoms of a delusional disorder since childhood and that he functions intellectually in the low average to borderline retarded range. Trial counsel stated that he had not pursued a competency defense because the defendant denied committing the murder. The Commonwealth did not present evidence. During a hearing, the defendant shouted “racist bitch” at the judge, who had also been the trial judge. The judge ordered a competency evaluation. The court’s forensic psychologist reported that the defendant presented a "complicated diagnostic picture" and was likely incompetent in a complex proceeding such as an evidentiary hearing; she recommended medications, noting that defendant had previously benefited from psychopharmacological intervention. The defendant began taking prescribed medication. His condition improved. The court denied a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Court vacated, finding that the defendant made an adequate showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Chatman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sexual offenses. Before Defendant completed his sentences, the Commonwealth filed a petition to commit him as a sexually dangerous person. A superior court judge granted Defendant's motion to have his counsel be present during interviews conducted by qualified examiners. One of the two examiners refused to conduct the interview with counsel in the room and submitted to the court her report based on her review of Defendant's records. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Commonwealth's petition, claiming that the examiner's report was not based on an "examination" pursuant to Mass. Gen. Law. ch. 123A, 13(a). The superior court granted the motion, concluding that dismissal was required. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, dismissal of the Commonwealth's petition was not warranted where one of the qualified examiners personally interviewed Defendant as part of his examination and filed with the court a report expressing his opinion that Defendant was a sexually dangerous person. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Felt" on Justia Law

James Walsh, an electrician, became a member of the Massachusetts Teachers' Retirement System (MTRS) when he began teaching at a vocational school. Before the effective date of his retirement in 2006, Defendant applied to MTRS to increase his anticipated retirement allowance by adding to his creditable service through the buyback of three years of creditable service based on his work experience as an electrician. MTRS assessed buyback interest to commence as of 1977, the beginning of the three-year period for which Walsh sought trade service credit. Walsh appealed, claiming that buyback interest should not have begun to accrue until 1987, when he became a member of the MTRS. The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board (CRAB) reversed, holding (1) the regulation promulgated by MTRS was a valid exercise of MTRS's statutory authority; and (2) CRAB's failure to assess interest in accordance with 807 Mass. Code Regs. 14.05 was an error of law. View "Mass. Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

A grand jury returned twenty-two indictments against Defendant, including indictments charging murder in the first degree and various counts of masked armed robbery. The charges arose out of a robbery of a department store perpetrated by Domenic Cinelli. The Commonwealth proceeded against Defendant as a joint venturer and coconspirator. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss (1) indictments relating to Cinelli's escape-related offenses as not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the portion of the murder indictment that included any theory of murder other than felony-murder. The motion judge dismissed the challenged indictments and the portion of the murder indictment that included theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the grant of Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments that charged Defendant with the assault and battery and firearm crimes perpetrated by Cinelli during his escape, holding (i) Defendant may be liable for Cinelli's escape-related crimes where the Commonwealth proves that he participated in, and intended, such crimes; and (2) reversed the grant of Defendant's motion to dismiss the prevented the Commonwealth from proceeding at trial on all three theories of murder, holding that sufficient evidence supported the indictment. View "Commonwealth v. Hanright" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant was indicted for distributing cocaine and for being a second or subsequent offender in violation of section Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(d). In 2012, before Defendant's trial had commenced, the Legislature enacted the Crime Bill, which amended the enhanced penalty provision of section 32A(d) by reducing the mandatory minimum sentence. Twenty days later, Defendant was found guilty. The judge imposed a mandatory minimum prison sentence as permitted by the Crime Bill. The Commonwealth requested that the judge correct the sentence so as to comply with the sentencing provisions as they existed on the date Defendant committed the offense. The judge denied the request, concluding that the Crime Bill made the sentencing reductions applicable to persons sentenced after the effective date of the new act even if the offense was committed before the effective date of the act. The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth's petition for relief, holding that to interpret the statute amending the mandatory minimum sentence in section 32A(d) not to apply to Defendant would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature. View "Commonwealth v. Galvin" on Justia Law

Karl McGhee, a financial advisor at LPL Financial, acted as financial planner for Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint against McGhee and LPL, asserting claims for, inter alia, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Defendants moved for an order compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration due to an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that none of Plaintiff's claims could be compelled to arbitration because claimants under chapter 93A, section 9 are not required to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) claims alleging an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of chapter 93A, section 9 must be referred to arbitration where the contract involves interstate commerce and the agreement is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); and (2) because Plaintiff and Defendants in this case entered into a valid contract whereby they agreed to settle all controversies related to Plaintiff's financial account by arbitration, and because the arbitration agreement was governed by the FAA, Defendants as a matter of law were entitled under the FAA to a stay of judicial proceedings and an order compelling arbitration. Remanded. View "McInnes v. LPL Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants for failing to pay compensation he alleged was owed to him under an employment contract. The complaint asserted claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Wage Act. The superior court dismissed all but Plaintiff's claim under the Wage Act, concluding that the Wage Act was the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid claims, thereby preempting Plaintiff's common-law claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not intend the Wage Act to be the exclusive remedy for the recovery of unpaid wages, and therefore, Plaintiff's common-law claims should not have been dismissed. Remanded. View "Lipsitt v. Plaud" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to police, as (i) Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, (ii) Defendant's statements were voluntarily made, and (iii) Defendant was not intentionally deprived of his statutory right to make a telephone call until he was booked; and (2) the judge slightly erred in instructing the jury on murder in the first degree committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, but the error did not prejudice Defendant. View "Commonwealth v. Walker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four charges of possession of firearms and ammunition. At issue on appeal was which two of four convictions must be vacated because they were duplicative. Defendant argued that the two convictions on lesser included offenses should be vacated even though they carried higher penalties, and the Commonwealth argued that the convictions carrying lesser penalties should be vacated. The Supreme Court (1) vacated two of the convictions and sentences as duplicative and remanded for a judge to decide which conviction in each set of paired convictions should be vacated; and (2) affirmed Defendant's motions to suppress and for a mistrial, holding (i) the vehicle stop during which the firearm was seized was lawful, and (ii) testimony given at trial indicating that the police were conducting narcotics surveillance when an officer observed Defendant with a gun was not prejudicial. View "Commonwealth v. Rivas" on Justia Law